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ABSTRACT
The Florida Borderlands from 1765 to 1837 was a fluid space in which established
colonial and Indigenous social, political, and economic systems were in dialogue with emerging
discourses associated with the market economy, nationalism, and race. Utilizing British,
Spanish, and United States government documents, diplomatic correspondence, and slave claims,
this work traces the racialization of diverse Indigenous and African populations. Older colonial
powers and nascent nation states sought to create political and social space between individuals
within these categories in an effort to better control their labor, movement, and economic status.
Consequently, Seminoles and Africans resisted and adapted, depending on the situation, to these
new forms of colonialism, especially during the U.S-Seminole Wars.
This study’s chronological scope facilitates a greater focus on the continuity of processes
such as racialization and identity formation between the British, second Spanish Florida, and
U.S. territorial eras, roughly from the 1760s to the 1830s. Historians tend to compartmentalize
these respective colonial projects as they pertain to Indigenous and African peoples.
Additionally, runaway African slaves are viewed as simply members of the African Diaspora and
separate from their Seminole neighbors despite their multifaceted relationship. This reinforces
racial categories and de-emphasizes the fluid sociocultural boundaries that these groups crossed.
A transnational borderlands framework interweaves the history of these groups and reveals their
impact and influence upon each other. Since Florida was located within the larger Southeastern
Borderlands and Atlantic World, it was affected by early nationalist discourse, the burgeoning
international market economy, and the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
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INTRODUCTION

Few events of the early nineteenth century Florida Borderlands best exemplify the
complex interplay of colonialism, racialization, and the power of the nation-state as the
destruction of the “Negro Fort.”1 On April 7, 1815, the Surveyor General of Spanish West
Florida, Vicente Sebastián Pintado, had been anchored off the coast near the entrance to the
Apalachicola River. Disembarking from his ship he was greeted by the British Captain Robert
Spencer and taken to Prospect Bluff. There he met Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nicholls of the
Royal Marines, who had recently returned from Mobile and the final battles in the southern
theater of the War of 1812. Pintado surveyed the area and noted that 250 Africans hailing from
respective United States, Spanish, and Indigenous settlements, as well as a number of native
peoples, resided there.2 He gathered information on the fortification and British plans to
evacuate the region. He learned that they planned to relocate a segment of the Black population
from West Florida while transferring the fully armed fort to Africans remaining in Apalachicola.
When Pintado toured the grounds he spoke to a group of Indigenous headmen in the midst of a
conference. Although Lower Creek and Seminole leaders bestowed the usual diplomatic
courtesies, they instructed him to leave since they planned to resist an imposition of Spanish
authority once the British retreated. While he heeded their advice, Pintado was still able to
chronicle his visit for Spanish authorities eager to learn of British, Indigenous, and African
activities in the area.
Pintado’s accounts are invaluable for the insight they provide on the inhabitants of the
“Negro Fort.” However, his perspective simultaneously questions the standard narrative of
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Spanish Florida. Pintado arrived at Prospect Bluff not simply to accumulate intelligence but to
seize Pensacola owners’ slaves, many of whom had escaped from their masters when the British
occupied the Spanish settlement. Eventually the base attracted other runaway slaves and free
Africans seeking protection in its hinterlands. This development deeply troubled Pintado. He
feared the military empowerment of former Spanish slaves, especially since the imminent British
evacuation meant the outpost was essentially free of European supervision. However, the
meaning of Pintado’s mission has been lost in light of the subsequent 1816 U.S. destruction of
the “Negro Fort.”
The event is usually conceptualized as one strand in the larger U.S. effort to enforce
hardening racial attitudes emanating from the South.3 Borderlands scholars have generally
argued that Spanish colonialism in Florida was responsible for creating a sanctuary for African
slaves escaping chattel slavery.4 However, Spanish acquiescence in the reduction of the fort
undermined their contribution to a “middle ground” for non-European groups against other
colonial powers. Eventual U.S. dismantling of Prospect Bluff ended a dangerous symbol of
African autonomy and served as an indicator of the broader realities of a borderlands society.
When confronted with aspects of Pintado’s mission, historical narratives positing a
racially fluid and accommodating Spanish Florida diametrically opposed to a racially rigid
hierarchical U.S. must be problematized. In his letters to British military officials, the Spanish
surveyor was perturbed not only with the loss of property, the Pensacola slaves, but also with
British plans to leave a number of Africans, Seminoles, and Creeks, in charge of a fort stocked
with weapons and ammunition. His views, not dissimilar to those held by American officials,
saw the outpost as a threat to order and stability. U.S. leaders such as Andrew Jackson issued
2

statements that the continuing presence of the installation meant suffering the designs of
“banditti,” pirates, slaves, savages, and others comprising the lowest levels of society.5 Pintado
was equally adamant about the insidious nature of an African and Indigenous stronghold that
would become a “Republic of Bandits that will trouble the Spanish monarch’s dominions in this
part of the globe and will bring other disastrous consequences which should be stopped before
they occur.”6 In an April 2, 1815 letter, the surveyor general took an increasingly aggressive
tone with Captain Spencer accusing the British of failing to uphold their promises to return
fugitive slaves.7 Acting as an official Spanish agent Pintado expressed his concern over the
fort’s continuing existence. Writing a few weeks later, he asserted that Prospect Bluff could
potentially attract “evil persons” assisted by the “Negros” and form a pirate haven that will
endanger not only the province but also the entire Gulf of Mexico.8 His efforts frustrated,
Pintado found the reclaiming of the Pensacola slaves an impossible task because they refused to
return to Spanish masters despite the precariousness of their situation.
While Pintado’s account of the “Negro Fort” is well known, his objective of seizing
fugitive slaves is often overlooked or dismissed as insignificant in light of the larger narrative of
the Florida Borderlands. His mission is both symbolic and representative of the racialization of
African and Indigenous peoples, in other words, the construction of racial categories, which
inform sociopolitical hierarchies, based on supposed biological difference and that began
supplanting cultural markers of identity such as religion. Although these processes were shaping
European and American attitudes towards Indigenous and African peoples, the meaning of these
racial categories remained contested and evolved over time.
Racialization was already discernable from the British Florida period and continued
3

through U.S. annexation when the full force of rigid racial ideologies had cast peoples in the
borderlands as “red, black, and white.” This slow shift in racial discourse was largely due to
policies that supported a plantation export economy based on African slavery and an emphasis
on Indigenous alliances and trade. The Second Spanish Florida period, 1784-1821, witnessed
integration into the Atlantic World economy through the British trading firm Panton, Leslie, and
Company; the abandonment of any pretense to sociocultural acculturation of Indigenous people;
and the discourse of slaves as property. Florida’s location within the Greater Caribbean, the U.S.
South, and the Atlantic World meant that while the territory was peripheral to colonial centers of
powers, it remained simultaneously accessible to the movement of people, ideas, capital, and
goods.
The late eighteenth through the first half of the nineteenth century saw hardening racial
categories, nationalism, and market capitalism gain ascendancy and create deeper divisions
within the different cultures and peoples of the Florida borderlands. Within the Atlantic World,
trade links interconnected Europe, Africa, and the Americas while simultaneously nationalist
ideology and racial discourse slowly gained currency. During the first Spanish Florida period,
the province was clearly a sanctuary for African slaves. Liberal Spanish colonial policies offered
Africans agency and sociopolitical space within their society due to an inclusive legal system and
possible conversion to Catholicism.9 Spain’s return to Florida in 1784 occurred under different
circumstances that forced modifications to the colonial project. During the British regime,
Lower Creek groups settled in Florida and staked claims of political autonomy. African slaves
from the U.S. and Spanish territories were also living among the Seminoles and both groups
sought their sociopolitical independence while their identities remained fluid in light of the
4

shifting relationships of the Florida Borderlands. Indigenous peoples and Africans inhabited a
“middle ground” and participated in a transcultural process with groups such as colonial
officials, traders, and planters.10 Depending on the situation, Africans could be manumitted by
their Spanish masters while Spanish governors simultaneously issued edicts restricting the rights
of both free and enslaved Blacks.11 No unified and consistent meaning of race characterized the
Second Spanish Florida period: rather race reflected and manifested itself in myriad ways
depending on the context and situation. Some scholars argue that ideas concerning biological
racial difference and the categorization of peoples into separate groups only began after 1821.
Importantly, this study seeks to illustrate that a measure of continuity, especially in terms of
racial discourse, existed throughout British controlled Florida, the Second Spanish Florida
period, and U.S. annexation of the territory. These points place this dissertation in productive
debate with much of the literature on the era and region.
U.S. efforts to draw clear racial lines and enforce its political and social order were
eventually successful due to its ability to project military and economic power, this being the
crucial distinction between the U.S. and earlier colonial powers in Florida. For instance, Pintado
echoed U.S. sentiments about the dangers of the “Negro Fort,” but the Spanish were in no
position to dismantle the stronghold. Instead they appealed to British “principles” and respect of
“law.” In contrast Andrew Jackson simply resorted to military force with minimum regard for
international legal conventions during the 1816 intervention. Nonetheless, the Seminoles and
Black Seminoles still mustered stiff resistance to removal, and in the case of the Black
Seminoles, they fought against re-enslavement as well. Although a growing chorus of southern
slaveholders called for the removal of the Seminoles, U.S. officials recognized their own military
5

limitations and obligations with Indigenous peoples, thus producing the 1823 Treaty of Moultrie
Creek which stipulated that the U.S. would create a reservation for the Seminole in central
Florida. U.S. authorities, including the Seminole Indian agency and Indian superintendent,
attempted to spatially restrict the Seminoles and control their finances through the annual
annuity. Despite the pressure, the Seminoles resisted confinement and also opposed slave claims
made on the Black Seminoles. Coupled with the desire to completely remove the Seminoles
because of “depredations,” their relationship with the Black Seminoles, and acquisition of further
land, U.S. officials exerted pressure for a removal treaty. Seminoles and Black Seminoles
launched an effective guerrilla campaign but eventually relocated to Indian Territory.12 The
complex and diverse arrangement between Africans and Seminoles is illustrated through Spanish
and U.S documents. Relationships ranged from kinship, political and diplomatic alliances, and a
form of Indigenous slavery distinct from chattel slavery. Nonetheless, U.S. policies sought to
separate and create space between both groups in order to divide and break their resistance to
facilitate removal and control over territory.
Examining the turn of the nineteenth century provides a perspective that is conducive for
thematic discussions of identity, race, colonialism, and the nation-state. Until forced removal in
the 1830s and 40s, the region largely remained a middle ground for Indigenous peoples,
Africans, and Euro-Americans. In the interior of East Florida the Seminoles carved out space to
establish their own political autonomy. Considered subsidiaries of the Lower Creek, the
Seminoles slowly established their distinct social identity from former leaders that had claimed
jurisdiction over them. Free and enslaved Africans lived among the Seminoles and
anthropologist Terrance M. Weik argues that the Black Seminoles experienced ethnogenesis, the
6

“creation, change, and fissioning of distinct sociocultural groups from culture contact
situations.”13 African, Indigenous, and Euro-American identity formation did not occur in a
vacuum but was shaped by a sociopolitical milieu consisting of respective groups’ dialogue,
negotiation, and adaptation to each other and with the region’s dynamic processes.
A complex interplay existed between more established Indigenous and European
economic, social, and political systems with emerging sociopolitical structures. Specifically, this
entailed the interaction between decentralized political groups, economies based on reciprocity,
and fluid sociocultural identities encountering and negotiating with centralized political entities,
plantation export economies, and clearly delineated racial hierarchies. Gradually materializing
out of these exchanges, Seminoles and Africans were racialized into “Indians” and “Blacks,” an
ongoing process beginning with the 1764 British Florida occupation. Eventually new racial
designations displaced other markers of identity not based upon biological difference. As a
consequence of the 1835 Second U.S.-Seminole War the U.S. sought to restrict Indigenous and
African peoples’ sociopolitical mobility by placing them within separate and rigidly defined
racial groups. Initially they sought to undermine joint African-Indigenous resistance but this
later served to maintain U.S. racial order. Ultimately, this study seeks to contribute to the project
of interrogating “how and why . . . ethno-racial categories and boundaries developed historically
in the way they did, and to examine their evolving meanings.”14

Historiography
Several factors make this study primarily a Borderlands History, rather than solely a work
of American Indian, African, Southern, Colonial or Florida History. It follows a chronology that
7

attends to transnational events and issues, analyzes a geopolitical situation that lacked the
presence of a dominant political entity until the 1830s, and incorporates malleable physical and
metaphorical boundaries between peoples and cultures. Indigenous peoples were the arbiters of
power in the Florida Borderlands, even as they recognized their own difference and diversity.
However, Seminole, Mikasuki, Apalachicola, and Lower Creek rivalries mitigated native groups’
military and political potency and allowed European nations to remain relevant in the region’s
power dynamics. African and Indigenous peoples’ agency and resistance has been emphasized
by recent scholarship. This work seeks to compliment this perspective with an understanding of
how colonialism and racialization functioned. It draws from and expands upon Jeremy Adelman
and Stephen Aron’s essay “From Borderlands to Borders: Empire, Nation-States and the People
in between in North American History,” which promotes a Borderlands framework when
analyzing the interplay between local and larger forces during the colonial period.15 Although
their definitions of frontiers and borderlands are problematic, primarily because of their
overemphasis on European agency, their work helps us understand the eventual the rise of the
nation-state and its ability to draw political and territorial borders over once contested areas.
Florida’s distinct colonial history and geographic position, particularly during the period
of this study, has made the region difficult to seamlessly incorporate within the framework of
various historical fields outside of Borderlands History. During the first Spanish Florida period,
the province was politically and economically orientated towards Cuba and the Caribbean and
positioned on Great Britain’s North American colonial periphery. With the territory serving as a
sanctuary to African slaves, it was influential in the outbreak of the 1739 Stono Rebellion and
undermined plantation slavery in the Southeast. However, near the end of the American
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Revolution, British Florida served as a refuge for loyalist planters from Georgia and the
Carolinas, and because of this the number of slaves swelled. While adjacent colonies eventually
became states, Florida retroceded to the Spanish. As a result of the 1802 Louisiana Purchase, the
U.S. expanded west of the Florida territories and they were not incorporated into the United
States until the 1819 Adams-Onís Treaty. This meant that Florida had been bypassed by the
conspicuous east to west frontier line so celebrated in Fredrick Jackson Turner’s “The
Significance of the Frontier in American History.” Turner established a grand narrative based
upon American exceptionalism stemming from the meeting of “civilization and savagery” that
forged cherished American institutions and character traits, such as democratic ideals and rugged
individualism, distinct from Europe. Florida occupied an awkward position in Turner’s
influential framework since U.S. history is conceptualized as “not the Atlantic coast, it is the
great West.”16 His only mention of Florida is to simply note that it “also furnished frontier
conditions.”17 Nonetheless, the area did not have “free land” in the Turnerian sense since
European, specifically Spanish, institutions meant the territory was no longer the “clean slate”
upon which American institutions could take root. Consequently, early Florida history fits
uncomfortably among the traditional grand narrative of U.S. History.
Herbert Eugene Bolton sought to address the inadequacy of Turner’s model when he set
out to write about the Spanish Borderlands. He wrote that the study of Spanish colonial areas
and their culture was “scarcely less conspicuous in the history of the Western world than the
advance of the Anglo-American frontier.”18 While Turner emphasized an East to West frontier,
Bolton focused on the northern expansion of Spanish colonialism from New Spain to the
Southwestern Borderlands, effectively pushing Florida to the margins as well.19 David Weber’s
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The Spanish Frontier in North America was more successful in integrating Florida within the
larger Spanish Borderlands paradigm.20 Weber was successful in re-orientating Spanish
Borderlands History away from the celebratory “Spanish fantasy past” and simultaneously
avoiding the demonization of Spanish colonialism associated with the “black legend.” His work
integrated subordinate peoples within a “complex mestizo frontier” which better highlights the
continuity between northern New Spain and contemporary U.S. Southwestern populations such
as Chicana/os and native peoples.
Weber’s analytical framework is well suited for interpreting the events of the first
Spanish Florida period when missions sought to acculturate Florida’s Indigenous peoples.
Studies centered on Spanish and Indigenous activity, especially in the vein of the New Mission
History with its emphasis on subordinate peoples, have recently increased. Edited works such as
Columbian Consequences, vol. 2: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives on the Spanish
Borderlands East and The Spanish Missions of La Florida enrich current research.21 Amy
Turner Bushnell’s Situado and Sabana: Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and Mission
Provinces of Florida contains a sociocultural analysis of the area’s indigenous peoples,
highlights their interactions with the Spanish, and describes the decline of the mission system.22
Among the significant scholars of the Spanish Florida Borderlands, Jane Landers’
research into Spanish archival sources and her work on the free black militia have set the
standard for the field. Her emphasis on secular Spanish institutions reflects aspects of Spanish
policy during the latter half of the eighteenth century and the priority given to Indigenous
alliances and free Black militias. Landers’ scholarship represents recent historiographical shifts,
which emphasize African and Indigenous peoples’ actions rather solely highlighting colonial
10

governments. In the seminal work Black Society in Spanish Florida, she illustrates how free
blacks utilized Spanish policies and the frontier militia in order to negotiate their position in
Spanish society.23 Specifically, they had access to manumission, the courts, and property. While
free blacks are central actors, Landers remains focused on Spanish institutions. Taking a cue
from Frank Tannenbaum who wrote Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas, she argues
that the presence of malleable Spanish institutions enabled Africans to pursue their interests.24
Legal customs and Catholicism offered African slaves more opportunities and acknowledged
their humanity.
As with Landers, a majority of colonial Florida scholarship has been under the rubric of
Spanish Borderlands. Though important, the work in this field has proven limited in terms of
providing a framework with the explanatory power to address the region’s diverse and
multifaceted history. The inadequacy of a model emphasizing institutions becomes even more
evident during the waning years of the eighteenth century when Spanish influence is essentially
relegated to St. Augustine, and as the colony’s Indigenous allies already experienced a sharp
demographic decline. In this vacuum, splinter groups of the Lower Creek exhibited their
autonomy from the Spanish. For example, a two-decade long British reign facilitated the
penetration of Scottish traders who established themselves in the region and thus linked the
province with the Atlantic World. Simultaneously, U.S. planters, including a few who entered
Florida, became influential in the Southeast.
For a Borderlands framework to be conceptually effective it must consider and highlight
the multitude of processes occurring in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A
viable model must draw from Richard White’s “middle ground,” a geographical and
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metaphorical space where competing colonial powers were not dominant.25 Concurrently, a
Borderlands model must also recognize when Indigenous notions of sociopolitical organization
remained dominant despite the designs of colonial powers. Juliana Barr, in Peace Came in the
Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands, highlights how Indigenous
kinship not only structured their societies but also diplomacy with the Spanish. The central role
of women and gender, in foreign relations and in Indigenous economic, political, and social
structures, was the “signature of Indian power in interactions with Europeans.” Nonetheless,
eventual U.S. expansion and market capitalism reduced spaces of negotiation for subordinate
peoples. James F. Books’ Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the
Southwest Borderlands outlines how a symbiotic captive raiding economy based on shared
notions of honor and gender created a fluid political and metaphorical borderlands that declined
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.26 During this period Reginald Horsman asserts that
rigid notions of racial difference based upon biological factors gained ascendancy and
increasingly influenced intercultural relationships. Although in a world systems analysis Florida
is considered peripheral, its geographical accessibility meant it was susceptible to larger trends
affecting the Southeastern Borderlands. Consequently, a focus on Spanish colonial institutions
does not provide a full understanding of the region’s history.
Various historical fields are also confronted with the difficulties of applying a narrow
scope to a complex region with tremendous demographic diversity.27 Embarking on a study of
Florida according to Amy Turner Bushnell means being “drawn into the histories of early
modern Europe, the Atlantic, the Caribbean, the Lower South, the backcountry, the Indian
Southeast, and, not least, the growing field of Spanish American frontiers, encompassing border12

seas and borderlands.”28 It is problematic to suggest that Indigenous and diasporic communities
can be quarantined from the larger political, economic, and social milieu.
Nonetheless, traditional narratives of Florida history hold that the colony was a
backwater and generally a failure. Even contemporary works acknowledge that Florida was
peripheral to “core” areas. While it might not have been as central as Virginia to the South and
slavery, Florida was nonetheless accessible through its maritime connections and geographic
position. For this reason an Atlantic World perspective helps us understand the expansion of the
market economy, African and European Diasporas, and the limitations of colonial designs and
policies when confronted with Indigenous autonomy. Scholars of the Spanish Borderlands such
as Bushnell and her proposal of a border-sea model, as well as Landers, who feels that work on
colonial Florida plantations should “encourage other colonial historians of the wider Atlantic
world to consider how Florida connected to their areas of study, because it almost certainly did,”
emphasize the value of this paradigm.29
Recent Atlantic World scholarship indeed provides insightful models that can be applied
to Florida. In The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of
the Revolutionary Atlantic, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker write that elites viewed
subordinate peoples such as the working class, sailors, and African slaves, as threats that needed
to be neutralized and controlled. One case study of this larger movement is the 1741 New York
Conspiracy in which thirteen fires broke out throughout the city targeting the “mercantile
oligarchy.” Linebaugh and Rediker write that in New York, captured free black sailors and
rumors of a Spanish invasion were important elements in driving the insurrection. More
importantly, the authors argue that Africans in British North American colonies were cognizant
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of the royal cédulas that offered freedom to slaves escaping to Spanish territory.30 In 1739, the
Stono Rebellion in South Carolina confirmed the disruptive influence of a slave sanctuary in
Florida. Additionally the free black militia members in Fort Gracia Real Santa Teresa de Mose
embodied Spain’s reputation as a liberator of slaves. While this study argues that Spanish racial
discourse as well as its sanctuary policy were less rigorous during the second Spanish Florida
period, Linebaugh and Rediker’s metaphor of the “Many-Headed Hydra” can still be applied to
this later period since the presence of fugitive slaves and other subordinate peoples represented a
threat that necessitated military excursions and the establishment of order.
A major component of the order elites established was associated with the slave trade,
which John K. Thornton examines in Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World
1400-1800. He illustrates how Africans were active participants in shaping their sociopolitical
worlds.31 African languages, notions of kinship and political structure, religion, music, and other
cultural traditions adapted to conditions in the Americas while influencing other groups. In
addition to their studies of the African Diaspora, historians such as Thornton working in the
fields of the Atlantic World and World History have shown that the beginning of the nineteenth
century and the onset of the Industrial Revolution marked the point at which Europeans could
more fully project their power. This narrowed Indigenous peoples’ ability to negotiate and resist
expansion. Florida roughly follows this pattern since Europeans did not gain effective control of
the region’s interior until the 1830s, when the U.S., an industrial power, could devote the
necessary military resources and facilitate significant Euro-American immigration into the
territory.
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Existing Florida Borderlands historiography has already embraced these Atlantic World
connections. In his work on the early colonial period, Paul Hoffman’s A New Andalucia and a
Way to the Orient: The American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century illustrates how
European colonization was a haphazard and disorderly process beyond the control of the mother
country.32 Spanish investors sought profitable ventures in the Americas and often lost significant
capital when many settlements failed. These setbacks were attributed to actions based on
Spanish myths such as New Andalucia, an agricultural paradise that never materialized.
Nonetheless, Hoffman highlighted the precarious nature of both European colonialism and
dominance in early trans-Atlantic interactions.
Roughly two centuries later the British trading firm of Panton, Leslie & Company found
more success with their economic ventures in the Southeast. William S. Coker and Thomas D.
Watson’s Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company
and John Forbes & Company chronicles how Florida became intertwined with entrepôts and
markets such as Nassau, London, and Havana. Traders negotiated with Seminoles for deerskins
that eventually made their way into the London market in exchange for manufactured goods
including guns and ammunition. Although trade in African slaves remained limited, the firm did
purchase and sell slaves who worked on their plantations. Throughout the company’s
operations, the movement of people and goods was constant. In Colonial Plantations and
Economy in Florida, scholars such as Daniel L. Shafer and Susan R. Parker demonstrate that the
territory, during the British and second Spanish Florida periods, was not a failure or lacking in
economic activity and development. The text focuses on large planters such Francis Philip Fatio
and Francisco Xavier Sánchez and their diversified economic endeavors. Especially pertinent is
15

James Cusick’s chapter “Spanish East Florida in the Atlantic Economy of the Late Eighteenth
Century” which argues “one means of understanding commerce in Spanish Florida is by fitting it
into the larger regional picture of trade between the United States and the Caribbean.”33 The
U.S. annexation of Florida was predated by the integration of St. Augustine with North
American ports such as Charleston.
In addition to Atlantic World studies, Florida Historians have also focused their scholarly
attention on African and Indigenous peoples. Larry Rivers, in Slavery in Florida: Territorial
Days to Emancipation, investigates the development of slavery in Florida, which, he argues,
demonstrates considerable variation in racial attitudes, plantation size, and intensity of labor
regimes.34 He not only utilizes slave masters’ records but also Work Projects Administration
interviews with former slaves in order to present slaves’ agency and resistance. Through his
demonstration of how Florida’s slaves had the power to shape their lives, Rivers seeks to build
upon the work of influential scholars Herbert Aptheker and Eugene D. Genovese.35
Simultaneously, texts by Michael A. Gomez and James H. Sweet are part of recent trends in
African American and African Diaspora studies to trace how African cultures, especially
religious beliefs, and ethnicities were resilient and adapted to conditions in the Americas. For
the African Diaspora this process was instrumental in the development of a Black identity.36
An emerging subfield has begun to develop around the Black Seminoles, “fugitive”
slaves and free Africans who lived with and among the Seminoles. Much of the scholarship
following Kenneth Wiggins Porter’s seminal text, The Black Seminoles: History of a FreedomSeeking People, has been in the vein of African Diaspora studies.37 Kevin Mulroy’s Freedom on
the Border: The Seminole Maroons in Florida, the Indian Territory, Coahuila, and Texas places
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the Black Seminoles within the context of other African maroon communities.38 Scholars
working on the Black Seminoles have utilized different terms for the population depending on
their respective conclusions concerning their identity. For instance, Mulroy’s utilization of
“Seminole Maroons” is illustrative of the fact that he believes “Africans and Seminoles often
became close allies, to be sure, but for the most part, the two groups kept themselves to
themselves and maintained a social distance.”39 His conclusion is keeping with recent trends in
African American and African Diaspora studies which stress the continuity of respective African
identities, ethnicities, and culture. These studies are in stark contrast to Stanley Elkins’ thesis,
which he offered in his 1959 book, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual
Life. He argued that the brutality of slavery had limited the cultural and ethnic connections
between Africa and the Americas.40 Contemporary scholarship in the field has successfully
countered Elkins by illustrating that African sociocultural systems were not extinguished by the
exploitation and inhumanity of slavery. However, this focus has a tendency to emphasize ethnic
and cultural continuity from Africa while limiting analysis on the transculturation between
Africans and Indigenous peoples.41
American Indian Studies has undergone a similar transformation from countering
Eurocentric narratives, emphasizing Indigenous agency, understanding Indigenous sociopolitical
structures, and examining the wide-ranging consequences of colonialism from Indigenous
peoples’ perspective. After the 1960s, the New Indian History sought to confront native peoples’
portrayal within U.S. historical narratives as antagonists doomed in their futile conflict against
frontiersmen and western expansion. Vine Deloria Jr.’s Custer Died For Your Sins
empathetically challenged assumptions that Indigenous groups and cultures were in a constant
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state of decline and his focus on contemporary political struggles highlighted Indian resistance
and survival.42 In the decades leading up to the twenty-first century, scholars such as James W.
Covington, Brent Weisman, J. Leitch Wright Jr., and William C. Sturtevant wrote Seminole
histories dealing with themes congruent with the New Indian History. They respectively
examined Indigenous agency, resistance, foreign relations with rival Indian and colonial powers,
cultural traditions, and Seminole ethnogenesis from Lower Creek bands. These scholars
succeeded in shifting the historical focus upon the Seminoles rather situating them as peripheral
to European colonialism.
Recently scholars have sought to go beyond the balanced accounts of colonial encounters
and more accurate portrayals of Indigenous societies found in the New Indian History.
Decolonial texts seek to privilege Indigenous peoples’ projects and agendas which are cognizant
of contemporary political issues, especially the drive to protect tribal sovereignty. Linda
Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples advocates
Indigenous scholars’ research projects which present native voices and perspectives on topics
deemed important to Indian communities.43 Decolonial scholarship challenges Euro-American
notions of “objectivity” which privilege colonial textual sources while questioning the legitimacy
of Indigenous forms of knowledge such as oral histories. Susan Miller’s Coacoochee’s Bones: A
Seminole Saga is a decolonial text, the work of an Indigenous scholar writing with the primary
goal of presenting her people’s history while not being limited by colonial materials. She seeks
to affirm “the sovereignty of tribal nations and identities of tribal peoples as distinct and prior to
the United States.” Miller’s book not only recounts the Seminole leader Coacoochee’s resistance
against the U.S. and relocation into Mexico but also comments on historical events such as the
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relationship between the Seminoles and Black Seminoles, an issue of contemporary importance.
In the year 2000 the Seminoles sought to assert their sovereignty by divesting the Freedmen
descendents of citizenship rights in the Seminole Nation. Leaders argued that the Black
Seminoles were not Seminoles by blood and could be expelled. Consequently Miller has argued
that the Black Seminoles maintained social and political space from the Seminoles and had no
historical claim to their position within the nation. As a result of the focus on Indigenous
nationalism, discussions of cultural fluidity, hybridity, and both biological and fictive kinship
between Seminoles, neighboring Indigenous peoples, and Africans are effectively minimized.
Due to U.S. policies, Indigenous peoples seeking to defend their status as autonomous nations
must conform to Eurocentric definitions of nationhood, which includes a discourse espousing an
homogenous race and shared culture.
Efforts to demarcate Indigenous nations as racially and culturally exclusive entities have
not deterred recent authors from tracing the connections between native peoples and other
groups. Studies by anthropologist Circe Sturm and sociologist Eva Marie Garroutte address the
complexity surrounding Indigenous nationalism and tribal membership. Building upon the work
of previous scholars such as Theda Purdue, Sturm in Blood Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity
in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma analyzes how Euro-American colonialism and
encroachment upon Cherokee autonomy and land led elites to adopt aspects of U.S. nation
building in order to resist. Part of this project was a cultivation of a homogenous racial identity
that would lend the new nation legitimacy and political currency in the eyes of EuroAmericans.44 Later U.S. policies, in particular the 1887 Dawes Act, were influential in the
conflation between blood, race, identity, and culture. Individuals classified as “full-bloods” were
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deemed “real Indians” and culturally authentic while “half-bloods” were perceived to have lost
some of their Indianness. Consequently the U.S. implemented the Dawes Act with polices that
protected the land allotments for “full-bloods” but not “half-bloods” on the assumption that the
former needed more paternalistic protections because they remained pristine Indians lacking the
intellectual astuteness to conduct economic transactions. Garroutte in Real Indians: Identity and
the Survival of Native America examines the construction of Indian identity in the twentieth
century. She illustrates how the utilization of blood quantum has become a primary factor in
bestowing tribal and national membership. These standards have deeply divided Indigenous
communities and have socially and economically marginalized individuals unable to gain a
Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood. Garroutte proposes a re-conceptualization of how identity
is constructed, which she terms Radical Indigenism, through an understanding of tribal
philosophy in order to find “robust” yet “flexible” definitions of group memberships.45
Due to the legacy of Euro-American colonialism, contemporary U.S. policies, and recent
Indigenous nationalist movements, native peoples have been portrayed as culturally and racially
insular. Nonetheless scholars such as William Loren Katz and Daniel Littlefield examined the
shared histories of Indigenous peoples and Africans in their resistance against similar colonial
processes. Simultaneously they highlighted the interaction and intermarriage between both
groups and consequently individuals with multi-racial backgrounds. More recently scholars have
expanded upon this earlier work by focusing on African and Indigenous kinship, identity
formation, hybrid cultures, and how both groups’ relationship challenged the emergent racial
order. A sampling of this work can be found in the Confounding the Color Line: The IndianBlack Experience in North America, a collection of essays from authors such as Claudio Saunt
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and Tiya Miles. James F. Brooks calls on scholars to problematize racial categories and “engage
carefully with the cross-cutting tensions and ambiguities of dynamic cultural hybridity and to do
so as much as possible from the standpoint of these mixed-and-multiple descended peoples
themselves - to confound the color line.”46 Following this line of thinking, Eric Meeks in Border
Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona illustrates how ethnic and
racial designations such as Mexican and Indian fail to encapsulate the “complex reality of
people’s experiences and identities.”47 Serving as a model for this study, the author highlights
the various processes involved in subordinate peoples’ identity formation. He examines both the
expansion of the nation-state, market capitalism, and the hardening of sociocultural borders as
well as Mexican and native peoples’ continuing ability to contest these developments and
maintain agency in defining their own identities. Equally significant, Meeks argues, “the
relationships that these groups formed with one other and with the political economy
substantially influenced how they indentified themselves over time.”48 Saunt has shown that this
was also the case in the Southeastern Borderlands since the Seminoles’ relationship with
Africans living among their settlements helped shape their distinct identity from the Creeks.49
Due to Florida’s geography, various colonial administrations, and presence of
Indigenous, African and European peoples, scholars of various fields and subfields have been
attracted to region’s history. Works emanating from Spanish Borderlands History, Atlantic
World History, African American Studies, and American Indian History are influenced by recent
trends in their respective fields. For instance, Spanish Borderlands studies are still anchored, to
some extent, on Spanish policies and actions, Atlantic World texts stress trade and Diaspora, and
both American Indian and African American texts largely focus on sociocultural continuity
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within their respective communities. The abovementioned fields continue to make valuable
contributions but naturally focus on themes, groups, and processes indicative of their traditions.
This study seeks to enrich previous historiography by demonstrating that Borderlands, as a
conceptual framework, because of its elasticity, transnational perspective, and ability to
incorporate other fields, is the most applicable for studying Florida during the 1763-1835 period.
A Borderlands model is well suited to Florida because its ability to holistically examine
the demographic and sociopolitical variation that characterized the region at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Due to the depth of Indigenous, African, and European mobility, interaction,
and influence, a separate scholarly treatment of each group threatens to present only a partial
perspective of a broader analytical vantage point. This is especially pertinent when considering
that Florida existed in a geographical nexus between the Southeast, Caribbean, and the Atlantic
World, areas experiencing increasing economic integration. Within this physical space,
Seminoles, Lower Creeks, Africans, Spanish agents, Euro-American planters, and British traders
traversed sociocultural boundaries during daily and sometimes frequent contact. This work
seeks to examine not only each specific group but also the impact they had upon each other. A
Borderlands framework is not limited to geographical and physical spaces but is also capable of
illuminating the metaphorical borders that various individuals crossed, especially groups with a
hybrid culture such as the Black Seminoles. Although the extent of intermarriage and
transculturation between groups within Florida is debated, undoubtedly a significant number
people had lives shaped in some form by cross-cultural interaction. A Borderlands perspective
has the conceptual elasticity to understand a region exhibiting diverse demographics,
sociocultural processes, and political structures.
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However, a “Spanish” Borderlands perspective is limiting because of the emphasis placed
upon the Spanish. This study’s purview is not restricted to periods of Spanish occupation or
interaction with Indigenous and African groups. A Borderlands model, not anchored by Spanish
colonialism, can effectively examine Florida during periods when the Seminoles, Mikasuki,
Lower Creek, Spanish, British, and the U.S. negotiated and contested power. This project takes
its cues from James Brooks and Juliana Barr’s respective works which utilize Spanish sources
while centering their narratives in areas where Indigenous peoples either shared power with the
Spanish or were the dominant power.50
A broader understanding of Borderlands within this study also facilitates a discussion of
Florida as part of the Southeast. Consequently, Saunt, Purdue, and Miles’ respective scholarship
emphasizing the region’s Indigenous peoples, racial discourse, and gender systems, are
especially pertinent. This work utilizes Saunt’s concept of the “new order,” which
simultaneously refers to political centralization, Euro-American notions of property, chattel
slavery, and rigid notions of race. He argues that these developments were becoming more
prevalent in the early nineteenth century Southeast, especially among the Creek.51 Purdue
highlights similar processes in her text, Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 15401866, describing how Cherokee political, economic and social structures slowly adapted to
European colonialism, particularly the eventual utilization of chattel as opposed to more
traditional Indigenous slavery. The latter never stigmatized slaves as inherently inferior and
offered them possible social mobility since slavery was never vital to the Cherokee economy
until elites began accumulating private property. Consequently by the late eighteenth century
Cherokees were aware of racial differences and recognized other groups through racial
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designations based on skin color.52 Nonetheless, Cherokee sociopolitical structures such as
matrilineal based clan identities persisted despite changes initiated by Euro-American
colonialism, specifically the establishment of trade networks and plantations.53 Saunt and Miles
have also undertaken micro-histories focused on respective Creek and Cherokee families and
individuals whose lives demonstrated how the processes mentioned above manifested themselves
on a local level.54 These studies represent recent examples of scholars seeking to understand the
ways Indigenous peoples dealt with the important transformations occurring at the turn of the
nineteenth century.
Utilizing Borderlands as a conceptual base enables this study to make several
contributions to current historiography. Chronologically speaking, this work focuses on
continuity between British, Spanish, and U.S. governments in Florida. Typically these regimes
are treated separately and rarely have scholars discussed the influence each entity exerted over
the other. In particular, scholars have argued that racial discourse operated differently under
each colonial power. Discussions of race have generally been the domain of nineteenth-century
studies focusing on the development of scientific racism and its intimate association with
Manifest Destiny, U.S. expansion and colonialism.55 Notable exceptions do exist including José
Cuello’s work on colonial Saltillo, which argues that the fluid and malleable sistema de castas
only illustrates that Spanish colonialism adapted to local conditions and that the system was still
based upon an acceptance and acknowledgement of a hierarchy based on whiteness.56
This study argues that it is beneficial to trace the early evolution of racial discourse
through various colonial administrations beginning in the late eighteenth century despite the
continuing importance of competing sociopolitical markers of identity, such as kinship, religion
24

and other cultural factors. Sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s definition of racial
formation as “the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the content
and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial categories,
and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meaning” can be applicable with the caveat that
racial formation, especially in its infancy, remained contested by those whom it sought to
racialize.57 Nonetheless, this period is quite accessible for scholars interested in examining a
transitional period when racial designations eventually gained hegemony over other forms of
categorization, although the process was by no means preordained. Consequently, this project
must balance an analysis cognizant of Indigenous and African agency and autonomy with
nascent Euro-American understandings of racial difference.
In addition to an overarching emphasis on questions of race, the dissertation’s individual
chapters augment historiographical debates, specific to Florida History, concerning colonialism,
nationalist discourse, and identity. Specifically, the project reinterprets British and Spanish
colonialism, the role of nationalist ideology in William Augustus Bowles’ filibuster activity, and
the Seminole-Black Seminole relationship, and examines how the U.S. enforced the racial
categories during the Second U.S.-Seminole War. Previous works labeled the British reign in
Florida as a short-lived failure because of its abrupt end. However, the British established
important precedents in diplomacy with Indigenous peoples, trade, and the establishment of
plantations. Their vision for Florida’s economic and political development remained influential
among the Spanish, who counted on Euro-American planters and British traders for their control
of the region. Simultaneously, William Augustus Bowles’ filibuster activity, or rather the
actions of his Indigenous hosts, served to undermine Spanish policies. Nonetheless the
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adventurer illustrated how Florida and the Southeast had become familiarized with nationalist
rhetoric and ideals despite continuing political decentralization of Seminole communities. U.S.
annexation of the area and the subsequent designs of officials and elites to stabilize Indigenous
relations in order to support plantations was the fulfillment of the British vision previously
plotted half a century before. These developments in turn, especially the racialization of
Africans and Indians, have lead scholars to stress sociocultural separateness in the Seminole and
Black Seminole relationship. Colonial sources failed to account for the sociopolitical complexity
that existed for Africans living among the Seminoles. The points mentioned above ensure that
this work is in dialogue with current historiographical discussions while contributing original
arguments.

Methodology
This study utilizes colonial sources written by officials charged with overseeing and
controlling East and West Florida. Their correspondence with superiors, subordinates,
merchants, Indigenous leaders, and others provides insight into local interactions. Often
obscured and hidden, voices from subordinate groups are nonetheless present in colonial
documents. For instance, diplomatic talks preserved Indigenous leaders’ views on foreign policy
and to a more subtle extent on race and gender. Petitions from Indigenous men and women were
also taken to colonial officials and judges. Black Seminoles served as interpreters and
occasionally as witnesses and translators. During the Florida territorial period, U.S. citizens’
slave claims made to the Seminole Agency against the Seminoles produced Indigenous and
African peoples’ testimony and statements. Additionally, Black Seminoles and Seminoles
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worked for the U.S. military and these documents contain valuable information as well.
However, materials ostensibly providing non-European perspectives are often filtered through
the cultural lenses of British, Spanish, and American officials. Thus colonial sources remain
problematic and their analytical value limited, which in turn hampers the ability to center the
narrative upon Indigenous and African groups’ settlements, sociocultural development, and
identity formation.
Predominantly based upon internal British, Spanish, and U.S. government
correspondence, policy discussions, and directives, this work utilizes significant turning points in
the Florida Borderlands to emphasize themes of race, identity, and colonialism. Scholars
working on mission history and free black militias anchor their work on records produced by
those institutions: likewise this study relies on sources produced by the colonial administrations.
However, the focus is not on a particular set of missions, military units, or specific Indigenous or
African settlements, but rather on events that caused colonial entities to highlight their
interactions with subordinate groups. This project’s chapters are shaped around treaty
conferences, legislative debates over slavery, the plantation economy, establishment of
Indigenous trade, Seminole and Mikasuki “raids” and “depredations,” filibuster threats, the
operation of the U.S. government’s Seminole agency, and slave claims made against Indigenous
owners. The availability of these materials influenced the direction of this study to focus
principally on the colonial policies that eventually racialized diverse ethnic groups into “Indians”
and “Blacks.” Emphasis on colonial policies notwithstanding, this work still seeks to present
Indigenous and African peoples’ resistance to the new colonial order and their ability to craft and
preserve their identities. While subordinate peoples’ agency is an important and significant
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aspect of any historical narrative, the outcome of the colonial project and the larger structural
forces, related to political and economic structures, that detrimentally affect the lives of
subordinate groups must not be minimized.
Due to the type of sources being utilized for this study, priority is given to the critical
analysis of colonial documents in order to illuminate what James C. Scott has called the “hidden
transcript.” For instance, letters communicating Indigenous leaders’ views or responses to
government officials are often shrouded in nuance and subtlety. Documents containing
descriptions of Indigenous actions regarded as “savage” or “illogical,” especially in regards to
“raids,” “captive-taking,” and “depredations” must be thoroughly interrogated and
contextualized. New Mission History and Borderlands scholarship have established standards
for working with colonial documents in order to gain insight about Indigenous peoples’ lives.
For example, missionaries’ records are imbued with a religious worldview and preoccupation
with proselytizing but nonetheless contain important Indigenous ethnographic data. Within this
work colonial officials, merchants, and prominent residents’ correspondence is similarly
analyzed for insight into Seminoles and Africans’ lives. Scholars such as Daniel K. Richter have
gone beyond a critical reading of sources and have used innovative approaches to present
Indigenous voices. For instance he reinterprets and revisits historical figures such as Pocahontas
using available materials.58 Unfortunately colonial sources sometimes speak more directly to
Euro-American views on race and the “Other” rather than accurately describing Indigenous or
African communities and societies. However, this tendency in the historical record facilitates a
study highlighting racial discourse among colonial governments.
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This project’s methodological approach is centered on the analysis of the sources
mentioned above in order to address three crucial questions. These inquiries emphasize the
themes of colonialism, race, identity, and the nation-state. How did the colonial project adapt to
Florida’s distinct geopolitical situation at the turn of the nineteenth century? Both British and
Spanish administrations were forced to modify their plans and were influenced by the broader
currents of the Atlantic World and the U.S. Southeast. Equally significant are questions about
Seminole and Black Seminole identity, which have been central to the work of scholars such as
Porter and Mulroy. Although colonial regimes sought to create racial categories, Indigenous and
African peoples remained in a strong sociopolitical position to maintain their localized identities
based on real and fictive kinship. Finally, this work analyzes the rise of the nation-state and
nationalism to determine its impact on hardening racial categories in the Southeastern
Borderlands.59 A critical reading of colonial documents in conjunction with questions
concerning colonialism, race, identity, and the nation-state constitute the basis of this work’s
methodological foundation.

Sources
Materials utilized in this study are archived in three principal depositories and span the
British, Spanish, and U.S. colonial regimes. Within the region, government sources are well
preserved and represent a solid foundation for many of the work’s inquiries. Few Florida
Borderlands studies have adopted the scope and chronological perspective that spans the 17651837 period. Thus the integration of sources produced by the governments mentioned above is
critical in analyzing the continuity of important processes.
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British Public Record Office sources are housed in various institutions, such as the
Library of Congress and the University of Florida’s P.K. Yonge Library. The Library of
Congress stores the Colonial Office documents dealing with the British occupation of Florida
from 1763-1784. These materials are informative because they deal with a board range of issues
centering on British colonial policies and goals for the province. This study has focused on
British-Seminole diplomacy, development of the plantation export economy, and the transition
from indentured servitude to African chattel slavery. Documents from the Joseph Byrne Lockey
Papers, located at the P.K. Yonge Library, contain correspondence from the Foreign, War, and
Colonial Offices as well as from the British Admiralty. Especially significant, the Lockey
Papers have letters between British officers and their superiors dealing with their maneuvers and
eventual evacuation from West Florida after the War of 1812. These actions caught the attention
of neighboring powers since the British helped mobilize Indigenous and African allies during the
war. U.S. and Spanish officials’ worries over the disarmament of these groups was the source of
much consternation.
The written record of the Second Spanish Florida period archived in the P.K. Yonge
Library includes the East Florida Papers, the Papeles Procedentes de Cuba, and the Pintado
Papers, all of which yielded important information. Primarily containing documents from the
provincial capital of St. Augustine, the East Florida Papers contain materials produced by the
various Spanish administrations such as the governor’s correspondence, edicts, court cases, and
military records. They provide a window on Indigenous-Spanish relations, outbreaks of
violence, and the treatment of free and enslaved Africans. The Papeles Procedentes de Cuba, a
section of the Archivo General de Indias, is a collection of colonial documents generally from
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Spanish possessions under the jurisdiction of the captain general of Cuba. Correspondence
between Havana and the East and West Florida governors supplements much of the information
within the East Florida Papers. Highlighted in this collection are events associated with SpanishSeminole relations, the filibuster William Augustus Bowles, and the threat of U.S. invasion. In
the Pintado Papers, documents related to the official duties of the Spanish surveyor general of
West Florida provide insight on the last years of Spanish occupation. As noted above, Pintado’s
accounts offer details on the “Negro Fort” at Prospect Bluff. The Spanish sources for Florida
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provide an impressive amount of
information.
With the annexation of Florida in 1821, U.S. government agencies and institutions
established themselves in the territory, and their records can be found in the Library of Congress
and the National Archives. Among the collections of the Library of Congress are the American
State Papers and the Territorial Papers of Florida. The American State Papers hold the
congressional records relating to Florida while the Territorial Papers contain correspondence
between the governor and federal entities, especially the U.S. Department of State. Stored at the
National Archives, the records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in conjunction with other relevant
offices produced documents related to their efforts to oversee the Seminoles. The Florida
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Seminole agents, and sub-agents sought to restrict Indigenous
peoples’ movement and space, enslave Black Seminoles, and manage the annuity.60 Combined
with military records stemming from the U.S.-Seminole Wars, government records provide vital
data for analyzing the central themes and questions of this work.
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Chapter Outline
This study traces the interrelated development of racialization, market capitalism,
and nationalism in the Florida Borderlands. Following a rough chronological order, this work
spans the colonial regimes of the British, Spanish, and the U.S.61 Taking as a starting point the
1765 Picolata Congresses between the British and the Seminoles, this text highlights important
precedents in Euro-American and Indigenous diplomacy.62 Stable relations with the Seminole
and the Lower Creeks were intimately connected with the propagation of the plantation export
economy and the shift from indentured servants to African slavery. These trends are traced
through the second Spanish period, 1784 to 1821, and culminating with the Second U.S.Seminole War in the 1830s.63 This study concludes with the significant turning point marked by
the Treaty of Fort Dade in 1837 and its far-reaching consequences. General Thomas Jesup
sought to divide the Indigenous and African resistance through simultaneous overtures of
freedom to Black Seminoles and guarantees of property to the Seminoles. Military force enabled
the U.S. to project its power through policies to separate African and Indigenous peoples into
discrete racial categories. Jesup sought to divide their interests, firmly establishing one group as
“master” and the other as “slave” in a system meant to approximate chattel slavery rather than
Indigenous forms of bondage. The overarching narrative, found in the six chapters of this work,
seeks to highlight the interaction of the larger processes of the Southeastern Borderlands,
mentioned above, with local forces in the Florida territories.
Among the various colonial regimes of East and West Florida, the British period, 17631784, is often overlooked or met with muted interest. Scholarship focusing on this period had
generally lacked analysis but did present valuable accounts of the events that transpired.64 In
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contrast, the first chapter argues that the British period is relevant and was not simply an
interlude between periods of Spanish occupation. Addressing the significance of the British
Florida period, this work argues that their colonial administration was influential to the
development of plantations, establishing the parameters of diplomacy, and the expansion of the
Atlantic World economy through the deerskin trade. Governor James Grant’s vision for the
colony consisted of learning from previous Spanish deficiencies by developing stable diplomatic
relations with Indigenous peoples thus enabling the growth of plantations based on crops such
indigo and rice. Effective diplomacy in the Picolata Congresses delineated the “Indian Nation”
from British territory. The rise of plantations, such as the Andrew Turnbull’s holdings worked
by Greek and Minorcan immigrants, convinced colonial leaders that African slavery was
preferable to indentured servants. In the final days of British rule, the influx of refugee planters
escaping the Carolinas and Georgia during the American Revolution led to calls for a “Negro
Act” providing masters greater security in their property while restricting African slaves’
sociopolitical mobility.65 Simultaneously, the Panton, Leslie, and Company trading firm began
collecting Seminole and Lower Creek deerskins to exchange them for European manufactured
goods. While the first chapter traces these developments, the second chapter will emphasize
their influence on the succeeding colonial regime.
Seminole-Spanish diplomatic exchanges constitute the core of the second chapter.
Correspondence, known as the pláticas or talks, between Spanish East Florida governors with
the Seminole leader Payne sought to preserve peace agreements and defuse potential conflicts
while highlighting themes of colonialism, race, and gender. They serve as excellent gauges of
the geopolitical situation and power dynamics between both groups. For instance, this work
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outlines how the Spanish were reliant on British traders, the Panton, Leslie, and Company, and
their need to base their legitimacy upon the previous British administration, thus signaling
Spanish weakness. Traders such as John Hambly and John Forrester were important conduits
between the Spanish and the Seminoles: they translated, explained, and transcribed pláticas for
both parties. Information passed through their cultural lenses before it reached the Spanish
governors or the Seminole headmen. Additionally, this chapter argues that British-Seminole
relations served as a template for Spanish officials, as did goals of promoting a plantation export
economy. Effective British diplomatic strategies allowed Florida’s economy to develop
similarly to other Southeastern British colonies, which resulted in the commodification of
African slaves and rigid ideas of race. Meanwhile the region’s connection to the Atlantic World
was through the expansion of the market economy. This chapter argues that Spanish Florida was
influenced by these transformations. Pláticas are especially insightful if the analysis considers
how they are transmitted, the role of interpreters, and the meaning of their metaphors and
symbols.
Central to the focus of the third chapter are the events associated with William Augustus
Bowles and interplay between growing discourses of nationalism and Florida’s decentralized
political systems, especially among the Seminoles. This occurred in geographic borderlands and
colonial peripheries that nonetheless remained accessible to the mobility of various groups,
goods, and ideas. Partly due to the abundance of sources generated by Bowles’ exploits, this
section will analyze and reconceptualize the events surrounding his interventions between 1788
and 1792, and his return in 1799 through 1803. However, unlike older accounts, this work will
focus on the actions of his allies, the Apalachicola Seminoles and the Mikasuki. Colonial
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accounts often perceived conflicts with Indigenous peoples being the result of nefarious white
men’s designs. However, Indigenous peoples were astute observers of the geopolitical situation
and formulated strategies based upon their own concerns and objectives. For instance, in
Florida, the Lower Creek, Mikasuki, and the Apalachicola Seminoles may have sided with
Bowles in hopes of attaining better trading terms and to acquire a counterweight to the U.S. and
the Spanish. Also significant is the discourse of nationalism present among the Creek, the U.S.,
and in Bowles’ “State of Muskogee.” This chapter examines how emerging ideas of nationalism
in Florida were illustrative of a liminal space in which different ideas concerning sociopolitical
organization especially the nature and structure of political entities came into contact and
engaged in dialogue.
The fourth chapter demonstrates how Seminoles and Black Seminoles were viewed as
threats to both the Spanish and the U.S. because they undermined an emergent racial order based
on non-whites’ subordinate position. In the waning days of the Second Spanish Florida period,
the British sought alliances with African and Indigenous peoples to strike out at the U.S. During
the War of 1812, the British army attracted African, Seminole, and Creek allies and supplied
them with goods to facilitate their resistance. While the British eventually evacuated the
Southeast, they left behind the “Negro Fort” on the Apalachicola River. As previously noted,
one of the valuable accounts of the African stronghold comes from Pintado, who harbored the
fear that the fort would destabilize the entire province. On the pretext that Spain could not
control this “dangerous” outpost the U.S. invaded West Florida. The first U.S.-Seminole War
involved the illegal U.S. invasion to destroy the “Negro Fort” as well as Seminole and Black
Seminole settlements. This drove both groups from northern Florida and forced them to relocate
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further south. With this show of power, the U.S. sought to end the fluid cultural, racial, and
political borderlands because it believed that they undermined the nation-state.66 Nations strive
to gain control over territorial and sociocultural borders and establish a racialized hierarchy. As
Sturm aptly illustrates, “virtually all nations, including the United States, have normative racial
ideologies that homogenize cultural diversity and shape discourses of social belonging.”67 The
U.S., especially in the South, because of its labor segmentation due to the plantation export
economy, sought to impose its racial order in the hopes of maintaining that system. To U.S.
officials, and to a lesser extent the Spanish colonial government, the “Negro Fort” represented a
dangerous blurring of racial lines that undermined the social order. The nation-state could not
tolerate the challenge to its influence from people it considered inferior yet dangerous. Cases of
runaway slaves leaving their masters and seeking sanctuary at Prospect Bluff threatened the very
notion of the nation-state.
Events stemming from the first U.S-Seminole War initiated the sustained drive to
displace and relocate Seminoles, Black Seminoles, and recent runaway African slaves. Chapter
five demonstrates that after annexation the U.S. attempted to extend its control over the
Seminoles and Black Seminoles in order to promote its political and economic interests in the
Florida Borderlands. Beginning with the Treaty of Moultrie Creek in 1823, the U.S. sought to
restrict the Seminoles to a territorial boundary and warned that any movement outside of that
space justified removal. U.S. agents also chastised the Seminole for their “corruption” of the
master-slave relationship. They were appalled when Seminoles refused to cooperate in the
capture of runaway slaves. American planters were astonished that they were deprived of their
property because Seminoles refused to capture and return African slaves. U.S. citizens made
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numerous claims to acquire the Black Seminoles believing that the Seminoles did not know how
to properly utilize them. This chapter examines many of the detailed slave claims in order to
speak to the relationship between the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles. A significant number
of scholars have debated the status of both groups arguing that the Black Seminoles were slaves
within a system of Indigenous slavery that differed from chattel slavery.68 Porter argues that the
Black Seminoles were vassals in a “democratic feudalism” to their Seminole masters.69 Recent
scholarship has stressed the sociocultural space between Seminoles and Black Seminoles. This
work seeks to problematize this argument by demonstrating the difficulty of generalizing both
groups’ varied and multifaceted relationship, which also included myriad forms of kinship.
However, U.S. efforts to racialize African and Indigenous peoples served to obscure this history.
The sixth chapter commences with an analysis of the 1837 Treaty of Fort Dade. In the
agreement General Jesup was successful in dividing the Seminole and Black Seminole alliance.
He sought to impose distinct and separate racial identities on groups with a history of fluid
sociocultural interaction. Although there was prolonged resistance to removal, the U.S. did
remove a significant number of Seminoles and Black Seminoles west by the late 1830s.
Removal out of the complex Florida Borderlands meant that the nation-state could exert more
power over both groups, and fully integrate Florida into the body politic. Prior relationships
between Seminoles and Black Seminoles became strained when slave claims from Creeks and
Euro-Americans effectively racialized Black Seminoles as black and subsequently as slaves.
Even Seminole identity was threatened when U.S. officials sought to politically subsume them
under Creek authority in Indian Territory. Close proximity to the Creeks meant the Black
Seminoles were especially vulnerable to attack from slavers and a number were seized. Scholars
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have argued that the relationship between the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles was altered by
the removal experience and life further west.70 Miller writes that some Seminoles had felt that
Black Seminoles had betrayed them by accepting positions as U.S. Army translators and were
responsible for the removal treaties.71 Nonetheless, when Coacoochee, known by American
authorities as Wild Cat, lost his bid for Seminole leadership he brought a number of Black
Seminoles into his group and emigrated to Mexico. They left in search of the geopolitical
borderlands they had lost in Florida as well as seeking relief from Indigenous rivalries and the
increasing power of the nation-state.

Figure 1.1 The Black Seminole/Seminole Diaspora. Source: Mulroy, Freedom on the Border, 24.

Although scholarship concerning the Florida Borderlands, Seminoles, and Black
Seminoles has grown in the last few years, few studies have implemented the chronological
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scope of this project. While the events of British Florida are often isolated from the Second
Spanish Florida period, this work asserts that the continuity of certain processes can be traced
from the 1760s to the U.S. removal of Indigenous and African groups in the 1830s. With the
utilization of British, Spanish, and U.S. sources this text is able to examine a critical transitional
period through an approach that transcends the lifespan of a particular colonial government.
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Chapter 1
“THE WHITE AND RED PEOPLE LOVE ONE ANOTHER AS
BROTHERS SHOULD DO”: BRITISH-SEMINOLE RELATIONS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EAST FLORIDA PLANTATION
ECONOMY, 1762-1783
The Great King after driving the French and Spanish from this land was most
graciously pleased to appoint me to govern the white people in this part of his new
conquered dominions.
I know and love the red people. I have lived long with them and as I am
acquainted with their customs and manners, the Great King knew that I will do
everything in my power to keep up peace and harmony between his white subjects and
red children who the Great King wishes to live together as brethren should do.
You are apprehensive and have been told that the white people are desirous of
getting possession of your hunting grounds. Your fears are ill founded for I am ordered
by the Great King not to take any lands which are of use to you even if you should agree
to give them up. You may judge from that how careful your Father the Great King is of
your interests and welfare.
James Grant, 17651

British East Florida Governor James Grant readily recognized that relations with the
Lower Creek and the Seminoles were of the utmost importance to his new administration.2
Consequently in 1765 he accompanied the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern
District John Stuart to Picolata, the primary crossing and meeting point on the St. Johns River
between territory considered “Indian Country” and the colonial capital of St. Augustine. During
the treaty conference, the European officials demonstrated their familiarity with Southeastern
Borderlands diplomatic relations.3 Previously Grant had been involved in the Anglo-Cherokee
War’s 1761 campaign and he cited this as evidence of his ability to treat with native peoples.4
Both men utilized Indigenous diplomatic procedures and employed metaphors and symbolic
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language within their speeches. They sought to obey the appropriate protocols by participating
in a calumet ceremony and evoking fictive kinship. During their speeches or “talks,” they
dropped a string of beads for emphasis and as a sign of their good faith. 5 Creek leader Tallechea
took note that the British representatives’ posture had changed from his initial meeting with them
at Taffuskie, “for now they (colonial officials) talked to them (Creeks and Seminoles) in their
own way by giving them beads and tobacco to put them in mind of what is said, that everything
is now well.”6
British officials gained jurisdiction over Florida after negotiating for its transfer
following the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763. Spain had been unable to control Florida
partly due to the Lower Creeks’ power to “raid” and harass the province and its Indigenous
allies.7 Although agreements had existed between neighboring Georgia and these Indigenous
groups, their relationship became strained in the 1750s since the latter avoided an exclusive
alliance with any European power.8 Cognizant of the Creeks’ strong geopolitical position, the
British viewed a diplomatic agreement as critical to the future of East Florida.9 Grant felt that
economic development hinged on the growth of plantations, which was contingent on stable
relations with the Lower Creek and Seminoles. His willingness to grasp Indigenous diplomatic
customs was motivated by the necessity of gaining their approval for British territorial claims.
He wanted the Lower Creek and Seminoles to cede “the sea coast as far as the tide flows.”10
Essentially the British sought approval for the occupation of a sliver of land between the St.
Johns River and Florida’s eastern coast. Although the governor undoubtedly foresaw taking a
more aggressive stance concerning Indigenous subjugation and territorial expansion in the future,
his pragmatic nature meant that he had to deal with native people on equitable terms.11
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Despite Grant’s zeal for successfully completing the treaty, the decentralized nature of
the Lower Creek political structure made consensus elusive. Understanding these barriers, the
British negotiators sought to gain leverage by stationing a schooner with gifts in the St. Johns
River.12 They were sending a clear signal that the British were eager to partake in reciprocal
exchanges, an important component of treaty negotiations. Theda Perdue asserts that the basis of
these exchanges hinged on the fact that “the Indians received gifts; the English received peace
and trade.”13 Sensing that some Indigenous leaders questioned the treaty, the governor and
superintendent began holding private meetings in order to individually persuade them of their
plans. Grant and Stuart made Tallechea, Estime, and Captain Aleck “great medal chiefs” to
demonstrate that British favor could enhance the prestige of the Lower Creek headman above
their political rivals. Meanwhile the Alachua Seminole leader, known as Cowkeeper, was also
awarded a medal in absentia, which was redeemed by his second-in-command, Wioffke. Once
the Lower Creek contingent signed the treaty, Grant arranged a later meeting with Cowkeeper to
further cement the alliance. The governor quickly made plans to have a second Picolata
Congress although Stuart felt it was superfluous. Grant was adamant that disaster would befall
British East Florida if he did not diligently seek and nurture Indigenous support.
The Picolata agreements represented a transformative moment in the Florida Borderlands
and revealed the presence of various processes that ran both parallel and counter to one another
depending on situation, time, and place. Colonial powers in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century developed ideas associated with biological definitions of race, the nation, and
market capitalism. However, Indigenous groups simultaneously inhabited a “middle ground” by
maintaining a measure of power against the colonial project. Nevertheless Europeans sought to
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promote and establish their hegemony over non-European peoples.14 This entailed the effort to
control Indigenous and African peoples through their categorization as “Indian” and “Negro”
which silenced their ethnic and political diversity.
While the Picolata Congress is representative of the pragmatism displayed by Grant and
Stuart as well as the relative strength of the Lower Creek and the Seminole, the British
nonetheless envisioned their colony reaching a “State of Maturity as will make them respectable
and enable them to stand alone.”15 While conducting treaty negotiations, the British were
already attempting to exert some control over Indigenous peoples. In their talks they presented
the British monarch as the “Great Father” and the paternal authority over his “red children.”
Additionally, Grant and Stuart, through their appointment of “Great Medal Chiefs,” were seeking
to impose a centralized political structure upon the Lower Creek and Seminole. The British also
began to utilize the terms “red” and “white,” a practice both Southeastern Indigenous peoples
and Europeans engaged in and did not initially signify distinct biological difference until the
middle of the eighteenth century. However, as Nancy Shoemaker states, British encouragement
of a plantation export economy, especially in Barbados, led to the racialized division of labor and
helped create the economic and political basis of whiteness and blackness.16 In East Florida, the
British perception of a “red” identity upon Indigenous peoples was connected with efforts to
confer blackness to African slaves. Governor Grant informed the Board of Trade and Plantations
that “planters in the several provinces upon this continent only waited for the conclusion of the
Indian treaty” and that “a number of Negroes have already been brought in, their labor is
absolutely necessary in this warm climate.” The racialization of African and Indigenous peoples
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was central to the British colonial project in East Florida and, despite its limited effectiveness,
later shaped Spanish and early U.S. colonial policies.
Gauging the overall impact of the roughly twenty-year British reign in East Florida
remains difficult. While this study is centered on illuminating how colonial powers starting with
the British imagined and constructed racial categories, subordinate peoples, especially within the
“Indian nations” continued to defend their political and cultural autonomy and negotiated
alliances. Beyond the limits of St. Augustine no single power with its associated discourses on
race, identity, politics or social structure held sway. This was due to the constant movement of
Indigenous, African, and European peoples within the Florida Borderlands. Seminole
settlements, once an outlier of the Creek Confederation, incorporated other groups such as the
Yamassee and subsequent Creek migration from the north, especially the Creek Red Sticks after
the War of 1812.17 British colonization of the Floridas coincided with the ethnogenesis of not
only the Seminoles but also African slaves from European settlements. Living among the
Indigenous peoples, either in adjacent settlements or within Seminole settlements, Africans
occupied numerous positions in Seminole society ranging from slaves to kin. Colonialism’s
ability to impose hierarchies based on whiteness and its sociopolitical order had to be modified
when confronted with the fluid and dynamic Florida Borderlands.
The majority of studies on British Florida do not trace the continuity between its policies
and the subsequent Spanish and U.S. regimes since the period was labeled a “failure,” implying
it had little lasting impact. This perception is largely based upon the colony’s brief lifespan,
stunted economic development, and limited power base. As noted above, emergent British
notions of race were not hegemonic among all groups and their significance not readily apparent.
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Among the early and few examinations of the period, Cecil Johnson’s British West Florida,
1763-1783 and M.L. Mowat’s East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784 was described by a
reviewer in 1945 as “explaining the failure of the Florida colonies.”18 With the “failure thesis”
establishing a consensus that British Florida offered little of analytical value, these works rarely
strayed from a straightforward narrative. In fact, a significant number of texts, especially
publications by James W. Covington and Lawrence H. Feldman, focused solely on presenting
primary source materials from British archives.19 By looking at British Florida only through the
lens of major events in U.S. history such as the American Revolution, the history of the region
will continue to be treated as incidental. The onset of more studies focusing on subordinate
peoples and themes of race, gender, identity, market capitalism, and colonialism will go beyond
the question of failure.20
Recent texts on British West and East Florida have emphasized individual colonists and
their ambitions, which were rarely realized. They highlight British policies centered on
economic expansion and the recruitment of planters. Robin F.A. Fabel in The Economy of
British West Florida, 1763-1783 touches upon the development of slavery, plantations, and the
Indigenous trade. He argues that the drive to make Florida economically viable may have been
possible if it did not face numerous constraints, not the least of which being time.21 In Colonial
Plantations and Economy in Florida, Daniel L. Schafer, Patricia C. Giffin, and Susan R. Parker
respectively examined the land holdings of major planters such as Richard Oswald, Andrew
Turnbull, and Francis Philip Fatio. Only Fatio obtained long-term success through a
“supranational viewpoint and business style that allowed him to readily adapt to the national
requirements of shifting governments in Florida.”22 On the other hand, Oswald and Turnbull
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were on the verge of operating large prosperous plantations and settlements until drought and
political disruptions proved insurmountable.23 If the standards of British “success” continue to
be economic factors and long-term political stability, then short-term growth of plantations and
strategic planning aside, historical judgment of the British Floridas will continue to stress its
“failure.”
This chapter seeks to contribute to current historiography through its central argument
that the British occupation of East Florida established crucial trends in the racialization of
Indigenous and African peoples, which provided a template for subsequent colonial powers.
Rather than concentrating on economic success, this study centers on important processes
occurring between the British, Indigenous peoples, and Africans. Specifically, a connection is
discernable between the development of diplomacy, labor systems, and the codification of the
emergent racial order.
In particular, three events are emphasized, the Picolata Congress, Governor Grant’s
encouragement and support of plantations, and the Negro Act of 1781. As mentioned above, the
Picolata Congress produced the first treaty between the “proto-Seminoles” and the colonial
power residing in St. Augustine.24 This agreement and the manner in which it was produced,
utilizing the protocols of Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy, remained in place until the 1824
Treaty of Moultrie Creek. Consequently, a stable relationship with the Lower Creeks and the
Seminoles meant that Grant was free to promote the creation of plantations. During the
American Revolution, Grant’s goals were nearly fulfilled when Florida experienced a sudden
influx of refugee Southern planters and their slaves. Consequently, the emergent elite demanded
stringent laws to maintain control over their slaves. With the backing of the Florida legislature
51

in the colony’s waning days, the Negro Act sought to give slave owners security over their
property.
These developments are significant since many of the British goals of obtaining land
from Indigenous peoples, populating Florida with European settlers, and utilizing African slave
labor eventually occurred under the U.S. The goals outlined by Grant in the 1760s were also
voiced in the 1820s by numerous Euro-American authors seeking to embrace the political and
economic vision established by the British. Although the return of the Spanish in 1784 is often
perceived as a continuation of the policies of their previous colonial reign prior to 1763, the
Spanish had to be aware that their initial occupation verged on collapse and that the British had
made some strides towards making the colony viable. This would explain why the Spanish
referenced the British in their dealings with the Seminoles while allowing traders and EuroAmerican planters access to its Florida colonies. A de-emphasis upon the “failure thesis” can
facilitate a re-conceptualization of British East Florida and highlight its lasting influence on
subsequent colonial projects resulting in a much more nuanced and informative historical
narrative.

1.1

First Spanish Florida Period
In order to assess the transformations that occurred during the British period, a brief

discussion of prior European colonization of Florida is necessary. The geopolitical situation
from the middle sixteenth to the latter part of the eighteenth centuries witnessed cycles of
Spanish colonial expansion and contraction centered on the colonial capital of St. Augustine.
Indigenous leaders from the Guale, Timucuan, and the Apalachee utilized Spanish “gifts,” trade,
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and missions against both external and internal rivals. Spanish officials during periods of
relative strength, coinciding with Indigenous demographic decline, attempted to impose their
hegemony. Excessive demands of tribute and labor as well as attempts to manipulate internal
Indigenous social and political structures often shattered optimistic Spanish assessments of their
progress. Various incidents often sparked significant resistance movements such as the Juanillo
(Guale) Revolt of 1597, the Apalachee Revolt of 1647, and the Timucuan Rebellion of 1655.
During the final years of Spanish occupation the mission system and Spanish presence outside of
St. Augustine collapsed under British pressure and a nascent Indigenous political and military
power, the Creeks.
In areas that lacked valuable mineral wealth or large sedentary pools of Indigenous labor,
the Spanish were more reactive than active in terms of colonial expansion. Early Spanish
excursions into Florida had inflated expectations of finding wealth either through “gold and
slaves,” as in the case of Juan Ponce de León in 1513, or an agricultural paradise which
motivated Lucas Vásquez de Ayllón’s hunt for Chicora in 1526.25 Scholars such as Paul
Hoffman and John T. McGrath have provided insight into preliminary efforts to colonize Florida.
Disavowing the notion that Spanish occupation was inevitable, they respectively focus on the
individuals and the precarious events that could have easily altered the course of history.
Through an examination of Ayllón’s colonization schemes, Hoffman both demonstrates the
limitations of establishing settlements in the Southeastern Borderlands while also illustrating
how expansion was not directly controlled by the Spanish monarchy but by individual investors,
who often lost their venture capital.26 McGrath focuses on the pivotal French settlements that
rudely awoke Spanish officials from their complacency in the region. As the author notes,
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viewing the destruction of Fort Caroline, and the subsequent founding of St. Augustine in 1565
by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés as predestined de-emphasizes the uncertainty that accompanied
Spanish efforts to oust the French from Florida.27 The author’s micro history of an event
traditionally portrayed as a historical footnote does well to explain why the Spanish and French
exhausted significant resources to gain a foothold in Florida. Control of the region meant having
access to the Bahama Channel where Spanish naval convoys filled with the spoils of conquest
regularly traveled en route to Spain.
Spanish occupation of Florida after 1565 consisted of alternating efforts to expand
Spanish dominion from St. Augustine and hasty retreats back to the colonial capital during times
of crisis. Franciscans, having replaced the Jesuits in the 1570s, established themselves among
the Guale, Timucua, and later the Apalachee. Florida’s Indigenous peoples possessed a measure
of political, social, and economic autonomy when dealing with missionaries. Spanish colonial
hegemony strengthened when the groups mentioned above were confronted with a deteriorating
demographic situation. Indigenous leaders sought a counterbalance to internal and external
conflicts while Spanish authorities moderated their intervention into Indigenous political and
social systems. Amy Turner Bushnell states that the Jesuits attempted to appropriate native
peoples’ leaders by sending their sons to college in Havana, but eventually the children were sent
to the governor’s residence.28 Indigenous leaders or caciques, as the Spanish called them, were
appointed to head the República de Indios, a society considered parallel yet subordinate to the
República de Españoles: they served as mediators and collectors of tribute. However, higher
taxation and infringements upon Indigenous political structures caused the spread of significant
revolts, which curtailed Spanish expansion into the Florida interior.
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Indigenous peoples within the Florida Borderlands tolerated and utilized Spanish
colonialism until Franciscans and government officials overtly asserted their authority. Located
north of St. Augustine, the Guale experienced early contact with the Spanish, and a reciprocal
relationship was established with the various headmen. Guale leadership attempted to utilize
Spanish trade items and recognition in order to bolster their claims to the position of “mico
mayor,” or principal leader.29 When the Spanish attempted to elevate one particular person in
1576, other Guale contenders killed the man and resisted against Spanish interference. The
Timucua and the Apalachee, among whom disease and colonialism eroded or challenged
Indigenous leaders’ legitimacy, became more willing to accommodate missionaries in hopes that
increased access to the Spanish would add credence to their claims of authority.30 As the
Spanish interpreted this as subjection to their will, they increased the pressure on Indigenous
economic, political, and social systems. Consequently, the 1597 Juanillo Revolt began when
Franciscians interceded in a Guale succession of leadership. They opposed the ascendency of
“Juanillo,” a proponent of an Indigenous sociopolitical revivalist movement viewed as
intractable to Spanish governance. In the subsequent conflict the Spanish lost many missions
and suffered diminishing influence among the western Timucuans.31 When the Spanish finally
did expand into western Florida, a violent encounter between the Apalachee and the Franciscans
led to another major rebellion in 1647. Eight years later the Spanish lost control over the region
for a year when their excessive corn demands drove Timucuan leaders, Lucas Menéndez and
Diego, to overthrow colonial authority.
Spanish-Indigenous relations were also strained by further manifestations of European
rivalries in the Southeastern Borderlands. With the exit of the French from Fort Caroline in
55

1565, the British eventually filled the vacuum by establishing colonies on the Atlantic and
finding their own sources of wealth. Francis Drake’s plunder of St. Augustine in 1586 stunted its
growth and marked the arrival of the new British threat. A year later Spain abandoned Santa
Elena in present-day South Carolina, due to logistics and expenses, effectively ending the
region’s prospects for Spanish colonization.32 Charles Town was then founded in 1670 and was
implicitly recognized by the Spanish as a British settlement in the Treaty of Madrid, which was
concluded the same year.33
Following the establishment of British settlements, increased trade and political alliances
between Southeastern Indigenous peoples and the British occurred because of the latter’s ability
to consistently furnish quality goods. Charles Town became integrated into the Atlantic World
market economy and sought exports. As a result, the Indian trade, which included Indigenous
captives and slaves, became the most important economic activity and source of labor until 1715.
The Westo, seeking an alliance with South Carolina, supplied the colony with Indigenous slaves
hailing from groups such as the Guale. When conflict occurred between the British and Westo,
the Yamasee became the dominant power on the Savannah River. These groups proceeded to
conduct raids into Florida and in 1685 attacked the Spanish mission school of Santa Catalina as
well as the Timucuans.34 Alan Gallay’s The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire
in the American South, 1670-1717 convincingly illustrates how trade in 20,000-50,000
Indigenous slaves for British manufactured goods had significant consequences and eventually
reshaped the region’s power dynamics.35
Initiating important shifts, the Yamasee War in 1715 marked the transition from
Indigenous bondage to African slavery. The Yamasee, a multiethnic political confederation on
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the Savannah River, attacked the British over various abuses including fears of their own
enslavement. Indigenous groups on the Savannah River and the Creeks joined the Yamasee and
caused considerable damage to the colony. Eventually a British-Cherokee alliance against the
Lower Creek represented a turning point that gave the advantage to the Europeans and their
allies. Once the conflict ended, South Carolina drove many Indigenous peoples to Spanish
Florida or to the Creek settlements. The latter were now in an advantageous position over the
Spanish and the British; Creeks were the dominant power and could command gifts from both
parties without committing to either camp. With increased leverage in their trading
relationships, Indigenous groups no longer turned to slave raids and instead focused on the
trading of pelts. Concurrently, South Carolina also witnessed the detrimental effects of the
Indian slave trade and promoted a plantation export economy based upon rice cultivation and
African, not Indigenous, slave labor.36 This led to an embryonic racialization of Africans as
“negroes,” bestowing upon them the inferior hereditary status of slaves. Development of chattel
slavery in South Carolina created a new flash point between the British, Indigenous peoples, and
the Spanish. During the 1715 conflict the Yamasee had seized African slaves and both groups
established a base in Florida and returned to raid and liberate slaves from South Carolina
plantations. As Gallay notes, the British were wary of Indigenous-African alliances and
attempted to create social space between both groups.37
Spanish Florida’s embrace of African slaves entering into the Florida Borderlands would
also draw the ire of the British. In response to their precarious situation, the Spanish established
the garrison town of Garcia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose for free Africans and runaway slaves,
utilizing them as a border militia. The events of 1739, one year after the founding of Mose,
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proved to be pivotal. In South Carolina, the Stono Rebellion illustrated that slaves would seek to
utilize Spain’s policy of sanctuary, which had been clarified six years earlier by Philip V’s
cédula or royal order.38 Scholars argue that all parties involved were cognizant of role Spanish
Florida played in inspiring the predominantly Congolese slaves to resist.39 Towards the end of
the year, the War of Jenkins’ Ear offered Governor James Oglethorpe, of the newly founded
Georgia colony, an opportunity to remove the Spanish irritant from the region. Oglethorpe and
Creek allies quickly occupied the hinterlands including Mose, thus ensuring widespread
destruction outside St. Augustine’s Castillo de San Marcos. The siege lost its momentum when
Spanish led forces, comprised of Europeans, allied Indigenous groups, and free Africans,
launched a counter attack on British occupied Mose. The maneuver served to siphon off steam
from the British offensive and eventually led to Oglethorpe’s retreat.40
Despite St. Augustine’s stubborn determination and refusal to capitulate to the British, it
lay prostrate to the diplomatic maneuvering following the Seven Years’ War, which produced
the British occupation of Florida. Although the Spanish had retained nominal control of the
colony throughout the war, signs of weakness were evident. For example, the mission system
completely collapsed, only 158 persons remained in the system by 1752.41 Thereafter the Lower
Creeks gained hegemony over northern Florida and displaced prior groups such as the Yamasee
and eventually incorporated them. Economically, Hoffman writes that Charles Town traders and
Georgia ranchers even managed to incorporate St. Augustine as their market despite the illegality
of their exchanges.42 The cycles of expansion and retraction of Spanish control over the Florida
Borderlands ended as it had begun in 1565, with the Spanish clutching the coastline.
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1.2

Seminole Ethnogenesis
As a distinct political and social entity, the Seminoles did not exist until the eighteenth

century. According to anthropologist William C. Sturtevant, the Seminoles were a “postEuropean phenomenon” whose ethnogenesis and distinct identity resulted from the splintering of
various Creek bands that migrated to Northern Florida.43 Historian J. Leitch Wright has done
well to document how the Seminole’s progenitors, the Creek, were themselves an amalgamation
of various Indigenous ethnicities, cultural groups, and bands, mainly based around the
Mississippi Valley.44 In the Southeastern Borderlands events such as the Yamasee War caused
the physical mobility, fission, and fusion of Indigenous settlements and groups. While these
processes occurred prior to European colonization, the Spanish and British presence, as well as
continuing Indigenous rivalries, seemed to have intensified the factors, such as prolonged
conflicts, Indigenous slave raids, and commercial hunting, which applied ever increasing
pressure for Indigenous groups to adjust to new conditions. Many of these challenges were met
through malleable political and social systems that could incorporate new cultural and ethnic
groups. Conversely, European imperial powers sought to project centralized political authority
and identity upon Indigenous groups in order to facilitate treaty agreements and land
concessions.45 Significantly, the Southeastern Borderlands, during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, was a site of negotiation between political centralization, racialization, and
market capitalism with decentralized Indigenous political structures, fluid identities and
ethnicities, and primarily reciprocal exchanges.
Creek diversity is visible through their ethnic, linguistic, and geographic divisions.46 The
term “Creek” is said to have had its origins from the British traders who utilized the word to
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describe the Ochesee living near the Ocumulgee River in Georgia.47 This Muskogee speaking
group migrated from the west and helped comprise one of the two linguistic divisions among the
Creek. Meanwhile, the Ochesee became situated near the territory of Hitchiti speakers, who had
inhabited the region longer than other groups. Both Muskogee and Hitchiti are considered to be
part of the Muskhogean linguistic family but are mutually unintelligible. While these two
divisions serve as convenient markers within the confederation, they do not encompass all the
linguistic variety within the Creek. For instance, a few Shawnee settlements, consisting of
speakers of an Algonquian language, were also incorporated, as were the members of other
language groups, such as Koasati, Alabama, and Yuchi, and the Natchez. Although many bands
and towns spoke different languages, Muskogee did develop, for non-native speakers, as a
second language that facilitated communication. In addition to language, geographic divisions
also existed. “Upper Creeks” were based on the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers in present-day
Alabama and the “Lower Creeks” were located in present-day Georgia near the Chattahoochee
and Flint Rivers. The Upper Creeks had more contact with the French near Mobile while the
Lower Creek were alternating between alliances with the British and the Spanish, depending on
the geopolitical situation.48
In conjunction with linguistic and geographic divisions, the Creek, perhaps owing to their
diversity, increasingly embraced ethnic designations. Scholars state that in the Southeastern
Borderlands, Indigenous settlements had identified as either red (war) or white (peace) moieties.
The exact responsibilities and duties under the purview of each division remained ambiguous or
often changed. A simplistic description of the system holds that war towns provided leadership
during military conflicts while white settlements served as sanctuaries and incorporated new
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groups.49 Red and white categories continued into the eighteenth century, but the more relevant
membership status was roughly based upon the Muskogee/Hitchiti dichotomy. Affiliated and
refugee Indigenous members outside the two main groups were given unflattering designations
such as estenko, a Muskogee word, and called “stinkards.” This pejorative name conferred
foreignness, inferiority, and a subordinate position.50 Creek methods for ordering society would
persist among the Seminoles, as they became a more unified ethnic group in the Florida
Borderlands.
Scholars agree that while linguistic, geographic, and ethnic divisions were present among
the Creek, the primary basis of Indigenous identity was based upon kinship, clan, and town
membership. Serving as the foundation of Creek communities, the huti were clusters of several
structures containing a clan based on the families of several Indigenous women.51 These were
matrilineal settlements, meaning that men lived with their mothers and later their wife’s family.
The leading male authority figure would be a man’s uncle, his mother’s brother. Concerning
duties and responsibilities, women were involved in agriculture, preparing hides, making crafts,
and tending children. Men devoted part of their seasons to hunting, trading, raising livestock,
and were utilized during armed conflicts.
Significantly, women also had the vital role of bestowing upon their children their clan
identities, which could not be altered by marriage. Clans were larger groupings of people who
believed they shared a common ancestor; these identities were not localized to specific
settlements but spanned the Creek towns. Various clans existed, such as the Bear, Deer, Wind,
Beaver, Turkey, Wildcat, Panther, and Wolf, with some more prominent than others.52 Clans
were charged with providing visiting members, considered relatives, with hospitality and more
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importantly clans served to address perceived injuries and attacks upon anyone in the group. An
elder headman of the clan represented its interests not only at the local level but also at regional
conferences. If the clan had an association with an even larger political entity then its leader
would go to that council as well.53
In conjunction with clans, settlements and towns were crucial in the functioning of a
Creek hierarchy as well as social and political structures. Talofas were small villages with a
cluster of buildings where the huti lived. They served as satellite settlements and were affiliated
with a square ground town known as the talwa. This was the principal political and social center
for the talofas in the vicinity. A square ground at the talwa was a plaza surrounded by four
rectangular structures, and served as the location of the ceremonial fire. One of the buildings in
the town center was the council house, utilized for important conferences, meetings, and events.
For instance, the busk or green corn ceremony was meant to mark a new year, the lighting of a
new ceremonial fire, and the ripening of maize.54 Talwa leadership consisted of the micco, the
political headman, and the tustenuggee thlacco, the top military leader, and would also include a
principal spiritual head. Power usually remained within a specific family, the micco’s brothers
held the military and spiritual positions. Clan leaders from the talofas sent representatives to the
talwa council to balance their authority.55 While the talwas were considered independent, they
could be part of a larger political entity meaning that they sent representatives to a general
council led by a micco whose prestige gave him authority over other talwa’s miccos. This brief
summary of Creek social and political organization, with its linguistic, geographic, ethnic, clan,
and town divisions, illustrates that its overriding characteristic was decentralization, especially
considering that talofas could splinter off from their talwa and form their own square ground
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town.56 This would occur in the eighteenth century when groups of Lower Creeks would enter
into the Florida Borderlands and eventually become known as the Seminoles.
When the Seminoles entered Florida and the date that their talwas gained complete
independence from the Lower Creek continues to be uncertain. Spanish overtures were made
during the early eighteenth century encouraging Creek bands to relocate to Florida and serve as a
buffer to the British. These efforts included Lieutenant Diego Peña’s visits to the Lower Creek,
the establishment of Fort San Marcos de Apalache, and the presence of a trading house.57
However, Spanish officials’ inability to guarantee a steady supply of gifts and trade undermined
these efforts. Scholars argue that some Lower Creek may have accepted the offer and relocated
near Apalachee.58 Nonetheless, general consensus holds that Creek raids into the Florida
Borderlands, especially during the 1739 and 1743 Oglethorpe invasions, not only devastated
Spanish indigenous allies but familiarized the Lower Creek with the northern Florida interior.
Subsequently, the vacuum created in the Florida offered an opportunity for bands or towns
seeking to relocate.
Precisely tracing the movement of proto-Seminoles in a fluid and dynamic borderlands is
difficult. Nonetheless, scholars such as Covington and Miller write that proto-Seminoles entered
the area in various phases, with the latter identifying four specific groups and geographic areas,
three of which will be discussed shortly.59 Early settlement occurred with the first few bands
establishing themselves in the present-day Florida Panhandle. Around 1715, the first major
relocation involved Indigenous villages leaving Lower Creek territory and moving south to form
Apalachicola River towns. A few years later, a significant second front of Lower Creek
immigration was opened in the vicinity of Apalachee, a trend that would continue in the
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following decades. The Mikasuki, a major power during the second Spanish Florida period,
would establish themselves at this location. Around the 1750s, the Indigenous leader
Cowkeeper, as the British called him, founded the Alachua Seminoles in the area of present-day
Gainesville and Micanopy. These interior north-central Florida lands during the first half of the
seventeenth century had been part of Spanish treasurer Francisco Menéndez Márquez’s Rancho
de la Chua where he raised cattle.60 Apparently the name Cowkeeper alluded to the Seminoles
tending of cattle in that location as well.61 These three main areas in the Florida Borderlands,
Apalachicola, Apalachee (Mikasuki), and Alachua, would become the major Seminole
demographic and political centers until the 1830s.
Eventually, the Indigenous groups establishing themselves in Florida would become
recognized as the Seminoles and would diverge politically from the Creek Confederacy. Various
factors led to the fissioning of the Lower Creek and the ethnogenesis of the Seminoles. The
towns and bands that relocated from Georgia, the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, have been
described as primarily Hitchiti speakers with a significant Muskogee minority.62 Wright states
that non-Muskogee groups, including the Hitchiti, were often singled out as “stinkards.”63
Hitchiti bands may have sought to evade a stigma of inferiority by relocating to Florida. Another
explanation may rest with the efforts of Lower Creek headman to achieve positions of
leadership. Miller writes that Chilokilichi, in Apalachicola, and Simpukasee, based in
Apalachee, were related to the prestigious Coweta Micco, known as Brims, the former his
brother and the latter being his son.64 Additionally, Cowkeeper, the Alachua Seminole founder,
was from the elite lineage of the Oconees, and thus proto-Seminole leaders were not marginal
members of Lower Creek towns. However, especially in the case of Chilokilichi and
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Simpukasee, they may have not been in line for becoming miccos.65 Establishing their own
talwas in northern Florida may have offered the opportunity to strike out on their own.
Numerous explanations could possibly be made in order to understand Indigenous peoples’
movement into Florida. Nonetheless, Lower Creek political structures were decentralized and
the branching out and founding of new talwas was representative of that system. Since Lower
Creek talwas often retained their independence it was not abnormal for proto-Seminole
settlements to then assert their autonomy.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, Seminole and Lower Creek cleavages had
become apparent. British documents and naturalist William Bartram’s travels in 1774 produced
the first written sources to recognize Seminole autonomy.66 British East Florida Governor
Patrick Tonyn would come to understand that agreements with Lower Creeks did not necessarily
apply to Florida’s Indigenous peoples since “the Indians settled in this province . . . are separated
from the Creek Nation, and are not considered by them to be of it.”67 Tracing the etymology of
“Seminole” can provide some insight into the development of their distinct identity. Sturtevant
writes that “Seminole” is derived from the Muskogee term simanó•li, which was influenced by
the Spanish word “cimarrón” meaning “wild” and “runaway.”68 Beyond the adoption of a
separate term to refer to Florida’s indigenous peoples, political motives were the driving force in
the separation of the Seminole from the Creek. A radical transformation in Seminole culture
from the Creek was not the cause of the spilt. Anthropologists state that among the Seminole,
“Creek settlement patterning, religious and political institutions, and economic practices were all
preserved.”69 However, Seminole talwas had the geographical space and latitude to assert their
own autonomy. In a convincing argument, Claudio Saunt asserts that it was Upper Creek elites,
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such as Alexander McGillivray, who embraced political centralization, market capitalism, and
chattel slavery, which represented a shift in Lower Creek values and from the Seminoles. Rigid
social hierarchies contradicted previous decentralized political and social relationships. While
scholars such as Mulroy and Miller de-emphasize Africans’ role in shaping Seminole identity,
Saunt states that their rejection of chattel slavery and incorporation of Africans was a
“distinguishing feature of Seminole identity by the beginning of the nineteenth century.”70

1.3

British Colonialism in East Florida
Whereas Oglethorpe’s siege of St. Augustine had failed, negotiations stemming from the

1763 Treaty of Paris effectively swapped Havana, which the British had captured, for Florida,
and consequently divided the province into East and West Florida.71 Colonial officials were
certainly cognizant of the geopolitical situation not only in the Southeastern Borderlands but in
North America generally. As illustrated by the Proclamation Line of 1763, the British sought to
avoid costly wars with Indigenous peoples while utilizing alliances and gifts. This policy took
shape in the Florida Borderlands as officials were determined to establish stable relations with
the Lower Creeks and the Seminoles in order to achieve their larger goal of making their newly
acquired colony profitable.
British occupation of Florida after 1763 occurred within a larger context of North
American colonization. As Richard White notes, Indigenous peoples strategically utilized
imperial rivalries between the French, British, and in the Southeast, the Spanish. The “middle
ground” was a physical and metaphorical space of negotiation and accommodation. With the
withdrawal of the French from the Great Lakes Region and the Mississippi River Valley, the
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British hoped their victory in the Seven Years’ War meant they could dictate terms to Indigenous
peoples. In particular, British General Jeffrey Amherst sought to curtail the distribution of gifts,
a significant component of the reciprocal exchanges vital to diplomacy in the region.72 He felt
the Algonquians and Iroquois were no military threat and should fully abide to British authority.
Although colonial powers operating in the middle ground expediently turned to diplomacy, they
still had expectations of having their authority over Indigenous peoples and their territories
recognized. However, Indigenous peoples had simply viewed arrangements with Europeans as
alliances that did not entail allegiance to a European monarch. Once colonial powers’ positions
improved they sought to enforce the hegemony they perceived Indigenous peoples had already
accepted.73 Concurrently, there was an increase of social space between Europeans and
Indigenous peoples, with the latter viewed as alien and biologically different. In the Great Lakes
region the British began to demand the return of all captives, many of whom had served as
important cultural mediators, and they also viewed the exchanges of goods as solely business
transactions without any social meaning.
These policies were pivotal in the resistance that culminated in Pontiac’s Rebellion, a
pan-Indian alliance that attacked newly occupied British forts. White writes that the while the
conflict is seen as a failure in terms of ending British occupation, it did succeed in restoring the
middle ground.74 This was epitomized in the Proclamation of 1763, which sought to avoid
expensive wars with Indigenous peoples by restricting colonists from settling west of
Appalachian Mountains. British policy reversed course and resumed the utilization of gifts in
order to cement the Algonquian-British alliance. Although the costs of engaging in Indigenous
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diplomacy were great, the British were convinced they had to follow what they knew as the
French model in order to avoid the greater cost of larger conflicts.75
As Pontiac’s Rebellion was drawing to a close, East Florida Governor Grant was
nervously welcoming delegations of Lower Creek headmen at Picolata. Undoubtedly aware of
the broader trends of British North American colonization, he was personally involved with
developments in the Southeastern Borderlands. The region had witnessed destructive conflicts
such as the Yamasee War and Oglethorpe’s offensives. Inheriting a feeble colony confined to
the coast was the end product of those wars. Preceding his appointment as governor, Grant was
a British officer in the Anglo-Cherokee War, ignited in part by tensions over Carolina colonists
encroaching on Cherokee territory. In the waning years of the conflict, Grant and the Cherokee
leader Attakullakulla were credited with ending the war. Supposedly sympathetic towards the
Cherokee, Grant offered generous terms.76 He would later brandish these credentials during the
Picolata Congress to illustrate that he was an honest broker.77 Grant’s efforts may have also led
to the presence of a Cherokee delegation at recent Augusta treaty negotiations with the Creeks.
John Stuart, assigned the position of Superintendent of Indian Affairs, was at this conference
where he informed the Creeks that a separate treaty would be discussed with the East Florida
governor.
Although the British officials at the Picolata Congress were supporters of diplomacy and
practitioners of negotiation and accommodation, the conference was meant to facilitate
colonization of Florida, not to guarantee Indigenous autonomy. Early British documents outline
the goals of developing the colony into an economically viable province.78 Neighboring
colonies, especially South Carolina, established the precedent of utilizing slave labor, initially
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Indigenous but later African slaves, to fuel plantations that produced commodities for the
Atlantic World economy. Grant stated that securing land and stability from the Lower Creeks
and Seminoles represented the most significant obstacles against the immigration of South
Carolina planters, such as Francis Kinloch, to relocate to East Florida.79 British officials, such as
Major Francis Ogilvie, continued to believe that Florida was an agricultural paradise that had
been stymied by neglectful Spanish colonists.80 In a letter to the Board of Trade, he expressed
his disdain toward Spanish subjects by writing that their departure was:
no loss to his Majesty’s Government of East Florida, their not staying here as they
were the least industrious of any people I ever saw having depended entirely on our
colonies in America for supplies of provisions, there was no trade or manufactures of
any kind in this province, and by the constant war with the Indians and their little
capacity to carry it on, they were helm’d in within the lines of St. Augustine excepting
two posts Picolata and Apalachia, which were supported by very bad troops.81
Spain’s inability to control Indigenous peoples and its failure to contribute to the Atlantic World
economy disqualified its claims to the province in the eyes of British officials. In order to follow
South Carolina’s precedent of creating productive plantations with prosperous planters, British
Florida had to avoid Spanish mistakes. Grant realized that an agreement with the Lower Creek
and Seminoles had to be reached before another colonial endeavor could be undertaken.

1.4

British-Seminole Relations
The 1765 Picolata Congress marked a transformative event that delineated the political

relationship between the British, Lower Creeks, and the Seminoles.82 While other scholars have
noted the conference and even published its proceedings, there has not been an in-depth analysis
of its consequences and broader meaning.83 Concerned with the racialization of Indigenous
peoples and Africans, this work argues that the congress set the terms of the Seminole-European
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relationship and was a significant component in the colonial project. In contrast to narratives
that draw a stark line in 1821, the date of U.S. annexation, as the significant period in terms of
racialization, market capitalism, and political centralization, the British occupation should be reexamined for its contribution to these trends. This may seem counterintuitive since the British
had rejected Amherst’s polices and embraced the “middle ground,” especially in terms of
diplomacy. However, this was only seen as a temporary solution, a pragmatic course, and did
not represent a British repudiation of their presumed hegemony over Indigenous peoples. During
the Second Picolata Congress Grant sought to avoid diplomatic failure with the Lower Creek and
Seminoles since “there would not have been a plantation existing in the province in six
months.”84 The British sought to establish more social and physical space between themselves
and Indigenous peoples in order to support the development of plantations and chattel slavery.
British occupation turned the Florida Borderlands into a contested space where emerging rigid
racial views dominated in some locations and situations, especially on the indigo, rice, and sugar
plantations, while away from European settlements more fluid notions of race continued. The
Picolata Congress illustrated the insidious nature of colonialism in the sense that the British
acceded to Indigenous autonomy in exchange for the stability that allowed British planters to
enslave and racialize Africans.
A discussion of the Picolata Conferences should concentrate in three areas: an assessment
of British policies, a discussion of the diplomatic protocols and language utilized in the
negotiations, and an examination of internal Indigenous politics. Although prior historians have
judged the British period a failure, in the realm of diplomacy its record is more positive.
Consequently, the language utilized in the conferences would establish an important precedent
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that would influence diplomacy in the Florida Borderlands until the 1820s. Although written
sources from Picolata privilege the perspective of British emissaries, the meetings shed precious,
but limited, light upon Lower Creeks and the Alachua Seminoles. The Picolata Congresses
provide a rare glimpse into the important transformations occurring in the Florida Borderlands
during the late eighteenth century.
Governor James Grant, a skilled mediator from his experience with the Cherokee, was
fully aware of the stakes as he awaited the arrival of the Lower Creek headmen in 1765.85
Certainly Grant’s most advantageous virtue was his grasp of Southeastern diplomacy, especially
the importance of “gifts.” Considered the lubricant to the gears of foreign relations, gifts were
more than mere bribes but neither were they European charity. Their value went beyond the
accumulation of commodities and they represented important reciprocal exchanges that
cemented alliances. The governor knew that the expenses resulting from the gifts would raise
the ire of superiors but he nonetheless defended their use.86 They played a significant factor in
the determining the success of the first Picolata Congress. Grant stationed a schooner in the St.
Johns River stocked with gifts in order to ensure an agreement with the Lower Creek. While the
promise of receiving gifts was not the only factor in the treaty, it did enhance British prestige
because they were able to supply gifts and promise abundant trade goods. Lower Creeks would
have seen the benefit of having Florida as outlet for their deerskins and as another source of trade
in case other colonies threatened an embargo.
In addition to gifts, Governor Grant and Superintendent Stuart balanced their use of
distributing goods with attempts to exert their influence among Lower Creek headman. Initial
meetings at Picolata exposed Indigenous leaders’ reluctance to cede land because of their
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discontent with Pensacola trade rates and disputes in Georgia. In between sessions the British
representatives had private meetings with the leading Indigenous spokesmen, Tallechea and
Captain Aleck. The headmen were informed that they would not receive any gifts if an
agreement on the land cession could not be reached. Grant’s posture towards the leaders became
more reserved and he did not extend invitations for dinner as he had done previously.87 These
maneuvers seemed to have been effective since an agreement was reached shortly thereafter.
Captain Aleck was then presented to Grant in order to recognize him as a “king” so that he could
negotiate with Georgia Governor James Wright. Additionally, Grant presented “great medals” to
Tallechea, Estime, and Captain Aleck while making others small medal “chiefs.” British
officials utilized internal Creek politics by seeking to bestow prestige upon headmen who
accepted their terms. While the Lower Creeks had a decentralized political structure, agreements
such as those reached at Picolata sought to elevate headmen like Tallechea and Captain Aleck as
spokesmen for a broad range of Indigenous groups.
Vital to the Picolata negotiations were Grant and Stuart’s recognition that Lower Creek
autonomy had to be respected, at least temporarily. A year after the conference, Grant wrote to
the Broad of Trade and outlined recent conflicts between the Cherokee, the Creek, and the
British colonies. According to the governor the Creek had grown “insolent and overbearing”
because of their ability to play colonial powers against each other. Nonetheless, Grant could
only foresee disaster for the young colonies of Georgia and Florida if a war with the Creek broke
out.88 With this understanding of the geopolitical situation British officials found it prudent to
negotiate on Indigenous terms and form alliances. The treaty articles illustrate the extent to
which the British recognized Indigenous authority. Article five utilizes ambiguous language and
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stops short of stating that the Lower Creek were allowing the British settle in East Florida.
Considering that the province, from a European perspective, belonged to the British monarch, it
must have been awkward for the colonial power to admit it was not the dominant group. Seeking
to avoid this issue, the agreement stated that in order to sidestep misunderstandings, both the
British and Lower Creek, were simply seeking to clarify land boundaries. Further reinforcing
Indigenous jurisdiction, the third article of the accord allowed for Indigenous peoples to apply
justice within its own community for anyone proven to have committed an offense against the
British.89 Through an accurate gauging of power dynamics in the Southeastern Borderlands,
British officials were prudent not to encroach upon the autonomy of the Lower Creek.
In addition to the shrewd political calculations of dispensing gifts, persuading headmen,
and respecting Lower Creek authority, Grant also partook in the rituals and metaphors of
Indigenous diplomacy. Tallechea remarked that his “white brothers” now ‘talked to them in
their own way,” meaning that appropriate customs and language were implemented. Naturalist
John Bartram was present at Picolata and mentions the dances and presentations that began all
the sessions.90 Three different translators were utilized and various Indigenous traders were
present. They were an important source of information for the governor considering their
association with the Creek. Both Grant and Stuart seem to have handled the protocols for the
conferences correctly.
Diplomatic exchanges or talks usually sought to create a familiarity and connection
between both parties. Grant and Stuart invoked fictive kinship in order to establish the close
bonds of alliance. Since the Lower Creek were decentralized and invested considerable
importance to the huti, it was understandable that diplomatic relations occurred through the
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prism of kinship. Talks often began with the greeting “friends and brothers,” and the British
king was given the position of patriarch, father to his “red children.” However, through the
cultural lens of the British and the Lower Creeks, the position of a father had a different
connotation. To the British it meant the Indigenous peoples were recognizing the British king as
their ultimate authority. On the other hand, the Lower Creek were from matrilineal societies
were fathers were advisors but not authority figures. While gender was often cited, especially
since kinship was often mentioned, in talks between Europeans and Indigenous peoples it often
had a different meaning for each party.
Race is another concept over which the British and Lower Creeks would have diverging
understandings. As scholars such as Reginald Horsmen note, notions of race were in flux during
the late eighteenth century.91 Nancy Shoemaker argues that British plantations in North America
and the development of blackness and whiteness helped usher in categories of biological
difference.92 However, when this transformation actually occurred is difficult to ascertain.
Certainly this process was present in British Florida, nonetheless it remained ambiguous, as the
term “white” had different meanings. In some cases officials state that it only applies to the
British, yet when Mediterranean immigrants were recruited for Florida plantations they were
alternatively called white and non-white, depending on whether their behavior was considered
virtuous.93 Within the Picolata Congress the ubiquitous terms “red” and “white” are regularly
used by both the British and the Indigenous leaders. When these categories came to represent
distinct biological difference is debatable. Indigenous usage does not seem to connate a racial
difference, for instance Tallechea stresses commonality when he said that the British were sent
by the “great giver of breath.”94 Shoemaker also notes that the Lower Creeks had recognized the
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division of red and white towns and this may have been what they were referring to during
discussions.95 However, it has been noted that the British were never viewed as “red” but only
as “white.” There is a greater probability that the British did use “red” and “white” as racial
designations since they had already utilized the designation black or “negro.” If this was not the
case in the 1760s, certainly it became the case in succeeding decades with the increase of
plantations and the movement to legalize Africans’ inferiority. While “white” may have been
restricted to the English initially, when the Spanish returned to Florida in 1784 they would
embrace the term in their diplomatic relations with the Seminoles which they patterned after
British precedent.
Although it is difficult to gauge Lower Creek beliefs of an emerging racial order, the
Picolata Congress is able to speak to the dynamics of internal Lower Creek politics. Scholars
have debated whether the Creek had reached a beneficial agreement at Picolata or whether they
were swindled. While Saunt writes that Creeks were in a weak position and were “cajoled” to
cede the land, Kathryn E. Holland Braund argues that this is a “harsh” assessment.96 Braund’s
conclusion is more accurate, since a close examination of the headmen present at the conference
demonstrates the true costs to the Lower Creeks. Many of the leaders were from towns located
on the Chattahoochee River, about 300 miles northwest from Picolata. Considering the
decentralized nature of the Creek Confederacy it is difficult to assume that headmen such as
Tallechea and Captain Aleck felt they could project their power over Florida towns. In reality,
the Lower Creek leaders were able to gain British favor and goods for distant lands that only
served as seasonal hunting grounds. This is apparent in the concerns that the Lower Creeks aired
during the treaty negotiations. Rather than focusing on the land cession, sticking points
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concerned trade prices promised at Pensacola and the increasing numbers of settlers in Georgia.
These were all relevant issues for Indigenous peoples living further north. The cession of land in
Florida was perhaps a secondary issue or simply leverage for dealing with conflicts in Georgia.
As mentioned above, once the Picolata conference concludes, Captain Aleck and other leaders
quickly informed Grant they will depart to meet with Georgia Governor Wright. Tallechea and
Aleck, despite having conducted a treaty previously in Augusta, were savvy enough to once
again gain gifts and trade assurances in exchange for land they did not control. This begs the
question of exactly who was being out-maneuvered during the negotiations.
The biggest injury committed at the Picolata Congress was directed towards Cowkeeper,
the Seminole headman. Alachua was directly adjacent to the territory the British were requesting
and they would have to deal with the consequences of the transaction. Although speculative, it is
difficult to argue that Cowkeeper’s absence from the proceedings was purely coincidental. In a
similar situation that occurred in 1774, the trader and planter Jonathan Bryan had claimed that
the Creeks had agreed to cede an enormous land grant just north of Alachua to him. While
British authorities felt that this was fraudulent, Gallay argues that the Creek may have been
attempting to preempt a possible British trade embargo by having Bryan as another source of
goods.97 He also states that the Creek possibly sought to coerce the Seminoles to return to
Georgia. When Bryan sought out Cowkeeper’s approval of the land grant, the headman was
absent long enough for British East Florida authorities to thwart Bryan’s land scheme.98
Whether Cowkeeper utilized absence as a negotiation ploy is uncertain, but it is more reasonable
to assume he did not appreciate lands arguably in his jurisdiction being ceded by leaders living
hundreds of miles away.99 Nonetheless, the Alachua Seminoles lacked the power to openly
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confront the Lower Creeks, for their population numbers even into the nineteenth century were
relatively low. Perhaps the Seminoles were yet to decisively spilt from the Lower Creeks. This
is illustrated through the behavior of Wioffke, considered Cowkeepers’ second-in-command, and
his deference to Tallechea during the Picolata Congress.100
While the cession of East Florida territory was done largely through an agreement
between the Lower Creek and the British, Cowkeeper still saw the benefit of an alliance with the
latter, which ironically secured the Seminoles their independence from the Creek. Cowkeeper
and Governor Grant met privately in St. Augustine to ratify the Picolata agreements. Although
they were scheduled to meet in a few months, Cowkeeper briskly made his way to the colonial
capital to make his own arrangements with Grant. The Seminole leader established an important
policy position for the Alachua Seminoles. He decided that a close alliance with the British, a
policy that continued even after the Spanish returned, was in the best interest of the Seminoles.
This served not only as an important military alliance but also a source of trade goods, especially
ammunition. Although the Lower Creeks had negotiated with the British, they maintained a
policy of ambivalence towards their treaty partners. On the other hand the Seminoles embraced
their British allies as a cornerstone of their foreign policy. In a 1774 letter to the new East
Florida Governor Patrick Tonyn, Cowkeeper explains that he “had always been a friend to the
English was taught to be so by his father and though he was called a wild man by the nation, it
was not so, for both he and his people loved the white people.”101 Linking their fortunes through
a strong alliance with East Florida served to make the Seminoles more independent from the
Lower Creek.
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When the Spanish returned to Florida after the American Revolution, they claimed
legitimacy by citing their close connection with the British in their talks with the Seminoles. The
Picolata Congress had established the terms of diplomacy in the region, even after the departure
of the British. Through an examination of Spanish colonial documents it becomes clear that the
Seminoles never lost their preference for the British over the Spanish. Grant’s conferences,
including the lesser attended second meeting held in 1767, achieved their immediate goals of
gaining territorial rights and defusing tensions in British, Lower Creek, and Seminole relations.
They established a blueprint, in terms of gift giving and the language of diplomacy, that the
Spanish would follow in their own policy. In this regard the British period could be considered a
success. Additionally, the congress led to the stability that the governor sought so that
plantations could develop.
The proceedings of the Picolata Congresses were not exhaustive and did not address
issues that would in the future become prominent, namely trade and fugitive African slaves.
Both issues had been important points of discussion in the past but the priority for the British
was the land grant. These issues were implicitly mentioned in the treaty articles concerning
guarantees of trade as well as the protection of settlers’ property. The presence of traders at the
Picolata meetings is mentioned but not elaborated upon. British merchants sought the
continuation of the commercial deerskin trade. Southeastern Indigenous peoples had requested
that the trading houses place agents in their towns in order to gain access to manufactured goods.
Tallechea stated at the Picolata conference that he requested the trader John Colvit be assigned to
his town while John Letter be sent to Alachuca.102 Although few records exist of his operations,
James Spalding was a prominent trader in East Florida among the Seminoles. Serving as his
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host, naturalist William Bartram often stopped with Spalding and documented transactions
between the trader and the Seminoles.103 Eventually William Panton and his partner John Leslie
replaced Spalding’s East Florida operation. They formed the Panton, Leslie, and Company
trading firm and in 1776 Patrick Tonyn appointed them to manage the Indian trade.104 They
established a trading network that would eventually span into the Second Spanish Florida period.
Although none of the traders married into Seminole communities their outposts represented the
few sources of intelligence about Indigenous settlements. During the Second Spanish period,
traders often doubled as Spanish diplomatic envoys.
Traders main line of business was the exchange of deerskins for manufactured goods
delivered from London, but they also traded in slaves on a small scale. As will be discussed
shortly, British Florida witnessed in its brief history a rapid transformation from a mixed labor
system including white indentured servants to the spread of plantations specializing in African
slaves. Earlier Spanish rule had made Florida a sanctuary for African slaves, including runaways
who relocated among Indigenous peoples. For British authorities seeking to promote the
development of plantations this would be a cause of concern. In a letter to the Board of Trade,
Lieutenant Governor John Moultrie writes that runaway slaves make haste to “Indian towns.”
Seminoles had given officials verbal assurances that they would deliver up “fugitive” African
slaves. Moultrie notes that in select cases the Seminoles consented to individual planters
retrieving their own slaves but without any actual assistance. Seeking to draw clear social and
political distinctions between Indigenous peoples and Africans, the British offered incentives for
the return of absconded slaves. Moultrie was convinced of continuing Seminole cooperation in
the future.105 Nonetheless, the historical record does show that the Seminoles often feigned
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compliance only to leave masters frustrated once efforts to locate slaves were thwarted. The
ever-increasing presence of Africans among Indigenous peoples would become a concern once
the number of slaves and plantations increased. During the upheavals of the American
Revolution and the influx of southern planters into Florida, Governor Tonyn lamented a trade
between the inhabitants and Indigenous peoples. Apparently colonists were “exchanging prize
Negroes and runaways for cattle taken by the Indians from the rebels which if not put a stop to
will be productive of very bad consequences.”106 Unfortunately, the governor failed to elaborate
why this development caused much consternation, but during Florida’s colonial period many
officials felt the congregation of Africans and Indigenous peoples would lead to negative
repercussions.107
With the success of the Picolata Congresses, Governor Grant had established the ideal
relationship, at least for British interests, with the Lower Creeks and Seminoles. Indigenous
groups made regular visits, participated in talks, and received gifts; conversely, they recognized
British land claims while agreeing to make restitution for the loss of property and damages
resulting from individual conflicts between Indigenous peoples and colonists. Due to the
proximity of the Seminoles, planters needed guarantees that they could control the social and
geographic space between Indigenous peoples and Africans. Emerging political and economic
systems based upon a plantation export economy were reliant on the creation of a rigid racial
hierarchy that marginalized African slaves to its lowest rungs. This racial order was based on the
creation and maintenance of biologically distinct categories. Populations of runaway Africans
among the Seminoles threatened the possibility of not only a political and military alliance but
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the blurring of racial lines. Grant seems to have sufficiently allayed these fears in order for
several ambitious endeavors to be undertaken.

1.5

The Rise of Plantations and the Racialization of Africans
Despite British Florida’s short lifespan and the disruptions of the American Revolution,

the potential of a developing plantation export economy and labor segmentation based on race
remained feasible. A number of prominent planters attempted large-scale operations and a few,
such as Fatio, had crossed the threshold of prosperity. While others, such as Turnbull, fell short
of their overly ambitious designs, nonetheless, their tales of unfulfilled wealth are instructive
concerning the direction that the colony was approaching. Particularly significant was the shift
from a labor system based on indentured servants and African slaves to a labor regime reliant on
the coercive labor of blacks. Although efforts were made to lure “white” indentured servants and
settlers, colonial officials swiftly emphasized the desirability of African slaves. As Stephanie E.
Smallwood notes in Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora, the
British, through institutions such as the Board of Trade and Plantations, had by the early
eighteenth century commodified African slaves as units to be quantified, measured, and
exploited.108 In Virginia during the 1660s, various laws were enacted distinguishing between
European American indentured servants and African slaves, most notably slaves’ children
inheriting their mother’s slave status and the declaration that Christian baptism did not release a
slave out of bondage.109 South Carolina’s panicked response to the 1739 Stono Rebellion was a
Negro Act, slave code, implemented a year after the insurrection. A little more than a decade
and a half later the recently founded Georgia colony would pattern its own code on the South
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Carolina law. Arriving late to these developments, Florida’s legislature would pass its own
Negro Act in the twilight years of the American Revolution. This legislative action cemented the
hardening of racial categories in British Florida.
Governor Grant was able to examine the development of neighboring colonies when
crafting the policies of British Florida. As mentioned above, his own experiences in South
Carolina with the Cherokee taught him the value of reaching diplomatic arrangements with
Indigenous groups. Considering that the governor also sought to lure South Carolina planters
and their African slaves to Florida, he also sought to emulate that colony’s economic model.110
In correspondence with the Board of Trade and Plantations, it is clear that Grant had a vision for
Florida that sought to attract white settlers (small-scale farmers) and large-scale planters. In his
July 1763 letter to the board, the governor mentions the possible use of French Protestants and
the purchase of a hundred slaves to assist in building projects.111 A year later he issued a
proclamation, which bestowed one hundred acres to a head of a household and an additional
“fifty acres for every white or black man, woman or child.”112 Grant was able to draw a number
of planters, as well as their slave workforce, who became recipients of large land grants. The
governor worked tirelessly to support these endeavors, including financial assistance; they were
part of his clear vision for British Florida.113
Beyond simply being a booster of plantations, Grant was among the ranks of investors
seeking profitability in the newly acquired territory. He formed his own plantation called
Grant’s Villa and procured advice on the cultivation of indigo, which became Florida’s principal
plantation export crop. The governor hired an experienced overseer and then purchased a
number of slaves: the estate eventually had sixty-nine slaves by time they were all sold in 1784.
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Slaves were initially organized in the “gang” labor system but Grant embraced the “task” model,
which assigned slaves a daily quota of duties.114 Although this method of organizing slaves is
generally viewed as less rigid than “gang” labor, Grant still sought to maximize the production of
his slaves. He began to boast of being a “great planter and improver” and seeking to increase the
number of his slaves.115 By 1774 Grant’s Villa had recouped the initial investment and yielded a
considerable profit for its proprietor, who by then resided in Europe.116
During the same year that Grant delivered his first Picolata talk to the Lower Creek and
Seminoles, he also established a partnership with Richard Oswald, a prosperous London
merchant. Grant choose his associate well since Oswald had access to both capital and African
slaves, both critical in the mind of the governor.117 Indigo and rice became important export
crops for their 20,000-acre Mount Oswald plantation. Oswald was willing to heavily invest into
the endeavor and he paid for African slaves who had carpenter and blacksmith skills. Many
were slaves from Bance Island in Sierra Leone, owned by Oswald’s slave trading company.
Daniel L. Schafer argues that Mount Oswald was on the verge of financial success when the
massive disruptions of the American Revolution caused first stagnation and then
abandonment.118 Oswald felt vulnerable in East Florida after the Spanish joined the American
Revolution, and he arranged for his slaves to be transported to Savannah. Eventually the slaves
were forced to return to Florida once the war concluded, the various journeys taking their toll on
the group. Many of the province’s planters would be forced to relocate once the terms of the
Treaty of Paris of 1783 were finalized.
One of the few British subjects and successful planters to weather the turmoil of the
revolution and remain in Florida was Francis Philip Fatio. His life is informative since it
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spanned British Florida and the succeeding Second Spanish Florida period. In a 1782 letter,
Fatio wrote to Major Morrison to convince him that the British should retain the colony.
Reminiscent of Grant’s early letters to the Board of Trade, Fatio perpetuated the trope of Florida
as an untapped Eden.119 While offering his words of wisdom, the planter discloses that he has
lived in British Florida for ten years.120 In Susan R. Parker’s analysis of Fatio’s New
Switzerland, she argues that his political flexibility and economic diversification ensured his
survival and financial gains.121 While others concentrated their activities on indigo, Fatio
invested in cattle, citrus, and the sale of timber. He made the necessary arrangements when the
Spanish returned to Florida and became a supplier to the government. Fatio’s stature as a
prominent planter was cemented under the Spanish and he often became a focal point in colonial
affairs especially when the Mikasuki raided his plantation and seized slaves.
In comparison to planters such as Oswald and Fatio, the events associated with
Turnbull’s estate are comparatively speaking more spectacular and educational. A prominent
Scottish physician based in London and former British consul to Greece, Turnbull became
enamored with the prospects of establishing massive settlements and plantations in Florida. The
cornerstone to his ambitions involved the enlistment of Greek, Italian, and Minorcan settlers to
work his lands in East Florida. Turnbull believed that people acclimated to a Mediterranean
climate and with knowledge of agriculture in such an environment would make an ideal
workforce. He felt that “whites” would be more industrious than African slaves and their
Mediterranean background would immunize them from the rigors of plantation work. Turnbull’s
use of white indentured servants ran counter to larger trends that began with Bacon’s Rebellion
and the shift towards a racialized division of labor and the utilization of African slaves on
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plantations. However, as anti-slavery policies in Georgia illustrate, critiques of slavery,
especially its propagation of a hierarchical society, did exist. On other the hand, Turnbull’s main
objection was based on the belief that “white” indentured servants were more efficient workers.
While Grant remained convinced of the supremacy of African slave labor for his colony,
Turnbull sought a labor force that was both considered “white” yet clearly subordinate.122 The
whiteness extended to Greek, Italian, and Minorcan workers was liminal. Their cultural position,
especially as Catholics, bestowed an aura of foreignness. Certainly their working conditions and
virtual state of bondage, including the renewal of contracts without compensation, threatened
their status as “white.”123 For example, one Greek worker’s attempt to flee was punished with
the warning he would labor with the “Negroes,” while a blacksmith was whipped by an African
laborer under Turnbull’s orders.124
A combination of misguided policies and the ill-treatment of workers was responsible for
the eventual dissolution of Turnbull’s grandiose scheme, which consequently reinforced
arguments about the impracticality of employing white indentured servants. While giving
Carolina planters a tour of his estate in 1768, Turnbull encountered an attempt by a portion of his
Italian and Greek workers to abscond to Havana. Just as his guests “were astonished at the
progress which had been made, they agreed that the same number of Negroes could not have
done more,” the rebellious laborers seized weapons, a ship, and left the main manager wounded.
They plundered storage buildings and attacked other servants, especially the Minorcans who
refused to join them. Grant believed that the lack of discipline among the leaders of insurrection
led to the eventual capture of the hijacked ship. Many of the instigators were punished, and the
governor had promised to send troops into the area since “planters in the neighborhood of Mr.
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Turnbull are already alarmed as what has happened.” 125 Grant stated that the Seminoles were
also alerted to the presence of the immigrants: apparently the workers were mistaken for being
Spanish. Attempting to clarify the status of the workers, the British official stated they are not
“white people (English)” but are subjects there “to help their brothers the English to cultivate the
lands.”126 While the Italians, Greeks, and Minorcans were obediently working they were labeled
white and industrious. However, after the incident Grant primarily points to their foreignness as
the root cause of the revolt and he disowns their whiteness in front of the Seminoles. More
significantly, this episode and the continued problems occurring at Turnbull’s plantation must
have reaffirmed the governor’s faith in the value of African slavery as opposed to white
indentured servants.127
Ironically, the same upheavals that eventually led to the 1783 retrocession of Florida to
Spain nearly transformed the colony into Grant’s vision of a substantial plantation export
economy. As a loyalist sanctuary from the active theaters of the American Revolution, Florida
attracted numerous planters with their slaves from South Carolina and Georgia who hoped to
resume their agricultural operations there.128 With the drastic influx of refugee planters, the
number of African slaves increased by 8,000, surpassing the British population.129 During a span
of about five years Florida experienced a rapid transformation and geopolitical shift from the
margins to the center of British activity in the South. Once the British experienced a Southern
resurgence around 1779 in the South Carolina and Georgia theaters, Florida was no longer
directly threatened by American Forces. However, Spain’s entry into the conflict and Bernardo
de Gálvez’ capture of Pensacola in 1781 did stir fears in St. Augustine. As mentioned above,
this prompted Oswald to relocate to Georgia. Similar to other wars, the East Florida capital
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never capitulated and British settlers, such as Fatio, had argued that it should remain apart of the
British Empire. To their dismay, as well as to the frustration of their Seminole allies, the British
would not make the necessary efforts to retain a territorial foothold in the Southeastern
Borderlands.
As the brief British tenure in Florida was drawing to a close, the newly formed East
Florida assembly passed the 1782 Negro Act, which epitomized the hardening of racial
categories in the colony. Children of African slaves were legally bound to follow the condition
of their mothers. Free Blacks and mulattos could be enslaved if they failed to provide evidence
of their freedom, such as a silver armband inscribed with the word “free.” Slaves were restricted
from freely moving around, especially while carrying arms, without written permission from
their masters. Other supplemental acts provided for slave patrols, construction of a workhouse to
provide discipline, and the impressment of slaves for public works.130
However, the Negro Act nearly failed to become law due to a substantial stalemate over a
provision in the law. Consequently Governor Tonyn had to take the drastic action of dissolving
the assembly. At the heart of the debate was the guarantee of a jury trial for African slave
defendants in capital cases. In the upper house legislators “maintained that it was most humane
and most conformable to the laws of England; and no wise prejudicial to the owners of slaves,
that they should have the fairest and fullest chance for their life, by being tried by a jury before
the justices of the general court.”131 Conversely the East Florida Commons House of Assembly
was adamant that sending slaves to St. Augustine for a trial was an undue expense to planters and
could be settled by a local trial with a jury of “twelve free white men.” Furthermore they argued
that a “a lenient slave code” served as an impediment to “loyalist slave-owning planters from
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immigrating into the province and might prod those already in the colony to leave.”132
Eventually they conceded to gubernatorial oversight over any judicial proceedings once the trials
were completed.133 Although the governor remarked that the debate “carried on with a great deal
of warmth on both sides, and with some illiberality by one side, no personal animosities prevail,”
tensions were clearly present.134 The lower house effectively stymied colonial business in 1781,
a critical period during the American Revolution, and refused to attend to any other business
until the Negro Act, their foremost priority, was adopted. The act was “virtually a Black Code
for East Florida” patterned after a similar laws in Georgia and South Carolina. Considering elite
fears that the American Revolution could spark social upheaval, including the increased black
agency that resulted from their military service in the British ranks, planters felt vulnerable and
sought legal protection.
Eventually Tonyn, chastised by his superiors, managed to reconvene the assembly in
early 1782 and reached a compromise.135 Passage of the Negro Act signaled the transformation
of Florida from a struggling area with a few plantations, many of which had to diversify in order
to survive, to a territory ready to follow the example of its neighboring colonies. Although the
revolution had created a chaotic situation with refugee planters in dire straits, a return to stability
would allow these recent arrivals to establish themselves in the territory. All the parties in the
dispute over the Negro Act had accepted its necessity and only fought over the extent of
restrictions upon African slaves. Writing two years prior to the impasse, Tonyn stated that:
the wealth of the inhabitants of the southern colonies consists entirely of Negroes, and
without a provincial law establishing a property in them, property is on a precarious
tenure, besides the great degree of licentiousness, that prevails amongst them renders it
necessary that they should be under more restraints than the laws of England have laid
upon servants.136
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Despite their opposition, the upper house had already conceded on many of the points of the act
but held firm on the issue of the trials. Their stance was cognizant of trends in England where
slavery was being phased out, but they realized that the situation in Florida was different.
Conversely, two members of the lower house, John Leslie and Thomas Forbes were Indian
traders and future members of Panton, Leslie, and Company.137 Although both men specialized
in transactions involving deerskins for manufactured British goods they nonetheless were
landowners. Forbes in particular had been in possession, through the company, of an indigo
plantation. In all probability they had utilized slave labor and were sympathetic towards efforts
to protect property rights. With the passage of the act, refugee planters and traders had made a
statement about the role they envisioned for themselves in the development of the province.
Although only existing briefly before the retrocession of Florida, the Negro Act marked
an important milestone in the racialization of Africans. In addition to the act, Tonyn later called
for the use of slaves for the public defense as well as the construction of a workhouse for “the
custody and punishment of Negroes.”138 Wright states that Africans in East Florida had to
contend with curfews, regulations on their economic transactions, and a system that publicly
delineated free Africans and slaves belonging to rebel colonists.139 Through the adoption of a
Negro Act, Florida now mirrored other southern colonies’ racialized division of labor. Although
Grant had always favored African slave labor, Turnbull and fellow planter Denys Rolle sought to
utilize white indentured servants on their plantations.140 In particular, Turnbull transported
Mediterranean “whites,” reasoning that their bodies were acclimated to the warm climate and
intensive labor. These workers’ rebelliousness and their later appeal to colonial authorities
proved decisive in the debates over African slavery and indentured servitude. As had been
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realized elsewhere, “white” workers, in this case Greeks, Italians, and Minorcans, were more
difficult to control. They had greater avenues to flight, resist, and the ability to appeal on the
basis of their, albeit limited, whiteness against extremely coercive labor regimes. Africans were
racialized as “black” and viewed as a distinct biological group, as evidenced in arguments that
Africans were suited for warm climates and naturally apt at plantation work routines. The Negro
Act institutionalized through government enforcement the subordinate position of Africans by
stripping them of any legal protections. No longer were the lines between African slaves and
white indentured workers blurred in a society where racial lines were clearly drawn between red,
white, and black.

Conclusion
News emanating from the 1783 treaty negotiations began to filter down to British
loyalists in East Florida. Despite expectations that the crown would retain the colony it became
clear that Spain would reclaim its former province.141 Disillusioned refugee settlers having
already been displaced from other southern colonies were forced to once again relocate. The
Alachua Seminoles also shared their frustration, having allied themselves closely to the British,
and enjoying a stable trade, they had to stomach the return of the Spanish. Cowkeeper had
apparently disclosed his distain of the Spanish by remarking that he would “kill every Spaniard
that offers to set his head out of the lines of the town.” Understandably he felt betrayed and
abandoned by his alliance partner.142 Nonetheless, the twenty-year British reign in Florida was
more than a brief interruption in Spain’s occupation of Florida. Although many of the ambitious
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schemes dreamt by Governor Grant never came to fruition, British Florida nonetheless left an
imprint on the development of the territory.
Traditional narratives stressing the failure of British East Florida have relied on economic
and political gauges but have not emphasized the important precedents established during their
reign. Agreements reached at the Picolata Congresses with the Lower Creek and the Seminole
would become the basis of Spanish diplomatic policy with those Indigenous groups.
Considering the Creek’s effective raids during the first Spanish Florida period and the collapse of
the Franciscan missions, Spanish officials would adopt the British model based on gifts and
alliances. In talks or pláticas with the Seminoles, the Spanish traced their political legitimacy
from the British, and in so doing they recognized the high regard the British held with
Indigenous leaders, especially Cowkeeper. The significant presence of Scottish merchants in the
Panton, Leslie, and Company trading firm began under British rule and continued under the
Spanish. Traders would become vital agents in the field, supplying trade, delivering pláticas,
and translating messages from Indigenous headman. They would ensure that the language
implemented by Grant in the Picolata Congresses would continue in Spanish-Seminole
correspondence. Additionally the British governor illustrated that stable relations with the
Seminole could enable economic growth through plantations. While the majority of British
planters evacuated the colony, Fatio remained and wielded considerable influence. Spanish
officials would attempt to nurture their own plantation export economy by seeking to entice
American planters to relocate to Florida. Considering the difficulties of their first occupation of
the province, the Spanish were keen to build upon the successful aspects of British Florida.
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Scholars examining the development of a plantation export economy, chattel slavery, and
solidifying racial designations begin their analysis with the U.S. annexation of Florida in 1821.
Nonetheless Grant’s policies were instrumental in encouraging an economic and labor system
dependent on the creation and maintenance of categories such as “white,” “negro,” and “red.”
Through the Picolata agreements, Grant was able to gain physical and social space between
Seminole and British settlements. In conjunction with the understanding that the Seminoles
would return runaway slaves, the governor could now nurture a plantation system that quickly
embraced African slavery over white indentured servitude. Refugee planters from South
Carolina and Georgia soon demanded that Florida institutionalize its control and racialization of
African slaves. With passage of the Negro Act, the territory more resembled other southern
colonies. Although the consequences of the American Revolution signaled the end of British
Florida and the displacement of many of its colonists, the processes ushered in during this period
did not simply vanish.
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Chapter 2
PLÁTICAS DE LOS ESPAÑOLES Y GENTE COLORADA:
SHIFTING RACIAL DISCOURSE IN THE FLORIDA BORDERLANDS
DURING THE SECOND SPANISH PERIOD, 1784-1821
To the headmen and warriors of the Lower Creek and Seminoles. I wish to see
you and it gives me much joy that you have come. My officials and I welcome you and
extend a hand of friendship and smoke the peace pipe. The Spanish and English kings
have reciprocated in extending their hands and burying the hatchet. Your sons and
warriors live in peace, and like brothers. Our father the great king of Spain has sent me
to look after the Red people as if they were his own children. We will keep the road clear
and abundant in this land and for the Indian nations. We will secure all the red people so
that they may hunt peacefully in the countryside and mountains.
Friends and brothers, let us now smoke the peace pipe. Let us become joyful, and
drink to the health of the great king of Spain and all the Red People.
Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes, 17841

Spain’s reacquisition of Florida coincided with the interplay between an emerging market
economy and increasingly rigid racial categories with previously established Indigenous and
European systems. Initial Spanish occupation of the province (1562-1763) more closely
reflected the institutionally driven colonialism found in other North American areas such as New
Mexico and California.2 The Spanish led military and missionary operations in the Florida
interior with efforts to expand their influence outside the few principal settlements. Their first
territorial reign underscored the limitations of this particular colonial project, especially in areas
outside St. Augustine, as increasing Indigenous and British pressure kept the Spanish at bay.3
For the region’s native peoples, the Gaule, Timucuan, Apalachee, and Yamasee, the presence of
the Spanish, the spread of diseases, and the outbreak of violent conflicts brought about their
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demographic collapse.4 Reacquisition of Las Floridas, East and West, during 1784-1821 ushered
in more varied governmental policies. Spanish officials, with a small military presence,
jettisoned attempts to acculturate Indigenous peoples through missions and centered their
colonial strategies on diplomacy.
Within this context, Governor Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes could not dictate the terms of
his economic and political relationship with the Seminoles and Lower Creeks. Setting a
precedent for subsequent Spanish governors, he instead relied on existing channels of
Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy. During their brief tenure in Florida, the British utilized
experienced officers to reach agreements with Indigenous groups through congresses and
conferences that followed the diplomatic protocols of the region. An essential part of these
gatherings were speeches given by Indigenous and European representatives outlining their
positions and grievances. Following an initial speech was an intercession and then the other
party would give its own speech rebutting unfavorable arguments while reasserting their
position. Transcripts of the discussions from Picolata Congresses of 1765 demonstrate that the
speakers utilized various metaphors in their speeches to communicate fictive kinship and power
relationships, express peaceful intentions, and to mitigate any words or actions that could cause
offense. Often the discussions occurred through an intermediary that could translate the
speeches, either a European-American trader or an African and Indigenous interpreter. An
additional component of the meetings was the distribution of gifts in order to establish a
relationship of reciprocity. Europeans viewed these expenditures as necessary bribes or
payments but for Southeastern Indigenous peoples they were important in cementing the new
arrangements. While calling these goods “gifts” connotes European benevolence, colonial
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representatives were asking for something in return. Indigenous peoples were expected to
consent to alliances, land grants, trade relationships, and to prosecute individuals accused of a
crime.
The talks or pláticas were letters that fulfilled similar functions as the speeches given
during conferences. This correspondence occurred between principal Seminole leaders and
various Spanish governors and constituted nation-to-nation talks. Nancy Shoemaker notes that
the term “nation,” in the early to middle eighteenth century, possessed a different meaning than
what it would eventually signify.5 Nations referred to political entities united through culture
and language, they were not synonymous with a nation-state and its accompanying institutions.6
Although the Seminoles were politically decentralized, the pláticas did serve to highlight
Indigenous leaders such as Payne. He was the recipient of the majority of talks directed to the
Alachua Seminoles, until the emergence of Bowleg. Meanwhile, Spanish messages to the
Mikasuki were directed to their leader Kinache. Thus the pláticas highlighted certain leaders
and colonial authorities held expectations that they spoke for a wide number of settlements and
people. During the Picolata Congresses, the British established a precedent of seeking to elevate
Lower Creek and Seminole leaders over others in order to facilitate negotiations.7 Indigenous
leaders holding discussions with colonial powers often gained control of trade and gifts, which
would help elevate their prestige and political position.
While physical meetings between Indigenous leaders and colonial representatives could
lead to new treaties, the pláticas often sought to reaffirm or maintain pre-existing agreements
rather than lead to new accords. The treaties were informal agreements spelling out roughly
what territory Europeans and Indigenous peoples could inhabit as well as the terms of mutual
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defense agreements. These arrangements could be undermined by the shifting geopolitical
situation, the encroachment of colonists in Indigenous territory, and even incidents between
individuals and small groups. Within the hierarchy of diplomatic encounters, the pláticas did not
carry the same weight of a conference. Nonetheless, the Seminole-Spanish pláticas sought to
defuse events that could unravel the delicate agreements that had begun between the British,
Lower Creeks, and Seminoles.
Diplomacy through the pláticas marked a departure in Spanish colonial policy and
highlighted their tenuous position. Unlike the British speeches delivered in the congresses and
conferences, the pláticas were even more dependent on intermediaries and translators to transmit
their messages. In Florida, this often meant that the British firm Panton, Leslie, and Company,
consisting of mostly Scottish merchants, handled the communications with Indigenous peoples
since the Spanish had been forced to outsource the Indian trade and by extension aspects of their
diplomatic mission. Unlike the British who could afford to hold meetings such as the 1767
Picolata Congress, the Spanish had to rely more on traders and pláticas rather than expensive
conferences. Indigenous peoples could identify the significance of Spain’s inability to hold
congresses, give gifts, and their reliance on British mediators who arguably were more powerful
since they controlled trade.
Although the late eighteenth century witnessed a greater tendency in Spanish colonial
North America to utilize diplomacy and gifts, Spain’s relationship with Florida’s Indigenous
peoples was distinct. In California, the Spanish remained faithful to a strategy based on mission
and presidio complexes to hold territory and acculturate Indigenous peoples and turn them into
Spanish citizens. Meanwhile in New Mexico and Texas, James Brooks and Juliana Barr write
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that the Spanish had to engage in Indigenous political, economic, and social systems centered on
the captive raiding economy and notions of gender. However, in Florida the Spanish had to
adjust to the specific conditions of the Southeastern Borderlands, a region also connected to the
economic and political currents of the Atlantic World. While captive taking and the use of
gender metaphors did occur in the region it was not as prevalent as it was in other areas.
Florida’s provinces during the British period experienced the growth of the plantation export
economy and African slavery; which made it different from the regions of Texas and New
Mexico discussed by Barr and Brooks respectively. British traders among the Lower Creeks and
Seminoles sought to control the deerskin trade and integrate the region to the market economy.
Consequently, scholars such as Nancy Shoemaker state that the spread of African slavery in the
Southeast initiated the creation of rigid racial categories. Indigenous peoples had previously
utilized terms such as “white” and “red” to refer to peace (white) and war (red) towns. Though
these divisions were malleable, white settlements were generally charged with domestic affairs
and diplomacy while red towns were responsible for military leadership.8 However, during the
eighteenth century these terms eventually became markers of racial difference for Europeans and
later Indigenous peoples as well. The Spanish upon their return to East and West Florida would
be influenced by these processes and be forced to adapt due to their vulnerable position.
Diplomacy between the Lower Creek, Seminole, and Spanish spanned the entire Second
Spanish Florida period, 1784-1821, and broached several themes and topics. Initial pláticas
were concerned with re-asserting Spanish political jurisdiction after the 1783 Peace of Paris
resulted in the evacuation of British officials and settlers from the province. In short order, the
treaties not only restored Florida to Spain but they also established a northern border with the
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young nation of the United States. Zéspedes and other Spanish officials were distressed over the
threat posed to the colony by combustible relations with Indigenous groups whose power in
northern Florida had to be respected. Seminole headman Cowkeeper had expressed his hostility
towards the Spanish and vowed to “kill every Spaniard that offers to set his head out of the line
of the town.”9 He also asserted his sovereignty over Florida and would contest Spanish
authority. In light of these concerns the early pláticas sought to win Indigenous acquiesce to the
transfer of colonial power and to convince headmen that Spain sought a continuation of British
policies. Zéspedes, his agents and interpreters, stressed a fictive kin relationship and a
willingness to acknowledge a measure of Seminole autonomy. Equally important for both
parties were assurances that gifts and trade goods, which were consistently provided under the
British, would resume unabated in hopes of securing Indigenous alliances and peace treaties.
Thus pláticas provide valuable insight into both the goals and agendas of the Spanish, Seminole,
and Lower Creek and they shed light on the ground level political dynamics of the Florida
Borderlands.
Aside from divulging details about the state of Spanish-Seminole affairs in northern
Florida, the pláticas provide larger analytical insight into important questions and processes.
They demonstrate how Spain’s geopolitical position, as illustrated through the talks, influenced
the racial discourse of the Florida Borderlands. Reginald Horsman argues that the late 18th and
19th centuries represented the beginning of a transition to more rigid notions of race based upon
the separation of racial groups and the inherent inferiority of non-whites.10 British precedents in
Indigenous diplomacy and the continuing presence of British traders and agents influenced
Spanish officials and the language they adopted in the pláticas. Scholars Richard White, Peter
106

Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker also trace, respectively, the decline of the “middle ground” with
a drive by empires to establish order against perceived threats to colonial societies and the
emerging capitalistic system.11 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron also write that “as colonial
borderlands gave way to national borders, fluid and ‘inclusive’ intercultural frontiers yielded to
hardened and more ‘exclusive’ hierarchies.”12 Spanish Florida could not help but be caught in
these emerging currents during its final years.
Considering the larger historical context of the second Spanish Florida period, this
chapter examines a couple of key areas, drawing upon Spanish-Seminole pláticas as an
informative lens on the interplay between local level power dynamics and larger transnational
processes. Examining the manner in which the talks are delivered, their language and
symbolism, and their subject matter powerfully testifies to the dynamism of the Florida
Borderlands. Diplomatic talks demonstrate the racialization of Seminoles and, indirectly,
Africans. Spanish diplomacy relied heavily on British traders as messengers, translators, and
official representatives as they simultaneously oversaw the expansion of the market economy
and the commodification of land, livestock, and African slaves. Their presence meant that
Spanish officials engaged in a racial discourse that utilized terms such as “white” and “red”
rather than more traditional cultural designations. Spanish colonial policies, influenced by their
British predecessors, sought stable relations with Indigenous peoples in order to promote
plantations while securing property. For Africans this signaled a shift in racial discourse and a
decline in spaces of negotiation. Simultaneously, native peoples used the pláticas as forums for
their political resistance to colonialism. Indeed, through the vehicle of the pláticas we see the
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racialization and construction of “Indians” and “blacks” and an economy moving from
reciprocity to the commercial deerskin trade.
Understanding how racialization and the market economy affected Spanish Florida
constitutes an important contribution to North American Spanish Borderlands historiography.
Claudio Saunt argues that while Spanish primary sources are invaluable, he challenges the notion
that the region as a whole represented a “Spanish borderlands” since the Europeans’ presence
was minimal.13 His efforts to integrate the Southeast into the larger story of U.S. colonialism
and the Atlantic World economy provides a useful framework. Scholars such as David Weber
argue that the return of the Spanish to Florida signaled the movement to “re-hispanicize” the
area.14 Jane Landers’ work, influenced by Frank Tannenbaum, has focused on the first Spanish
reign in Florida and has illustrated that African society in Florida received “acknowledgement of
a slave’s humanity and rights and a liberal manumission policy.”15 A consensus exists among
scholars that Spanish Florida was an area with malleable notions of race that offered groups,
especially Africans, increased space for agency and resistance. However this observation can
obfuscate and neglect larger processes that were taking root in the Southeastern Borderlands.
The pláticas problematize generalizations of Spanish colonialism and demonstrate how officials
adapted to changing circumstances. Factors such as the lasting influence of prior British policies
and traders, adherence to Lower Creek and Seminole diplomatic protocols, and the emergence of
racial designations of “white,” “red,” and “black” demonstrate that the Second Spanish Florida
period must be contextualized within the larger sociopolitical movements at the turn of the
nineteenth century.
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2.1 Seminole-Spanish Pláticas
Primarily, the pláticas between the Spanish and the Seminoles grew out of a need to
restore a sense of security for both groups during politically and militarily combustible periods.
Early talks dealt with the nurturing of peace between the Spanish and Seminole immediately
after the British evacuation finished in 1784. Periodically, conflicts broke out and threatened to
foment cycles of violence between the Indigenous peoples and the planters on the St. Johns and
St. Mary’s Rivers. Spanish governors sent pláticas hoping to assure Indigenous peoples that any
of their subjects who committed crimes would be punished and they requested that Seminole
leaders reciprocate against Indigenous individuals accused of similar offenses. During the
emergence of the British adventurer William Augustus Bowles in 1791, the Spanish governor
dispatched many talks to dissuade the Seminoles, Mikasuki, and Lower Creeks from joining the
movement against their colonial rule.16 Bowles wanted to utilize Indigenous alliances to seize
territory and to end the Panton, Leslie, and Company trade monopoly. His base of support was
first among the Apalachicola Seminoles and later with the Mikasuki. Indigenous accords with
the British filibuster owed more to their previous acrimony towards the Spanish and local
merchants rather than Bowles’ abilities as a leader, despite his unabashed self-promotion.17
Unsuccessful in the early 1790s, Bowles later returned around the turn of the nineteenth century.
Mikasuki headman Kinache utilized the ensuing upheaval to oversee successful captive taking
and the subsequent negotiation of ransom payments.18 The raids drew Spanish authorities’ ire,
setting off diplomatic dispatches to the Alachua Seminoles requesting their intercession. These
are only a few examples when Spanish officials, Indigenous leaders, and intermediaries relied on
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diplomacy in order to avoid even wider conflicts that would have upset the delicate balance of
power in the Florida Borderlands.
British withdrawal from East Florida in 1784 was disagreeable to the Seminoles,
especially since they were never consulted. Seminole leader Cowkeeper voiced his frustration
with the British, vowing to confront any Spanish forces attempting to re-occupy Florida and
declaring the Seminoles independent of any foreign powers.19 Obviously the Spanish needed to
earn the trust of the new headman Payne, who, having been related to the influential Cowkeeper,
ascended to a prominent leadership position.
In that same year Florida Governor Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes sent a “plática” to the
“Jefes y Guerreros de los Indios Seminolies” to begin peace talks.20 He invoked a kinship
relationship by using the terms “Amigos y Hermanos,” in an attempt to establish a familiarity
between two distinct people. The letter explicitly sought to conflate the Spanish and British
monarchs in the minds of the Seminole leadership. Evidently, colonial officials were attempting
to follow the guidelines set forth under the British. Zéspedes also invoked the smoking of the
“pipa de amistad,” which, according to Robert A. Williams, many of “the major Woodlands
tribal groups of the Mississippi Basin region, from Georgia to the upper reaches of the Great
Lakes, attached a sacred significance” during treaty negotiations.21 Within Zéspedes’ letter he
calls the Spanish, “los espanoles,” while referring to the Seminoles as “Hombres Colorados,”
translated as “red men.” Shoemaker, writing about race relations in the Southeast notes, the
conflation of native peoples with the color “red.” Europeans and Indigenous peoples engaged in
Southeastern diplomacy began to invoke “red” and “white” when addressing each other.
Although native peoples did not immediately interpret this terminology to signify racial
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difference, for Europeans during the course of the eighteenth century the use of “red” and in
general “race outpaced the older categories of Christian and pagan to become the primary
justification for expropriating the land and labor of others.”22 The Spanish governors and their
interpreters would implement the same use of “red” and “white,” signifying the occurrence of the
same process in the Florida Borderlands.
In the same vein as the plática mentioned above, Zéspedes delivered another talk in 1789.
The diplomatic message was translated into English and delivered to the Seminoles and probably
translated once more into Muskogee or Hichiti. It dealt with another contentious issue,
reoccurring episodes of individual violent encounters threatening larger cycles of retribution. A
recent murder of an Indigenous man apparently influenced “depredations” in the Mantanzas
region, where a “white man” was murdered and horses and cattle taken.23 Addressed within the
letter is a claim by the Seminoles that the Spanish did not have the right to reside in Mantanzas,
just south of St. Augustine. Zéspedes asserts his right of ownership through the Picolata
Conference and states that the lands ceded to the British, areas east of the St. Johns River, had
been transferred to Spain. Additionally, the governor requests that the Seminoles punish the
guilty party over the recent murder. Similar to efforts by British Governor Grant, Zéspedes
attempted to defuse a tense situation not through force but appealing to Seminole notions of
justice. This particular letter heavily relies on metaphors and symbols in comparison to the
plática discussed above. The governor metaphorically takes the “red man” by the hand and
places it in his “bosom,” while simultaneously keeping bright the “chain of friendship,” and
maintaining a “path clear between the Spaniard and the red people.” Zéspedes also positions
himself as a paternal figure, since he supplied the Seminoles with “powder and ball” so that the
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Seminole men could protect and feed their women and children. By situating himself as the role
of a provider, the governor claimed honor because the Seminoles were dependent on him to
protect their families. Finally, the talk ends with an admonishment to the Seminoles that the
“white” and “red” peoples should not settle in adjacent lands since disreputable elements from
“both colours” will be able to “deaden the brightness of the chain.”24
Politically, Spanish Florida suffered ever-increasing disruptions during the late 1780s and
early 1790s. Officials blamed Bowles, specifically his efforts to destroy and plunder the Panton,
Leslie, and Company’s stores as well as efforts to wrest control of the Floridas from the Spanish.
The Bahamas Governor Lord Dunmore, the British official who utilized African troops during
the American Revolution, encouraged Bowles’ covert operations. Landing in West Florida, the
adventurer sought to buttress his small force with Indigenous allies, both Lower Creeks and
Seminoles residing near Apalachicola. After a few setbacks, Bowles’ military forces were
stranded in the Florida Borderlands, unable to capture St. Augustine. Fearful that Bowles could
re-constitute his forces through the discontent of the Seminoles toward the Spanish, Governor
Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada sent talks to the Indigenous leaders to maintain their loyalty or at
least their neutrality.
In 1792, the governor sent a “plática” to “la nación Seminolie” in order to undermine any
support for Bowles’ efforts against the colony. Similar metaphorical flourishes are in this
diplomatic dispatch such as the “chain of friendship.” 25 Also present is the continuing
invocation of fictive kin relations as the governor expresses his brotherly love for “la gente
colorada.” Described as their common father, the king of Spain ensures trade and annual gifts to
the Seminoles whereas Bowles is a liar and cannot be trusted. While in Spanish culture the
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paternal figure received ultimate authority, Seminoles viewed the symbolic position of a father
differently, for they gained their clan identities through their matrilineal lines of decent.26 As
Barr argues, the language utilized in diplomatic talks between Indigenous peoples and the
Spanish could have different meanings for each party, but nonetheless remain beneficial.27 In
this case each party left the talks with different understandings of the role of a “father:”
Indigenous peoples may not have felt that this was intrusive since Seminole fathers were mostly
advisors, while the Spanish believed that they succeeded in establishing their paternal authority
over native peoples. Meanwhile, the governor described Bowles, unlike the Spanish king, to be
an untrustworthy father figure who will not be able to protect the Seminoles but rather bring
calamity to both their settlements and women and children. In other words, the governor feared
that Bowles, since he was a Euro-American claiming to have British support, could have
established control over the Seminoles because he thought they were naïve or gullible.
Europeans and later Euro-Americans repeatedly claimed that Indigenous actions were
often part of the nefarious schemes of “bad white men.” While Bowles was important in the
upheaval of the period, the Spanish never believed that the Lower Creeks and Seminoles could
have been manipulating the adventurer to further their own internal and external agendas. He
may have played a role as leverage in their negotiations against colonial powers. Conversely, if
Bowles fulfilled his lofty promises then Indigenous peoples would have access to greater British
trade goods and could avoid the Panton, Leslie, and Company monopoly.
Discernable in the three pláticas discussed above is the reoccurring theme that the
Spanish must stress their affinity with the British to illustrate that their reign in Florida
represented continuity with the older regime. Quesada stated that Bowles fell out of favor with
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the British government and was no longer their representative. Part of the adventurer’s rise to
prominence among the Lower Creek and Apalachicola Seminoles was based on his guarantees
that he could bring steady and larger supplies of British goods than his Panton, Leslie, and
Company rivals or the Spanish. Undoubtedly, Quesada happily noted that Bowles’ promises of
ships laden with trade goods never appeared. The need to associate with the British
demonstrated Spanish weakness but also illustrated that the new colonial administration sought
to learn from its predecessor. For instance, Zéspedes’ 1789 plática asserted land ownership in
East Florida through the transfer to the Spanish of the rights the British received at the 1765
Picolata Congress. Also, his handling of the revenge killings discussed in the same talk echoed
British Governor James Grant’s strategy to respect Indigenous autonomy while his position
remained weak.
The Spanish-Seminole diplomatic exchanges were not European dictates disguised in the
language of Indigenous diplomacy, especially considering that the language, metaphors, and
physical space of the discussions took place on Indigenous terms. Seminole leader Payne
became an influential political actor, not necessarily due to the Alachua Seminoles’ population
size or military capacity; rather he occupied a strategic geopolitical position between larger
powers. Payne’s role as a mediator presented opportunities to accumulate political capital with
his Spanish allies, but it also threatened to ignite rivalries, with the Mikasuki, Lower Creek, and
with Georgia. An alliance with the colonial government in St. Augustine meant expectations of
Seminole assistance if the Spanish were threatened. In addition to these duties, Payne often had
to address issues ranging from “depredations,” seizure of property, captive taking, and the return
of fugitive slaves. However, the Indigenous leader did not solely fulfill the role of responding or
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reacting to the demands or whims of the Spanish East Florida governors. He also made it clear
that the Seminole expected annual gifts and that the Panton, Leslie, and Company could trade
freely in their territory. Payne also subtly critiqued the Spanish with frequent mention of the
British as a reminder that Spain was inadequate in comparison to its European rival’s
commercial prowess. Some documents, especially those concerning the seizure of Spanish
subjects, paint a picture of Payne as a willing servant of the colonial administration.28 Different
circumstances illustrate his ability to assuage colonial officers’ demands with answers that hint
towards obstruction or an unwillingness to provide assistance. The Seminole leader’s pláticas
demonstrate that Indigenous groups were active negotiators and they strove to achieve their own
political, economic, and social goals through the rituals of diplomacy.
One example of Payne seeking to present himself as a staunch Spanish ally yet
simultaneously making material demands occurred in 1794, when a French inspired plot to enlist
European American frontiersmen to attack Spanish Florida posed a threat to the region. A
backdrop to the filibuster activity on the Florida border was the tenuous position held by the
Panton, Leslie, and Company in the province. Not only would larger conflicts complicate the
trading firm’s ability to purchase goods for exchange, but also prominent citizens and the
governor had signed a petition protesting the privileged economic position enjoyed by the
company. A royal order was passed on June 9, 1793, which liberalized Louisiana and Florida’s
trading restrictions thus opening up the territories to traders from friendly nations with economic
agreements.29
Payne wrote to Governor Quesada on January 31, 1794 to pledge his support during this
time of crisis.30 The headman states that their adversaries, most likely General Elijah Clarke and
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a body of men, recruited by French Ambassador Edmond Genêt, were lawless vagabonds since
Spain and the U.S. were officially at peace. The plática compares Clarke’s force as “wolves and
tigers” as well as “birds, going to build a nest in some sequestered point of land,” in need of
discovery and expulsion. Beyond the assurances of military assistance are also subtle reminders
of how the Spanish must reciprocate. Payne once again reminded Quesada that the Seminoles
“held by the hand” the British until they left and the Indigenous people then extended a hand to
the Spanish “as if two brothers out of the same belly.” The headman then stated that the
Seminoles would soon be left with a shortage of ammunition and he expected the governor to
provide the Seminole with these goods, as well as flints, knifes, and hatchets. Payne finished his
plática with a stinging jab by reminding the governor that when the British “father” controlled
the region the Seminoles were always supplied. Thus the comparison to the British questioned
Spanish masculinity as “protectors” and providers. Deftly dulling his rhetorical attack, the
Indigenous leader invoked a fictive kin relationship by stating that the Seminoles and Spanish
were “brothers, as if from the same father and mother.”31 On the surface, this talk appears to be
a pledge from an Indigenous leader to assist a colonial power, but a critical reading illustrates
that this is an arrangement by equal parties expecting a reciprocal exchange. Implicit in the
document is that the Seminoles will have continued access to Panton, Leslie and Company
agents and trade. The importance of the trading house to Seminole policy can be understood
through the physical transmission of the governor’s earlier plática. John Leslie, a firm partner,
had delivered the letter: Job Wiggins, an employee, had translated Payne’s subsequent reply, and
the talk was given at the Conception trading post on the St. Johns River.32
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In addition to trade and security, the recovery of seized slaves and property as well as the
return of “fugitives” were predominant topics within some pláticas. By 1800 William Augustus
Bowles, much to the surprise and consternation of many, reappeared in Florida after seemingly
being banished to a Spanish prison. Upon his return he led a force of Indigenous allies in
capturing the St. Marks trading post, dealing a setback for the Panton, Leslie, and Company.
This marked a period of increased raiding and attacks on the St. Johns plantations: it is unclear
whether it was simply, as some scholars claim, because of Bowles’ orders.33 Nonetheless,
planters experienced a loss of horses, slaves, and other goods. There were also incidents of
violence resulting in the murder of an inhabitant of the province. A talk purported to be from
Governor White quizzed Payne about recent incidents and warned him to make sure not to listen
to the “talks” of “bad men” such as Bowles.34 Coming just months after the capture of the
trading house at St. Marks, tensions were running high. White reported that “four negro slaves”
and a “family of free negroes” had been “plundered.” In a second incident, a Spanish subject
was murdered near the “town” by an African among a group of Seminoles. The governor
reminded the Seminoles that previously a “white man” had murdered a “red man” and was killed
in order to give the Seminoles “satisfaction,” and he now expected similar treatment.
Interestingly, this Spanish document is one of the few written on the behalf of an East Florida
Governor to simultaneously refer to three racial classifications based on color, white, red, and
black (negro).
Payne began his response to White’s plática by stating that he desired a “clear path
between you and us” and stated that he reprimanded his “young men” for listening to “bad
talks.”35 Apparently, the suspected African, who allegedly murdered a Spanish subject escaped
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in the night but was wounded. The “Negroes” state that he is dead since they found his gun near
a large pond where he apparently entered the water with no evidence that he ever came out. 36
Concerning the other fugitive slaves mentioned by White, Payne states that he has “sent“ for
them and that he desires it “ will be done.” Concluding quickly, the Indigenous leader bids
farewell by taking the governor’s hand in friendship and signing off as “Brother Paine king.”
This plática is curt in comparison to Payne’s other communications and offers very few details.
Considering that the body of the suspected man was never found, it is possible that Payne did not
want to apprehend and extradite him. Although the story of the man’s death may not have
seemed plausible to the Spanish, Payne may have surmised that the governor was not willing to
challenge its validity and risk greater confrontation.
The zenith of the crisis occurred with the Mikasuki’s captive raiding activities in 1802
and only eased with the capture of Bowles in May 1803. John Forrester of the Panton, Leslie,
and Company, later named the John Forbes Company after 1801, was tasked with reclaiming the
African slaves that had been seized in the sacking of the St. Marks trading post, slaves taken
from a raid on Francis Philip Fatio’s plantation, and the Bonelli family captives. He traveled to
see various Seminoles, Mikasuki, and Creek attempting to undermine Bowles, defuse tensions,
and deliver messages from White. The East Florida governor and Payne exchanged many small
pláticas during the year. These messages between the two men lacked the language of
diplomacy and the metaphors found in the other documents. They were succinct, impersonal,
and betray the frail relations between the Seminoles and Spanish. This is illustrated by a June
14, 1802 citizens’ petition seeking removal of the Forbes Company store at Picolata because it
attracted Indigenous clients.37 Capture of a “white” family made this incident particularly
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galling to the Spanish, who applied heavy pressure, such as the suspension of trade and gifts,
until the family and the rest of the property were returned.
Diplomatic efforts nearly failed to restore the general peace and stability. A March 26,
1802 message from Governor White highlighted the tone of recent communications. He stated
that he is ready to restore peaceful relations if the “Negroes, horses, white women, and children
they have carried off” are returned. White wrote that the Indigenous peoples had been the
“aggressors” and that he “patiently bore with the murders and robberies they have been
committing these two years past, which can now no longer be put up with, for it is natural in all
men to resist violence and defend their lives and property.”38 The governor concluded by stating
that if the “Indians” seek peace he demands to see actions demonstrating their good faith, such as
the return of any seized goods. Protection of private property was becoming a priority as
evidenced in Forrester’s advice to the governor in a July 5, 1800 letter to take actions punishing
its theft.39 Although diplomacy had been utilized in order to protect property, in early 1802
diplomatic channels were in disorder. Central to successful diplomacy in the Southeastern
Borderlands was reciprocity. Trade networks were disrupted in Florida and gifts were withheld
until the captives were returned. Even physical meetings between the governor and Payne were
limited since the latter feared for his safety.40
Both Payne and Governor White took the necessary steps to restore relations between
their respective groups. Payne continued to stress that the Alachua Seminoles were not
responsible for recent captive taking and that inquiries should be made with Lower Creek
headman John Kinnard.41 When Payne visited White in St. Augustine on March 20th he assigned
blame for recent actions on the Mikasuki and Bowles. The governor retorted that peace would
119

only be established with the return of the whites, Blacks, and horses.42 For his troubles, White
retained one of Payne’s men on the pretense that he was instructed to come alone. This would
explain why Payne temporarily halted his visits to St. Augustine and why it required various
assurances from the governor for him to return. On June 5, 1802, Payne explained that he had
sent his men to Mikasuki to inquire about the “white woman and her children,” without success.
He then requested his man’s release and a visit by Spanish representatives so that they could
have talks. The Seminole leader reiterated that he wanted peace and would send the governor
the forzado (a captured or condemned slave) Juan Ruedas, Gaspar Papy’s “Negro,” and also
“property” belonging to another settler.43 Concluding the letter by informing the governor that
Seminoles and the Mikasuki operate independently, Payne’s message combined a spirited
defense of his position while still striking a conciliatory note. Although White continued to
pressure Payne, he realized that the Seminole headman was a trusted ally and that the Mikasuki
were largely responsible for the episode. Once Forrester established peace and secured the
release of some of the captives, Payne was able to enter St. Augustine and collect on overdue
gifts.44 Eventually the tension subsided and gifts were extended to the Mikasuki and the Lower
Creek. The strained diplomatic channels had been repaired.45

2.2 Power, Race, and Gender in the Pláticas
The diplomatic exchanges between the Seminoles and the Spanish helped maintain peace
and stability in the Florida Borderlands, but they also provide an analytical window into how
power, race, and gender dynamics functioned in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. In terms of power, the pláticas shed light on the region’s geopolitical situation and the
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respective political motives of the Spanish and the Seminoles. With the use of Southeastern
Borderlands diplomatic language and metaphors, both parties could effectively communicate
while tolerating their mutual reliance on each other. Conversely, the pláticas highlight the
formation of a racial discourse increasingly gripping the region in the latter half of the eighteenth
century. This is demonstrated through a focus on the Spanish agents and interpreters of the talks
and the language that they often utilized. Since race and gender are often intertwined, the
diplomatic communications also shed light on both Spanish and Indigenous notions of gender.
Despite rarely mentioning women, the pláticas are nonetheless insightful in demonstrating how
gender functioned. While the talks were undeniably written to address local issues, this chapter
argues that they help explain how processes such as racialization and market capitalism emerged
in the Southeastern Borderlands. However, there is a caveat: it is difficult to argue that the
newer processes mentioned above had completely displaced older notions of race, economic
exchange, and political organization. For instance, developing ideas of race, biological
difference and clear separation of groups based on skin color, co-existed with Spanish beliefs
that a person’s racial classification was determined through cultural and class considerations
such as physical comportment, clothing, and occupation. Nonetheless, this chapter seeks to
problematize arguments that changing notions of race and market capitalism only occurred after
U.S. annexation and integration of Florida.
While the pláticas contain crucial insights, the documents themselves must also be
examined carefully. As scholars such as Brooks and Shoemaker note, diplomacy and interaction
between Europeans and Indigenous peoples required shared notions of gender, honor,
nationalism, and diplomacy.46 However, this is different from arguing that Indigenous and
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European groups had identical views of these concepts; rather, various groups had crafted a
mutually comprehensible discourse that furthered their diplomatic agendas. When analyzing the
pláticas, a critical reading of the documents is necessary. Although scholars utilize these written
materials to shed light upon Indigenous and European societies, the respective leaders quoted in
the pláticas had their own immediate concerns. Their messages were immersed in the language
of diplomacy and sought to appeal to the other party. Indigenous and European speakers
adjusted their views and language in order to be persuasive. As a consequence, the pláticas
highlight Indigenous leaders’ views about Europeans, and vice versa, as much as they disclose
Indigenous and European peoples own political and social systems. Additionally, the physical
logistics of translating, writing, and presenting the speeches must also be considered. In the
Florida Borderlands, British traders, Black Seminoles, and Spanish interpreters all transmitted
the various pláticas and distilled their messages to the Seminole, Creek, and Mikasuki leaders as
well as the Spanish governors. It is hard to believe that their presence in diplomatic proceedings,
especially traders with economic motives, would be inconsequential. Nonetheless, as scholars
such as Williams and Shoemaker assert, the diplomatic talks are important sources into
Indigenous peoples’ vision of diplomacy, politics, and society.
The pláticas were forums for the negotiation of political, economic, and military alliances
between Spanish and Seminole leaders. Colonial Spanish North America in late 18th century
witnessed the increased utilization of alliances and treaties with Indigenous peoples. Harsh
realities on the ground, such as inadequate supplies and resources, doomed traditional Spanish
policies that sought to incorporate Indigenous peoples. In the second Spanish Florida period,
officials followed a pragmatic foreign policy. For instance, Spanish officials turned to Panton,
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Leslie, and Company agents to deliver, translate, and present their dispatches. Spain had little
choice but to outsource their most visible diplomatic posts, and this spoke volumes about their
overall strength.
Seminoles and Lower Creek leaders constantly compared the Spanish king with the
British monarch within their pláticas, noting that trade and gifts were plentiful under the latter.
In Payne’s January 1794 plática he notes that his English “father” was never refused a service
and he always generously rewarded the Seminoles.47 Spanish governors acknowledged this. For
example, Governor Quesada asserted that the Spanish and British were allies and that they were
intimately connected and that his administration represented a continuation of British rule.48
Undoubtedly, the successful British-Seminole Picolata Congresses during 1765-1767 weighed
heavily on the Spanish. Upon returning to Florida they encountered Indigenous groups who
owed them no allegiance and had no history of being under Spanish authority. For a colonial
power, having little recourse but to base its legitimacy on the reputation of one of its traditional
rivals must have been galling. This was illustrated through the Seminoles’ use of the phrase
“friends and brothers” in addressing the Spanish whereas in the Picolata talks the British were
referred to as an “elder brother” by the Lower Creek leader known as Captain Aleck.49
Shoemaker notes that the British propensity to deliver gifts and trade had won them respected
status as symbolic older brothers to the Southeastern Indigenous peoples.50 However, the
Spanish were never accorded the position of an elder sibling, which could carry the added
responsibility “to assist their juniors in times of duress.”51 Consequently, Spain’s vulnerable
position made it even more vital to abide by Indigenous diplomatic protocols of the region. As a
result many of the Spanish pláticas contained metaphors, such as the “chain of peace” and
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“clearing the path,” that scholars such as Williams and Shoemaker illustrate were prominent in
the Great Lakes region and the Southeastern Borderlands.
Spanish political, economic, and military weakness led to their willingness to
diplomatically engage Indigenous peoples. Conversely, the Seminoles occupied a tenuous
position among regional Indigenous groups. During the final years of British rule, the Seminole
had established their distinct identity from the Lower Creek but residual political authority still
rested with the latter.52 Saunt writes that the Seminoles were “actually renegade Creeks” who
did not establish their complete autonomy until after 1814.53 Alachua Seminoles never had the
population to become a military power.54 They would continue to deal with threats concerning
re-integration within the Creek Confederacy even after removal to Indian Territory.55 Under
these geopolitical conditions the Seminole alliance with the Spanish was beneficial, especially in
terms of trade and gifts, towards supporting their continuing drive for independence. Since the
Seminole and Spanish were both dealing with threats to their autonomy, they treated each other
as equals within the pláticas. Utilization of the term “brother and friend” was the main greeting
of nearly all the diplomatic exchanges. As Jon Parmenter notes among the Great Lakes
Algonquian groups in the 1760s, the status of brothers in diplomacy connoted “less regular
interaction, less intermarriage, and fewer direct mutual obligations than a ‘father-child’
structure” and remained focused around trade.56 Seminole headman Payne often asserted this
language to preserve the alliance especially during times of crisis. Conversely, the Mikasuki, in
a stronger demographic and military position, were willing to challenge Spanish authority by
raiding the plantations of Spanish subjects. Although Spanish colonial power was limited,
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Seminole preoccupation with other external political and military rivals meant the pláticas
participants’ were on equal terms.
Although fictive kinship was a major component of diplomacy, the formation of racial
difference is seen in the creation of categories such as White, Red, and Black. The pláticas shed
light on the development of a racial discourse that began to stray away from the categorization of
people based on cultural factors to the lines of demarcation being based on skin color as an
indicator of innate biological differences. Shoemaker’s work establishes an important
foundation for understanding how notions of race developed in the region. Pláticas between the
Spanish and the Seminoles both utilized terminology based upon color to distinguish between
Indigenous peoples, Europeans, and Africans. Spanish governors wrote letters that mentioned
the three groups based on color, gente colorada, gente blanca, and negros. In his April 1793
plática, Governor Quesada stated that the king of Spain desired that his “gente blanca y la
colorada vivieran unidos como hermanos.” Also within the letter is a mention of seized
“negros” and “propiedad” which he demanded must be returned. Nonetheless, the rest of the
letter identifies the Spanish as “Los Españoles” rather than “gente blanca.” Discussions
translated into English, by interpreters and British traders, often utilized the term “white man”
and “red man” more frequently. Spanish racial designations had previously been based on
religious, social, and cultural factors with lines being drawn between “gente con razón” and
“gente sin razón.” However, the influence of British merchants, efforts to encourage planter
migration, African slaves’ value as property, and the lack of Spanish efforts to integrate
Indigenous peoples into their society made those categories inadequate.
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Scholars argue that Indigenous peoples were not passive participants in the construction
of a red identity.57 Although difficult to ascertain, origin stories invoking the color red as well as
the division of native peoples’ settlements into moieties of red and white towns, have been cited
for injecting “red” into Indigenous discourse. Consequently, Shoemaker argues that after the
1760s, as the “science of race emerged in Europe, Indians were also reading meaning into
observable bodily differences and putting people into categories accordingly.”58 Concerning
Spanish motives, various reasons could possibly explain the use of “gente blanca” in the
pláticas. As demonstrated above, the Spanish could have been simply adapting to Southeastern
Borderlands Indigenous diplomatic language. Additionally, Panton, Leslie and Company
employees skilled in diplomacy and comfortable with the emerging racial discourse might have
been the local source of this new terminology. Perhaps the Spanish utilized the term “white
man” in order to draw an affinity and connection with the British whom the Indigenous peoples
held in high regard. Spanish governors in the pláticas made many attempts to invoke the British
and the shared friendship between both European nations. Additionally, since Spain was
probably losing face by having the British firm Panton, Leslie, and Company provide goods to
the Seminoles, claiming a white identity as “gente blanca” might have sought to minimize that
loss of prestige by implying that the traders and the Spanish were the same.
Historians have cited the rise of the plantation export economy based on African slavery
as the key to not only the development of blackness but also whiteness. However, scholars have
often argued that in the second Spanish Florida period, plantations did not emphasize laborintensive crops or labor-intense routines.59 However, African slaves nonetheless escaped from
Spanish masters or were seized during Indigenous raids. Among the reoccurring subjects in the
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pláticas is the recovery of captured African slaves. Although slavery in Florida during this
period cannot be considered chattel slavery, it nonetheless served to racialize Africans as
“negros,” considering the fact that they were often listed as “property” along with horses and
other goods. The establishment of blackness led to a system of racial categorization which also
homogenized Indigenous peoples and Europeans into groups based on skin color.
Examining the utilization of the terms “red” and “white” men in the Seminole and
Spanish pláticas demonstrate that Spanish diplomacy and racial discourse in Florida were
affected by the territory’s proximity to the Southeastern Borderlands during a period of immense
transformation. Consequently, comparing East Florida with the rest of Spanish colonial North
America is difficult. Changing notions of race influenced and modified Spanish colonialism.
The argument that these processes bypassed Spanish Florida only to appear after U.S. annexation
assumes that the Second Spanish Florida period existed in a vacuum. The Florida Borderlands at
the end of the 18th century and the of beginning 19th century was in the midst of changing ideas
of race, but new rigid ideas of biological difference could not completely supplant culturally
based notions of race, rather they coexisted uncomfortably.
Power and race in the pláticas functioned in conjunction with gender discourse.
Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy often invoked masculinity and the role of men as
protectors. Gender served as a cross-cultural bridge bringing together Indigenous and European
leaders over a concept in which they shared some basic tenets. Similar to metaphors based upon
clearing a path towards peace or burying an instrument of war, invoking men and women’s roles
served to communicate messages, in this case connoting fictive kinship or dominance and
subordination. As Williams notes, the language and rituals of diplomacy sought to make it
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“possible, according to the values informing American Indian visions of law and peace, for treaty
partners to accept and embrace the divinely revealed truth of their oneness and shared
humanity.”60 Specific talks between the Spanish and the Seminoles only sparingly mentioned
women directly. However, a great number of discussions cited gender roles when assigning the
Spanish monarch the role of father and the Spanish subjects and Seminoles as brothers.
Particular conditions of the Florida Borderlands may have played a part in limiting the
effectiveness and frequency of gender metaphors.
Women in the Seminole-Spanish pláticas were often invoked by Seminole and Spanish
participants for different purposes. Seminoles cited woman within their discussions as figurative
mothers to both the Seminoles and the Spanish thereby establishing fictive kinship making both
parties symbolic brothers. Conversely, the Spanish sometimes reminded the Seminoles that they
provided the trade necessary to protect Indigenous women and children. Meanwhile, Payne
asserted that both the Spanish and the Seminoles came “out of the same belly” and that the
governor was his brother, “as if from the same father and mother.”61 By sharing the same
mother with the governor, he was creating a fictive kin relationship that acknowledged each
party’s equality and intimate ties. However, the Spanish never cited the role of mothers but only
the paternal figure of the Spanish king. While both groups shared some assumptions about
gender, the tendency of the Seminoles to emphasize mothers’ roles was due to matrilineal lines
of descent in determining Seminoles’ clan identities.62 In terms of male authority figures, uncles
held more prominent positions than fathers, especially considering “the relation between sister
and brother is a primary bond.”63 A Seminole man’s heirs were the children of his sister and he
would take special notice of their care. Consequently, the Spanish only mentioned Indigenous
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women to emphasize the necessity to protect them. In 1793, a plática from Governor Quesada
stated that the Seminole were provided ammunition to defend their women and children while
also providing articles of clothing for them.64 The Spanish believed that they strengthened their
paternal authority by facilitating Seminoles’ ability to assert their own paternal duties.
Despite not discussing women in the other pláticas, the Spanish and the Seminole
continued to communicate through gender-coded language. Prominent among all symbolic
images were the Spanish king’s claim to the role of father who looks upon “la gente colorada
como por sus propios hijos.”65 Undoubtedly European powers felt they scored a coup when
Indigenous people seemingly acquiesced to the paternal authority of the Spanish king. However,
as mentioned above, in Southeastern Indigenous groups, a person’s mother and uncle were the
most important figures in their lives while a father could be an advisor. Accepting the Spanish
king as a “father” did not indicate an abrogation of authority that Spanish officials mistakenly
thought it meant. Diplomatic discussions often resulted in parties leaving with different
understandings of the proceedings: however, this could actually be beneficial to establishing
peace.66 For example, the Spanish were pleased that the Seminole accepted the authority of the
king while the Seminole accepted the arrangement because they felt the king played a nonintrusive advisory role. Additionally, Southeastern Indigenous peoples believed that “higher
rank entitled nations only to deference, not to the power to rule over other nations.”67 Further
weakening the Spanish king’s claim to a position of absolute authority was his colony’s
constrained position. The pláticas demonstrate that power was evenly parceled out between both
parties.
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Scholars such as Shoemaker have demonstrated that in the Southeastern Borderlands,
sexuality and gendered metaphors were common because “diplomacy brought two bodies of
people together and in so doing raised questions of dominance.”68 However, among the
Seminole and Spanish, utilization of gender metaphors, with the exception of the Spanish king
asserting claim to paternal authority, were infrequent, and even more seldom were any specific
mention of women. The lack of gendered language in the pláticas can be ascribed to the settled
nature of the question of dominance. Diplomatic discussions between the Seminoles and the
Spanish were not so much negotiations over which group held more power, rather they were
mutual defense pacts aimed to preserve the precarious autonomy of both parties. Pláticas sought
above all else to maintain stability and prevent a major rift between Spanish and Indigenous
peoples. Consequently the most effective gendered language in defusing tensions over raids and
seizures of property were to credit such actions to “young men.” Speakers implied that male
youths could be forgiven because they were supposed to be ambitious, rash, and imprudent,
implying that young women and older men were the opposite. Nonetheless, Indigenous and
European leaders could salvage peace treaties threatened by the seizure of property. Spanish
officials were spared calling for harsh retribution that could backfire if Indigenous leaders
resisted. By assigning blame to “young men” both sides could save face and defuse a situation
without risking a costly conflict.69

2.3 Panton, Leslie, and Company
This chapter argues that in Florida, European promulgation of “Indian” and “Black”
racial categories were intertwined. In order to produce a viable plantation-based economy,
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planters need a steady labor source of Africans that could be exploited and controlled. Africans
were racialized as Black, and thus became synonymous with slavery, while Blackness more
broadly became associated with inferiority. Consequently, positioning Blacks in a racial
hierarchy/order as a subordinate group through legal codes sought to limit their sociopolitical
mobility. This process created space and delineated metaphorical borders between different
peoples through an emphasis on their alleged biological difference. As a result, Africans’ ability
to engage in multi-racial coalitions with working class whites, as was the case in Bacon’s
Rebellion, and in Florida with Indigenous peoples, were undermined by the assumption that the
purported biological inferiority was insurmountable. This process of racialization increasingly
cast African origin peoples as inherently-i.e. biologically-incapable of higher order thinking and
behavior. This alleged inferiority served to justify and explain in a circular and reinforcing
fashion their designation as slaves. They were enslaved and treated as property because they
were black, and they were black because they were slaves.
The racialization of blacks was slow and inconsistent in the Florida Borderlands in part
because of the relationships crafted between Blacks and Indians, and because of the larger
cultural and political landscape that both influenced. The Seminoles destabilized black
racialization because they posed a multifaceted challenge to the plantation system. Firstly, land
was an important resource and Euro-Americans needed Indigenous peoples’ recognition of
existing territorial claims with the possibility of seeking additional lands in the future. Secondly,
if native peoples seized property from plantations, especially African slaves, then colonial elites
would be deprived of the labor and stability vital for their economic endeavors. Thirdly,
Africans finding sanctuary among the Seminoles would not only give potential runaway slaves
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an incentive for escape but could lead to formable Indigenous-African alliances. Metaphorically
speaking, the union between Seminoles and Africans resulting in children claiming hybrid
identities also had the potential to destabilize and blur new racial boundaries. Mestizos and
mulattos represented a challenge to the new racial system because they occupied a liminal space
that called into question the legitimacy and permanence of racial categories. This would explain
why mixed race peoples later came to be denigrated as being inferior in comparison to people
from pure racial stock so that the fiction of biological difference could be maintained.70 The
presence of Black Seminoles would raise these difficult issues and potentially destabilize a
plantation system that rested on stark racial differences and the alleged inferiority of African
origin peoples.
British and later Spanish officials sought to address these problems by turning to
diplomacy. They utilized conferences and pláticas and had little choice but to accept Seminole
autonomy. Although this highlighted Indigenous peoples’ power, it also simultaneously
represented a facet of the colonial strategy to adapt to conditions in the Florida Borderlands. An
alliance containing mechanisms for avoiding conflict and retrieving property with the Seminoles
enabled planters such as Fatio and others to continue to function. Accommodation with native
peoples allowed plantations the space to develop, which in turn promoted Blackness.
Spain’s interactions with the Seminoles were distinct from its typical policies and
strategies regarding Indigenous peoples. During the first Spanish Florida period, missionaries
worked and lived among Florida’s Indigenous groups. However, the Seminoles who were
located further north during that period never experienced the mission system and Spain did not
attempt any missions after 1783. In Florida, the Spanish remained socially and politically distant
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from the Seminoles and relied on Panton, Leslie, and Company agents such as Forrester and
John Hambly to meet and initiate discussions. Even the traders, who managed posts near the
Indians, did not integrate themselves into Seminole society and few instances exist of their
marriage to Indigenous women. Captives that were taken such as the Bonelli family were
usually ransomed relatively quickly. Thus a mestizo population of Spanish and Seminole
individuals that transcended social and cultural borders while facilitating communication was
numerically limited. Spanish and Seminole populations remained distant, which explains why a
discourse of cultural and biological difference gained greater traction in Florida.
Panton, Leslie, and Company’s position within the Florida Borderlands allowed it to
serve as the link between the desired plantation export economy and the policy of pragmatic
diplomacy. Firm partners John Forbes and John Leslie had been members of the common house
of British Florida’s legislature in 1781 when that body stubbornly demanded a Negro Act.71
They owned slaves who worked company land holdings and although the overseers were not
known for utilizing gang labor or other aspects of chattel slavery, they were nonetheless staunch
supporters of the protection of property. Company profits were dependent on the security of
their investments, including African slaves. The commodification of slaves and their status as
property was an important development in the racialization of Africans as Black. Consequently
Panton, Leslie, and Company agents brought these concerns and views with them when they
spoke to the Seminoles on behalf of Spanish governors or when they offered their advice to
colonial officials.
The British firm was conspicuously present throughout the second Spanish Florida
period. Leslie began his trading activities in East Florida at the beginning of the American
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Revolution in 1776. On the foundation of James Spalding’s previous operation, the firm soon
began sending Indigenous supplied deerskins to London in exchange for manufactured goods,
especially gunpowder.72 Forbes, his associate, established warehouses and a base within the city
of Nassau located on the Bahamian Island of New Providence. When Florida returned to
Spanish control, officials feared that they would lose their existing trade networks. Although
mercantilist impulses nearly drove the Spanish to expel the Panton and Leslie partnership,
pragmatism and precedent of successful British-Seminole relations could not be ignored.
Providing consistent trading opportunities served as a major factor in successful diplomacy with
Indigenous peoples and consequently enabled the growth of plantations. The company also
aided its own cause by utilizing convincing arguments and economic leverage to convince
Spanish officials to allow their current trade arrangements.73
British defeat in the American Revolution meant a reorganization of trade and foreign
relations for the Indigenous peoples now forced to deal with an emergent U.S. However,
because the Panton, Leslie, and Company remained, trade links persevered in the Florida
Borderlands. The accumulation of deerskins had already become established as an important
activity that integrated the region “into the global economy; it also required most Indians to learn
new ways of making a living.”74 Undoubtedly the trade had forced both native peoples and
Europeans to adapt their economic systems. Merchants learned to use gifts and establish
relationships with Indigenous leaders in order to trade. Meanwhile groups like the Creek and
Seminoles came to understand that Europeans viewed resources as commodities that had certain
values and were not acquired simply for subsistence but required a surplus for the market. While
Saunt accurately points out that some Creek factions, rather than the Seminoles, more fully
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embraced socioeconomic concepts of property and chattel slavery. Nonetheless, Seminole
communities in Alachua and Apalachicola participated in the accumulation of goods for and
from European markets. They engaged agents that did not establish kinship relationships unlike
French traders in the Great Lakes region, but concentrated on economic exchanges.
Beyond the walls of St. Augustine and the west bank of the St. Johns River, the Panton,
Leslie, and Company posts and employees represented what Daniel J.J. Ross and Bruce Chappell
have called “an intelligence system so as to learn about events and conditions in the South and
among the Indians.”75 Hambly and Forrester engaged in the dual roles of traders and Spanish
agents. By 1787, Hambly was overseeing the Almacén de Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, the
St Johns River company store closest to the Alachua Seminoles, and he was overseeing 50 to 60
slaves tending crops and cattle. The post cured and tanned Indigenous supplied deerskins and
hides before they were sent to England.76 As Ross and Chappell point out, Hambly undertook a
few trips through “Indian Country” and his diaries provide rare glimpses into Seminole
settlements.77 Most likely his journeys combined business and intelligence gathering: for
instance Hambly purchased horses from Pompy, a man described as “Payne’s negroe.” His
journal highlights the fact that he was charged with explaining the governor’s talks to Indigenous
leaders and to retrieve any responses.78 Hambly’s counterpart Forrester provided the Spanish
with a similar service. For instance, in his July 5, 1800 letter to Governor White he offers his
“personal services to carry and explain any talk to them, personally, or to bring them (Indigenous
leaders) down to your Excellency, in order that you may see and talk with them yourself.”79 This
correspondence also demonstrates how Forrester’s roles could become blurred since in the same
letter he advises the governor, during a period of increased raids, that White must ensure that
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“these robbers would meet with their just punishment when they come among us to takeaway our
property.”80 Forrester’s main concerns were as a trader and property holder.
Participation of Panton, Leslie, and Company employees influenced not only the pláticas
they delivered but also racial discourse and the movement towards market capitalism. As the
documents attest, figures such as Forrester and Hambly possibly wrote but definitely carried,
translated, and “explained” pláticas as well as transcribed Seminole responses. Although they
did not usurp the complete meaning of the Spanish governor’s pláticas, Hambly and Forrester,
were able to steer the Spanish into the language of Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy that
included the use of metaphors, gendered language, and especially the utilization of the term
“red.” Although scholars have cited Hambly’s business with the Black Seminole Pompy as
evidence that Africans had more agency in Spanish Florida, nonetheless Hambly addresses him
as “Payne’s Negro.” Any complexity in Pompy’s cultural identity or relationship with the
Seminoles is glossed over. While Pompey is free to conduct financial transactions he is still
considered Payne’s property. Hambly, the overseer of his own company’s slaves and an agent of
a trading house that commodified resources such as deerskins and African slaves, helped
established a more rigid discourse concerning race and property.
In addition to the participation of the Panton, Leslie, and Company agents in IndigenousSpanish diplomacy, Florida planters were also vital in calls for the protection of property. Fatio
was one of the most prominent planters to span both the British and second Spanish Florida
periods. In December, 1782 he wrote a British official expressing the various reasons why the
British should maintain their hold of Florida, including the possibilities of supplying lands to
refugee planters for growing corn, indigo, and rice for the province and for British West Indian
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possessions. He notes that this had not yet occurred because of the interference of “wild
Indians,” the Seminoles.81 Within a short time Fatio switched his allegiance to the Spanish in
order to continue his economic progress. Susan R. Parker effectively illustrates that Fatio’s
success was due to his ability to subscribe “to many of the practices and following ideas held by
the ascendant cadre of British traders and entrepreneurs engaged in transoceanic and
multicontinent ventures while tempering and adjusting to local conditions.”82 Fatio’s plantations
emphasized the raising of livestock, citrus fruits, and the cutting of timber. Scholars have
accurately argued that these economic activities were not conducive to chattel slavery.
Nonetheless, planters such as Fatio did advocate for the protection of property. Slaves in
Spanish East Florida represented a valuable investment; for example the 1801 Mikasuki raids
demonstrated the value of slaves especially when they were ransomed for significant sums.
Scholars have approached questions of race in the Second Spanish Florida period by
citing examples of African slaves receiving manumission, utilizing Spanish courts, and engaging
in business transactions. Indeed, scholars such as Jane Landers have illustrated that the first
Spanish Florida period gave Africans a measure of autonomy especially through militia service.
The province had been a runaway slave sanctuary until the practice officially ended in 1790.
However during the Second Spanish Florida period these policies were also accompanied
by contradictory actions. For instance in 1795, two men named Robert Andrews and Carlos
Howard respectively complained about Francisco Xavier Sánchez’s slaves carrying arms and
Euro-Americans buying goods from the slaves without their owners’ permission.83 In 1806
William Lawrence had similar concerns about slaves trading in property without permission
from their owners. He implored Governor White to reassert an article from the Bando de Buen
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Gobierno, edict of good governance, that forbade trading between Spanish subjects and slaves.
Lawrence was adamant that officials “remedy an evil of such bad consequence.”84 A Panton,
Leslie, and Company employee, he had been responsible for a shipment of 114 slaves from
Africa into Florida, of whom 60 remained with the trading firm and the rest acquired by a local
planter.85 As a merchant he was deeply invested in the control of the slave population and the
security of property in general.
A year after Lawrence wrote his letter to the East Florida governor, the situation for both
free and enslaved Africans deteriorated. White on May 20, 1807 made a series of proclamations
seeking to better control the whole African population. He issued an edict in order to “maintain
the public peace which has been interrupted by persons with bad intentions.”86 Among the
articles, applicable to “all persons of color whether free or slave,” were curfews, the banning of
gambling and dances, outlawing unannounced visitors, prohibiting slaves from boarding ships,
and requiring residents to report suspicious behavior. Four months later, the governor expanded
upon his edict by adding that free and enslaved “Mulatos and Negros” could not carry arms
without permission, free persons had to have certificates from honorable residents or the
governor must be able to testify to their character, and any unemployed Africans would be given
six months labor on public works while being chained and shackled.87 The following year the
governor forbade “Negros de los Indios” from entering St. Augustine or any Florida plantations
with the only exception being the Panton, Leslie, and Company stores.88 Although legal edicts
were nearly impossible to enforce and their impact difficult to judge, they do provide insight into
racial beliefs held at least by the elites, such as the governor.
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This harsh government policy can be partly explained by the historical context of the
region at the turn of nineteenth century. Undoubtedly the events associated with the Haitian
Revolution, beginning in the 1790s and lasting over a decade, instilled fear and suspicion
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Planters had become especially distrustful of slaves
coming directly from Africa and the Caribbean, who were perceived as being disposed to
revolution and difficult to control. For Americans, the Gabriel Prosser Uprising of 1800
confirmed Euro-American’s apprehensions about slave insurrections when Virginia thwarted
slaves’ efforts to overthrow their masters and liberate others. Eight years later the Atlantic slave
trade was legally prohibited in the United States and coincided with a general reduction in trade
between the U.S. and Europe. President Thomas Jefferson supported the Embargo Act of 1807
and a year later the Non-Intercourse Act, which severely stymied commerce to belligerents
England and France. However, the legislation proved unenforceable because smuggling
undermined its effectiveness. Due to liberalization of trade policies resulting from the Bourbon
reforms in conjunction with the turmoil Spain suffered during the Napoleonic Wars, 1808-1814,
Florida’s Amelia Island, and in particular Fernandina, became a free port. Planters and traders
from the Florida-Georgia border region were responsible for a temporary surge in economic
transactions occurring in the settlement. Among the imports arriving during this period were
African slaves, which could no longer be legally brought into U.S. ports. These activities
continued until the Patriot Rebellion of 1812, an uprising of Georgia citizens with members of
Florida’s Euro-American population, and sequent filibuster activity as well as U.S. occupation of
Amelia Island after 1817 ended this commerce.
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Governor White’s edict restricting the rights of the Black population of Spanish Florida
coincided with the increasing economic importance of plantations and the slave trade. Even
before the trading upsurge in Fernandina, the island had been annually exporting 60,000 pounds
of cotton from local providers.89 Landers writes that planters such as Zephaniah Kingsley and
Fernando de la Maza y Arredondo had become major importers of slaves since they had the
resources to undertake these endeavors. Spanish officials facilitated these efforts since they “saw
slave traders as men who would help develop the underdeveloped colony.”90 However, Spanish
Florida’s history of liberal treatment for slaves and malleable definition of race contradicted this
embrace of plantations and the slave trade. For instance, the colony depended on the utilization
of a free black militia for its defense, yet it is unlikely that transplanted Euro-American planters
in Florida would be drastically different from their Georgia counterparts in their aversion to and
fear of armed Blacks.
These conflicted processes could be observed within the lives of the planters themselves.
Kingsley operated as a slave trader responsible for bringing numerous Africans into a state of
bondage because he believed they provided the few avenues for economic success.
Nevertheless, Daniel L. Schafer argues that the planter felt race “ought not be the badge of
degradation.” He cites the case of Anta Majigeen Ndiaye, Kingsley’s freed slave and mother to
several of his children. The planter also utilized the less restrictive task system, permitted
expressions of African culture, encouraged free Blacks to own property, and supported the
integrity of family units. Nonetheless, Kingsley felt that Blacks were naturally, if not
biologically, suited to work in the Florida climate and on its plantations, a conclusion he reached
because of their dark skin pigmentation.91 Due to the precarious situation of the colonial
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government, its inability to potentially respond to a slave revolt, the plantation system had to
adapt through a pragmatic approach that advocated lenient treatment of slaves. However,
Lawrence’s 1806-1807 letters to White demonstrate that not all planters had reached a consensus
concerning the treatment of slaves and some confusion existed over any regulations. In the
former’s correspondence to the governor, he asked for clarification because “some of the planters
in this district use their slaves with severity, which ought not to be practiced.”92 White answered
that he considered any punishment that resulted in death, mutilation, cost a limb, and led to
excessive blood loss to be a criminal act.93 Although White was apparently willing to prosecute
a slave master for killing his own slave, demonstrating a level of protection for slaves, he
basically set the standard for punishment to be anything as long as it was short of death. His
brief response, a short paragraph, may also be an indication of his interest in prosecuting abusive
slave masters. Even Lawrence’s concern for slaves’ wellbeing was mitigated by his
unwillingness to allow them to trade freely without their owners’ permission.

Conclusion
Beyond highlighting specific Seminole–Spanish diplomatic negotiations, the pláticas
provide insight into larger political, economic, and social trends. They demonstrate that the
region’s power dynamics were evenly distributed between Indigenous and European groups.
Payne and the various East Florida governors utilized their alliance to stem the threats of external
rivals, the Mikasuki, Lower Creeks, and the U.S. Internally, the talks also served to elevate
Seminole headmen, such as Payne, as the principal representative of the Alachua Seminoles.
Neither the Seminoles nor the Spanish could dictate the terms of their relationship since they
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could not jeopardize their mutually beneficial arrangement in light of their precarious political
and military situation. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous presence of Scottish traders in the
transmission of the pláticas testifies to Spain’s inability to conduct its own trade and intelligence
among Indigenous peoples. Consequently, the Panton, Leslie, and Company agents were
influential as merchants integrated into an Atlantic World economy and who sought to protect
private property, including African slaves. Their participation, including as occasional
interpreters, meant that the Spanish utilized the language of Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy
including the terms “red” and “white.” For Euro-Americans, especially traders and planters, in
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries these terms came to represent categories of
biological difference. These developments ensure that the second Spanish Florida era is difficult
to place within the general rubric of Spanish North American colonialism, especially in terms of
racial discourse.
Factors specific to Spain’s East Florida province near the turn of the nineteenth century
helped shape an intellectual borderlands where Indigenous and Spanish political, social, and
economic concepts interacted with what Claudio Saunt has called the “new order” consisting of
the movement towards political centralization, market capitalism, and hardening racial attitudes.
The territory concurrently experienced exposure to influential planters, the Panton, Leslie, and
Company, and the constant contact and movement of people through the Atlantic World and the
Southeastern Borderlands. Florida’s geopolitical situation meant that its experiences are difficult
to compare to other Spanish North American colonies.
With the pláticas as an analytical lens, this chapter argues that a degree of continuity
existed between British Florida and the return of the Spanish to the province in 1784. This
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serves to problematize the dominant historiographical narrative that asserts that the British period
had little influence on the Spanish and that processes, especially pertaining to race and market
capitalism, only reared their heads once the U.S. annexed Florida. Although these processes
were far from dominant and not always obvious during Spain’s final reign in Florida, it would be
difficult to argue they were absent and not in dialogue with the existing systems as part of the
larger milieu of the Florida Borderlands.
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Chapter 3
THE “STATE OF MUSKOGEE”:
EMERGING NATIONALIST DISCOURSE IN THE FLORIDA
BORDERLANDS, 1790-1803
Therefore we do determine, and are determined to take such measures as may be
effectually necessary to defend our Country, to defend our most Sacred Rights: to defend
the Honor of this Nation, and procure reparation and satisfaction for our injured citizens.
Therefore be known to all Men, That We the Director General of Muskogee, in special
council met, for the reasons aforesaid do, by virtue of our authority and High Office, as in
duty bound declare war against his Catholic Majesty and his subjects in order that general
reprisal be made both by land and sea of the goods, ships, and subjects of his Catholic
Majesty.
William Augustus Bowles, 18001

During the turn of the nineteenth century various rambling diplomatic dispatches
emerged from Mikasuki, a settlement sharing its name with the Indigenous group that inhabited a
part of northwestern Florida.2 Although its headman, Kinache, was one of the major power
brokers in the region, his guest, William Augustus Bowles, was responsible for the
proclamations. The theatrical visitor was a former British loyalist from Maryland who, while
serving in the armed forces, became acquainted with West Florida as well as the Seminoles and
Lower Creek. Bowles was a Euro-American filibuster seeking to carve out an empire in the
supposed political vacuum of the Southeastern Borderlands where national power was weak.
Although his “State of Muskogee” made pretensions to forging a united Seminole and Creek
national consciousness, he simply sought to exploit and “civilize“ his Indigenous hosts in order
to quickly elevate himself to a position of power. He was a strong advocate for Indigenous
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sovereignty and territorial integrity as long as it was beneficial to his cause. Indulging in the
discourse of the noble savage, the adventurer awaited the flood of Euro-American immigrants to
his new nation to educate and uplift his Indian supporters.
Bowles’ exploits, his two campaigns and subsequent imprisonments roughly spanning
from the early 1790 to 1803, became fodder for those dabbling in the “Great Man” theory of
history. J. Leitch Wright’s William Augustus Bowles: Director General of the Creek Nation is
one of the few extensive works solely focusing on the filibuster.3 Primarily a narrative of
Bowles’ life, Wright’s book focuses on an interesting figure whose life intersects with critical
historical events such as the American Revolution, the XYZ Affair, and the Louisiana Purchase.
A contemporary re-interrogation of the analytical value of Bowles’ life is needed but hampered
by scholars’ reluctance to once more center the narrative on a Euro-American male historical
figure.4 Recent Borderlands texts have shifted their focus to subordinate groups such as
Indigenous peoples, Africans, and women, examining how they shaped their worlds despite
imbalances of power and the onset of new forms of economic, social, and political control.
Nonetheless, this chapter argues that Bowles’ experiences in the Florida Borderlands still retain
historical importance beyond the confines of his own life. One of the advantages of utilizing
Bowles in order to touch upon the larger themes of this work is that his attempt to usurp existing
trade networks and colonial authority drew Indigenous and European powers’ attention, thus
producing a significant textual record of his activities. His interactions with the Mikasuki, in
turn, enables historians to gain an insight into the broad changes that were occurring in the
Southeastern Borderlands, especially among Indigenous communities. This chapter argues that
the events associated with Bowles, the Mikasuki, and the Seminoles illustrate that the Florida
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Borderlands remained quite accessible to various groups’ mobility and existed in an intellectual
and economic crossroads between the U.S. Southeast, Caribbean, and the Atlantic World. Thus
Florida did not exist in a vacuum since nationalist discourse and market capitalism often ran
parallel and intersected with established decentralized political and non-market economic
systems.
Bowles came to age during the Enlightenment and subsequently witnessed the nationalist
movements of the American and French Revolutions. He was a staunch supporter of the British
monarch and joined a loyalist Maryland regiment in order to fight against the Continental Army
and its allies. Bowles’ unit went to defend West Florida from the Spanish, but he soon chafed
under his superiors’ authority and deserted. He was allowed to reside among a party of Lower
Creeks before returning to his regiment just in time to be held captive by the Spanish. Bowles,
released, later returned to West Florida where he began to propagate rhetoric of Indigenous
nationalism with the goal of founding the “State of Muskogee.” Meanwhile Alexander
McGillivray attempted to fashion a Creek, mainly Upper Creek, national identity especially
though the Treaty of New York with the United States in 1790. Bowles gained allies among the
Lower Creeks and fancied himself a challenger to McGillivray’s leadership. He envisioned
himself as the Director General of what he probably viewed as a culturally and ethnically
homogenous Creek/Seminole nation. In conjunction with these efforts to forge an Indigenous
nation, the United States and Great Britain sought to extend their national control and power over
a perceived vacuum in Florida Borderlands left because of Spanish weakness.
Although the discourse of nationalism and the reach of American and European states
sought to assert itself into northern Florida and southeastern Georgia, the political, social, and
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economic systems of the borderlands continued to shape intercultural relations, and thereby
undercut the reach of the nation-state. Lower Creeks, Apalachicola Seminoles, and the Mikasuki
allied at various times with Bowles in order to resist the encroachment of European and
American nation-building and market capitalism. They hoped Bowles would serve as a
counterweight to the U.S. and the Spanish and could even bring the eventual return of the British
and thus the reemergence of imperial competition and the “middle ground.” Additionally,
Bowles backers including Bahamian traders desirous of disrupting the Panton, Leslie, and
Company trade monopoly were willing to offer competitive rates on manufactured goods for
deerskins. Indigenous peoples became further integrated in a system that linked New Providence
and London with the Southeastern Borderlands, accelerating the fluid movement of goods and
people across a trans-Atlantic trade system. Although figures such as McGillivray and Bowles
claimed to speak for multiple Lower Creek and Seminole settlements, these groups maintained
decentralized political structures. Indigenous peoples in the Florida Borderlands generally
continued to live in relatively small autonomous settlements with economic exchanges based on
reciprocity. However these communities were not isolated from the discourse of political
centralization and trans-Atlantic economic integration based on the safeguarding of property,
especially African slaves.

3.1 William Augustus Bowles and the Florida Borderlands
At first glance the biography of William Augustus Bowles remains largely a narrative of
an ambitious British adventurer and the precariousness of Spain’s hold on both Floridas.
However, his life sheds light on larger currents encompassing the Southeastern Borderlands
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during this period. Early scholarship emphasized Bowles and his character traits rather than the
historical context of his actions.5 Illustrative of this early work is Elisha P. Douglass’ description
of Bowles as:
tall, handsome, half incorrigible rogue and half idealist, gallant leader of a lost
cause, an intimate of the conspiracies of Spain and England as they struggled for
empire and finally a sacrifice to the very people for whom he had devoted his lifehe might indeed serve as a model for a fictioneer’s hero.6
Scholarship after the 1960s began to devote considerable attention to the historical context of the
events shaping Bowles’ public career while avoiding portraits of Bowles as a skilled white
adventurer leading “noble savages.”7 With increased attention to the documents concerning the
establishment of a “sovereign Indian state,” Lyle N. McAlister’s article “The Marine Forces of
William Augustus Bowles and his ‘State of Muskogee’” argues that Bowles invested
considerable intellectual capital in creating the contours of a nation.8 Wright’s scholarship
offered a more complete treatment of the filibuster and provided more historical context. This
chapter seeks to revisit Bowles and his activities in the Florida Borderlands while prioritizing his
influence in regards to the spread of nationalistic discourse and his relationship with Indigenous
allies. This requires a brief summary of the British adventurer’s background and a review of his
two major campaigns in northern Florida.
Maryland was the unlikely home for a historical figure claiming the mantle of leadership
over an Indigenous nation in the Southeast. Bowles’ father Thomas Bowles arrived from
England in order to become a landowner and to accumulate significant holdings. His middling
position in colonial society and access to important literature ensured his son received a wellrounded education. Although William would express an aversion to some Enlightenment
philosophies and political beliefs, he “always remained an ardent pupil of the European
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intellectual ferment.”9 However, Bowles never abandoned his loyalty for the British, especially
in the face of threats stemming from the American and French Revolutions. As an aspiring
leader, he did not appreciate any movements that threatened the social order. From an early age
Bowles seemed to thirst for opportunities for political and social advancement rather than
remaining at home in Maryland. At fourteen years of age Bowles became a low ranking army
officer and was stationed in Philadelphia and later New York. In 1778 Bowles’ regiment was
sent to the South as a part of the British strategy to utilize its popular support in the region. After
a brief respite in Jamaica they were sent to Pensacola to protect British West Florida and threaten
Louisiana because the Spanish had joined the hostilities. While in the area Bowles ran afoul of
his superiors and was taken in by one of the Lower Creek parties that often came to Pensacola to
receive gifts.10
During Bowles’ desertion of his military post he became acquainted with the Lower
Creek and Seminoles and utilized this information in his future endeavors. While in the Florida
Borderlands, Bowles allegedly had children with a Cherokee woman and with Mary, the
daughter of a Lower Creek headman named Perryman. He eventually returned to his old
regiment in order to fend off an imminent Spanish attack on Pensacola. Troops led by Bernardo
de Gálvez captured the West Florida post and Bowles was sent with his regiment as a prisoner of
war to Havana. Later, he was sent to New York where he remained until the war ended: Bowles
then decided to resettle in Nassau. After working odd jobs such as partaking in theatrical
performances and painting portraits, he wandered back to the Lower Creek in 1785. The British
adventurer would make valuable contacts with both Nassau officials and the Upper Creek leader
Alexander McGillivray and soon developed a scheme to gain political and economic power in
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the Southeastern Borderlands. Bowles’ 1788 expedition, funded by a couple of influential
backers, consisted of a party of Bahamian mercenaries and Indigenous allies who trekked about
northern Florida until deserters and lack of clear objectives dissipated their chances of success.
Falling out with McGillivray, Bowles returned to Nassau and decided that his best course of
action was to lead a small delegation of eight Creek and Cherokee leaders to London to meet
with British officials and to propose an alliance and seek British military and financial
assistance. The delegation disembarked in London during 1790 and garnered much attention
from the public, but British officials sent them back. Undeterred, Bowles regrouped with his
Bahamian backers and forged ahead with ambitious plans.
In his efforts to gain Indigenous support to challenge the dominant colonial order, Bowles
was more opportunistic than altruistic. It is doubtful that principled notions of justice for
Indigenous peoples solely drove him. Rather Bowles attempted to take advantage of one of the
few opportunities that might catapult him into a position of power. He had remained an ensign
in the British army and never advanced beyond the lowest rank for an officer. Wright states that
Bowles illustrated a “temperament better suited to command than to serve.”11 What is clear from
the diplomatic deputation to London is that Bowles enjoyed the status and attention he derived
from presenting himself as a “white Indian chief.” In future correspondence he declared himself
“Director General of Muskogee.” Assuredly Bowles’ endeavors were designed to elevate
himself to a position of high status. He would have had difficulty settling down to a quiet and
insignificant life as a soldier or farmer.
Bowles was part of a long legacy of Euro-Americans seeking social and economic
mobility in the frontier through the exploitation of Indigenous peoples.12 Additionally Bowles
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would not have received the attention he generated in London and elsewhere had he not been
“playing Indian.” As Phillip Deloria argues, Americans constructed their identities by assuming
an “Indian” persona and simultaneously defining their identities in opposition to a perceived
Indianness.13 As a Maryland loyalist at the losing end of the American Revolution, Bowles was
a man in a liminal position, existing between nations, unable to return home and a refugee among
the British colonies. He sought his new identity in the Florida Borderlands by becoming a
“white Indian,” but his whiteness and ability to “civilize” the Lower Creek and Seminoles
privileged him to a position of leadership. Conversely, the filibuster’s “native transformation”
imbued him with the frontier knowledge and “savageness” that the British lacked in the
American Revolution when their European military tactics proved inadequate against guerilla
warfare. Eventually Bowles sought to use this image to encourage whites to immigrate to
Muskogee and to transform the territory into a British protectorate.14
It would not have been possible for Bowles to promote himself as a white “chief” of
Southeastern Indigenous peoples without tacit support of the British government and concrete
support by Nassau officials and merchants. For their part, the British never officially sanctioned
Bowles activities but neither did they dissuade him of his plans. Political and diplomatic
circumstances remained fluid and many British observers felt that a weak Spain and United
States would be hard pressed to hold on to their territory in that region.15 Defeat in the American
Revolution only intensified British resolve to maintain or increase their political and economic
presence in the West Indies. They felt that these possessions “stood as easily Britain’s biggest
overseas capital investment, no longer simply the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, but
now virtually the crown itself.”16 The Florida Borderlands and the Gulf Coast had always been
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interconnected with the Caribbean and factored in British strategic thinking. According to
Wright they continued to seek an opportune moment to exert their influence there since the
Southeast was a valuable market for manufactured goods. With the onset of the industrial
revolution, increased production meant that outlets for those wares were highly prized.17
Instability and a dynamic geopolitical situation made a figure like Bowles, claiming to control all
Southeastern Indigenous peoples, a potentially important ally only if war erupted in that region.
While implicit British approval was significant, Bowles would have had difficulty even
attempting his plans without the support of Nassau traders. Lawrence Kinnaird argues that
Bowles’ campaigns amounted to “commercial warfare waged by the merchants of New
Providence against the house of Panton.”18 Panton, Leslie and Company had pragmatically
negotiated with the Spanish government for the right to continue their trade with Southeastern
Indigenous peoples. As a result they further integrated the Southeastern Borderlands with the
Atlantic economy by linking Florida posts with Bahamas warehouses and London suppliers.
Creek and Seminole deerskins were being exchanged for guns, ammunition, and a variety of
manufactured goods. The Panton monopoly irked powerful people such as John Murray, the
Bahamas Governor Lord Dunmore, and John Miller, head of the Miller, Bonnamy and Company
trading firm. They came to see Bowles as their representative into the Southeastern market and
began to invest in his venture. Miller sent his ships to West Florida with gifts and trade goods to
the Lower Creeks and Seminoles. With competitive rates and utilizing existing complaints
against Panton, Leslie, and Company, Miller sought to end his rival’s grip on the region. Both
firms effectively represented the expansion of market capitalism and the competition to acquire
markets and tap into native knowledge of important resources.
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Bahamian traders were interested in the Bowles expeditions because they wanted access
to Indigenous peoples’ deerskins and to satiate Indian demand for manufactured products.
Lower Creek and Seminole leaders had their own motivations and strategic concerns for forming
alliances with Bowles and indulging his schemes. As aptly illustrated by recent scholarship,
Indigenous peoples were political, economic, and social actors who operated within a “mediated
opportunism,” meaning their potential agency existed within constrains due to disease,
environmental conditions, and colonialism.19 Europeans perceived Indigenous peoples as
especially susceptible to the machinations of nefarious European men, implying that their mental
state resembled that of women and children, and that they should be treated as wards.20
Nonetheless, the Lower Creek and Seminoles were quite cognizant of their geopolitical situation
and attempted to address these conditions. Both groups faced increased stress from the
undermining of the “middle ground” and the increased centralization and expansion of Upper
Creek leaders such as Alexander McGillivray as well as land grants sought by the United States.
Disputes also arose between the colonial Florida government and the Seminole over the
boundaries between Indigenous peoples and settlers. In addition to these pressures, Panton,
Leslie, and Company operated a trading monopoly that commodified deerskins, land, goods, and
even African slaves. The British trading firm was able to keep its prices high thus placing its
Indigenous clients in debt, an issue that remained a source of contention even after Bowles
ultimately left the Florida Borderlands in 1803.21 Within this context various groups of Lower
Creeks and Seminoles felt it was advantageous to form temporary alliances and befriend Bowles.
Even McGillivray briefly considered cooperating with Bowles in 1788 when the Spanish and
Panton, Leslie, and Company were withholding trade, the most potent weapon in the arsenal of
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the colonial government.22 In this instance, McGillivray utilized Bowles as leverage in his
negotiations and probably never considered an alliance with the British adventurer as viable.
Whether Lower Creek and Seminoles perceived Bowles as a long-term solution to their concerns
or as negotiation chip is difficult to ascertain. Depending on the situation, which could rapidly
evolve, Bowles presented Indigenous people the opportunity to redress their grievances while
colonial powers continued to hold the filibuster, not the Creeks and Seminoles, responsible for
the turmoil.23
Bowles’ first two campaigns in the Florida Borderlands occurred in 1788 and again in
late 1791 to early 1792, taking place during the controversy surrounding the 1790 Treaty of New
York between McGillivray and the United States. McGillivray’s father Lachlan McGillivray
married Sehoy Marchand, a member of the prestigious Wind Clan and sister to the Upper Creek
headman Red Shoes. The Scottish trader’s marriage to Marchand gave him an important
connection to the community.24 His son Alexander was well primed for a leadership position
and would be able to enhance his economic status. According to Theda Purdue, it should be
noted that McGillivray’s ascendance among the Upper Creek should not be simply based upon
the fact he was a “mixed blood.”25 Previous scholarship conflated race with culture and thus
bestowed a political and economic astuteness to “mixed blood” progeny based on their partial
whiteness. However, the Creek leader owed a significant portion of his social, political, and
economic position to his mother since he lived in a matrilineal society and inherited her clan and
would have been supported by her male relatives. However, McGillivray’s father played a larger
role in his son’s upbringing despite the diminished role fathers had in the lives of Creek children.
Saunt writes that understanding how Creek clans and moieties functioned “provides rules of
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behavior but does not describe practice; in fact, practice fluctuated over time and place.”26
McGillivray is an important harbinger of the “New Order” taking root among a faction of the
Creek. His life epitomized the transformations that occurred in the Southeastern Borderlands.
He owned property, including African slaves, sought to construct a Creek Nationalism, and was
an agent of the Spanish and U.S governments.
In 1790 McGillivray traveled to New York and signed a treaty with the United States,
which caused an upheaval among the Spanish and the groups that he claimed to represent.27
Treaty articles stipulated that the provisions of the agreement pertained not only to a group of
Upper Creeks but to all Creeks, and the treaty even makes mention of the Seminoles. U.S. and
Spanish authorities had assumed that McGillivray held influence over the Lower Creeks and
Seminoles and overlooked their decentralized political structure. In 1786, the Spanish had
written to the Creek leader and asked for his intercession in an incident on the St. Mary’s River
presumably concerning the Seminoles. Seeking to sidestep the unpleasant issue, he informed the
Spanish East Florida governor “as for the Semanolies I have but little acquaintance with the
present leaders the former ones whom I knew are dead.”28 Nonetheless, McGillivray’s stature
among colonial powers and his employment as their agent were based on their calculation that
his agreements would be uniformly accepted by the whole “nation.” Indeed rival Creek leader
Hoboithle Micco was resentful of McGillivray’s attempts to centralize power and his pretensions
to being the representative of the Creek.
Indigenous peoples of the Florida Borderlands were also disturbed with McGillivray’s
and the United States’ attempt to expand their influence in the region. As a result Bowles
became “a lighting rod who attracted many Lower Creeks dissatisfied with McGillivray’s
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leadership.”29 The agreement with the United States to cede Oconee lands threatened the Lower
Creeks with the increased encroachment of American settlers. To make matters worse,
McGillivray’s authority over the Lower Creek proved questionable, yet he sought to bargain
away their hunting grounds. Saunt argues that resistance to the Upper Creek leader went beyond
the Treaty of New York but had to do with his efforts to usher in the “New Order,” a shift away
from Creek political, social, and economic systems. For instance, one treaty stipulation called
for the U.S. to provide agricultural and husbandry assistance in order to “civilize” the Creek and
end their supposed reliance on hunting. Another article required the apprehension and
extradition of fugitive African slaves among the Creek. McGillivray, himself a slave owner and
landholder, sought to uphold Euro-American notions of private property and orientate his
community towards a market economy and a stratified social hierarchy.30 Lower Creek leaders
and groups accustomed to local autonomy within a loose political confederation would not
accede to the “New Order.” Seminole settlements that had been in the process of politically
splintering off from the Creeks would especially resist McGillivray’s attempts at centralization.
Ironically, the Lower Creeks and Seminoles briefly utilized Bowles as a counterweight to
McGillivray. Saunt writes that as “a hunter and warrior, Bowles outwardly differed markedly
from McGillivray, the statesman and plantation owner.”31 However, Bowles’ eventual goal was
to encourage Euro-American immigration in order to “civilize” the Creek and construct a nation
based upon the principles of the “New Order.”32 He even sought the financial support of the
Church Missionary Society, informing them that the Creeks stood on the verge of civilization
and would readily accept Christianity.33 His Indigenous allies undoubtedly did not share his
broader designs in the Florida Borderlands.
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McGillivray’s multifaceted efforts to centralize power also included his interests in the
Southeastern Borderlands commercial deerskin trade. In addition to his positions as a Spanish
and U.S. agent, the Creek leader was also a “silent partner” in the Panton, Leslie, and Company
trading firm.34 His efforts were crucial in convincing the Spanish to allow the British firm to
remain in Las Floridas, as demonstrated in his 1785 letter to West Florida governor Arturo
O’Neill in which he states that the company’s ability to furnish trade will ward off the influence
of the United States among the Indigenous peoples.35 Panton, Leslie, and Company indeed
secured the trade concessions and soon monopolized the deerskin trade. Based upon the rules of
the market economy Lower Creek and Seminoles had to deal with the company’s high prices and
ability to incur debt upon Indigenous hunters. These debts often led to the eventual cession of
land grants in order to satisfy the demands of the firm for repayment. Indigenous peoples
understood that competition among colonial powers and trading houses meant they had more
leverage in negotiations and they could secure beneficial terms.
Bowles and his Bahamian partners offered the Lower Creeks and Seminoles an
alternative to the Panton, Leslie, and Company monopoly. Seeking temporary alliances with a
third party was not a novel development in the Southeastern Borderlands. Alan Gallay argues
that during the British occupation of Florida after the Seven Years War, the Lower Creek were
willing to lease land to the trader and planter Jonathan Bryan in order to apply leverage to the
British who had little political and economic competition.36 In Bowles’ case the Lower Creek
and Seminoles were seeking to encourage an increased British presence in order to pressure the
Spanish as well as the Panton, Leslie, and Company.37 In comparison to the previous British
regime, Spanish gifts were inadequate in terms of their quality and quantity. Additionally, a
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Spanish ordered embargo of the trade was one of the few effective tools the colonial government
could implement.38 Consequently Bowles’ most effective sales pitch to potential Indigenous
allies was that he was an official representative of the British monarch.39 Although he was given
no official support from the British, Bowles implied that his success would usher in the return of
the British. Considering that the Spanish felt the need in their pláticas to discredit Bowles’
status with the British government, the lure of their return to the Southeast must have
resonated.40 Eventually Bowles’ downfall was caused by his inability to deliver on promises of
inexhaustible trade and the unlimited support of the British government.41 Nonetheless,
Indigenous people sporadically supported the adventurer in order to address internal issues,
McGillivray’s centralization efforts, and external pressures, rising prices and debt owed to the
Panton, Leslie, and Company.
With the backdrop of a rapidly developing geopolitical situation in the region and several
internal and external motivating factors driving Indigenous support, Bowles’ first major
campaign occurred from late 1791 to early 1792. Unlike the 1788 expedition, the events of this
operation were more substantial and threatening to both the Spanish and the Panton, Leslie, and
Company trading firm. However, rarely did any of Bowles’ political and military endeavors
unfold as he had intended. Before he could reach Florida tensions between the British and the
Spanish were subsiding, thus spelling doom for the prospects of direct British intervention.
Nonetheless, Bowles was gaining Indigenous allies by criticizing McGillivray and the terms of
the Treaty of New York calling for the cession of Creek lands. His armed group effectively
thwarted the surveyors seeking to demarcate the newly acquired U.S. lands. However, the
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adventurer’s primary goal remained the fulfillment of the promises he had made upon his arrival
in western Florida.
Bowles’ success rested upon his ability to furnish a steady and substantial supply of trade
and gifts. In order to present himself as a viable alternative to his rivals, Panton, Leslie, and
Company, Bowles had to match or exceed their inventory. Unsurprisingly, the campaign soon
targeted one of the Panton trading posts located near the St. Marks fortification. Bowles, with
the assistance of one of his underlings, William Cunningham, apprehended Edward Forrester, the
store’s attendant, and requisitioned goods valued at a minimum of ten thousand dollars.42
Although the trading post was near the Spanish fort, the garrison lacked the strength for a
punitive expedition. However, Bowles also lacked the military capacity to besiege the fort.
Once Spanish reinforcements arrived, the adventurer gambled and entered the post believing that
the Spanish were prepared to negotiate and would be open to abandoning the Panton, Leslie, and
Company and rely on him and his partners instead. However, the Spanish commander José de
Hevia convinced Bowles that Louisiana Governor Baron de Carondelet sought to confer with
him. Once aboard a Spanish ship, Bowles effectively became a prisoner, a realization that
quickly dawned on him as he was sent to Havana and placed in the city’s prison. His rivals fully
expected that Bowles would no longer factor in the political and economic struggles of the
Florida Borderlands.
Exiled to Spain and then the Philippines, it seemed unlikely the filibuster would be able
to pursue his ambitious schemes. Nonetheless he managed to take advantage of a chaotic
situation aboard a Spanish ship that was transporting him back to the Iberian Peninsula.
Approximately six years after his faulty judgment led him into the St. Marks fort, Bowles
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managed to escape the clutches of his captors at sea and was rescued by an American ship and
soon deposited in British controlled Sierra Leone.43 Ever loyal to his dream of establishing
“Muskogee,” Bowles quickly sought to return to Florida but subsequent transportation problems
meant he was rerouted to London. Similar to his first trip to the English capital, Bowles sought
official sanction and political and financial backing of his endeavors. Once more he had to settle
for only an implicit blessing of his activities and enough monetary assistance to return to Florida.
Eventually he gained passage to the Caribbean, making the rounds between Barbados, Jamaica,
and the Bahamas. Much to his consternation, a political reorganization meant that Bowles’
allies, Governor Dunmore and Miller, no longer wielded the same amount of power as they had
six years before. William Dowdeswell, a Panton, Leslie, and Company ally, became governor
while Miller remained on the island but out of favor with the new administration. Despite the
undermining of his Bahamian base, Bowles cautiously remained on the island and kept abreast of
regional developments.
Bowles’ ultimate fate in the Southeastern Borderlands was partially based on the
combustible political and social situation at the turn of the 19th century. In conjunction with
local factors, especially the actions and motives of the Lower Creek and the Seminoles, the
shifting alliances and social instability stemming from the American, French, and Haitian
revolutions kept the Atlantic World in a state of flux. Bowles’ ability to coerce British officials
and his attempts to negotiate with the Spanish and the U.S. were based upon arguments that he
could prove useful to their larger designs. British officials continued to humor Bowles in case a
war between Spain and England required the aid of Southeastern Indigenous peoples. However,
stable relations between colonial rivals would doom the adventurer’s aspirations because his
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support among his allies, especially his Indigenous hosts, was founded on the assumption he
could guarantee official British recognition as well as political and economic support.
Furthermore, colonial powers were occupied with the wars that emanated out of the
French Revolution and the social unrest in the Caribbean. There were fears that the massive
slave uprising beginning in 1791 in Saint-Domingue would continue to spread. Caribbean
colonies were wary of the possibility of more slave uprisings. Although Jamaica’s 1795 Maroon
War was the exception, David Patrick Geggus argues that slave resistance in British possessions
was limited because of “exceptionally high concentrations of troops maintained in the British
colonies through the years 1789-1815."44 Numerous British soldiers had been sent to the region
not only to pacify the unrest but to capture the French controlled Caribbean Islands in 1794. The
French responded with emancipation for their African slaves, which assisted in the recruitment
of local militia in order to reverse the British gains.45 Although Florida was peripheral to the
main theater of the conflict, it was unable to completely escape the upheaval of the period. In
1795, the French minister to the United States Edmond Charles Genet sought to implement an
ambitious plan to wrest control of Florida from the Spanish monarchy utilizing American
frontiersmen. Governor Quesada took the costly measure of ordering the destruction of deserted
plantations and organized free African militia and Indigenous allies to ward off the offensive,
which eventually faded.46 Unlike the Caribbean where the French had utilized emancipated
slaves, in Florida Genet sought the support of Euro-Americans seeking to enslave Florida’s
Africans. This meant that free Africans had a vested interest in assisting the Spanish colonial
government. However, animosity between the French and the Spanish subsided with the Treaty
of San Ildefonso in 1796, which renewed hostilities between the Spanish and the British.
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Suddenly the strategic importance of Florida in conjunction with the rivalry between colonial
powers offered Bowles the opportunity to pursue his ambitious designs.
A shipwreck along the Florida coast was illustrative of the complications that became
commonplace during the Bowles campaigns. En route to the Apalachicola Bay, the filibuster’s
transport became stranded and he was forced to rely on assistance from a U.S. government
representative. Ironically the American agent, Andrew Ellicott, was on his way to survey the
line established by the 1795 Pinckney Treaty between the U.S. and Spain.47 This agreement
officially dissected Lower Creek and Seminole lands thus dividing the “State of Muskogee”
between Spanish Florida and the U.S. Nonetheless Bowles believed he would be able to renegotiate the agreement with the U.S. once he established Muskogee and assumed a position of
strength.48 These were issues that the British adventurer could address only after he
reconstituted his base of support among potential Indigenous allies. Eventually he called for a
council at Wekiva, which the Lower Creek and Seminoles attended because Bowles was
distributing goods, especially the munitions that he had brought abroad his transport.49 At the
conference, Indigenous participants apparently elected him “Director of our nation” and implied
that Bowles would rectify the situation concerning the scarcity of trade goods.50 Without a
steady supply of goods arriving from his Nassau partners, Bowles had to strike a blow against his
commercial rivals while bolstering his own inventory. Repeating his feat of 1792, Bowles with a
handful of Euro-American mercenaries and a few hundred Indigenous allies once more
plundered the St. Marks Panton, Leslie, and Company store.51 It was believed that they acquired
goods valued over fifteen thousand dollars as well as a number of African slaves. Bowles then
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diverted his attention to the adjacent Spanish fortification in which he had been captured years
earlier.
With the successful siege of the St. Marks military post, Bowles’ career reached its
zenith, but his rivals’ response would drain his momentum. The adventurer’s brief triumph
occurred because of the missteps of the Panton, Leslie, and Company employee and Spanish
commander Thomas Portell. Panton had sent a ship from Pensacola to support the beleaguered
garrison but unknowingly resupplied his enemy when Bowles’ forces captured the transport.
Eventually Portell lost his nerve waiting for reinforcements and surrendered the outpost, an
action for which he was heavily criticized in Spanish reports.52 Spanish soldiers evacuated the
fort in May 1800 leaving Bowles to his prize. With San Marcos de Apalachee in his possession,
the British adventurer’s prospects improved and the possibility of securing West Florida for his
merchant partners and Muskogee privateers remained within reach. Bowles’ Muskogee “navy,”
consisting of a few mercenary crews, harassed Spanish ships and disrupted shipping in the Gulf
of Mexico and became a source of plundered supplies. 53 With this initial success, the filibuster
envisioned more Indigenous allies rallying to his standard and the official entry of Great Britain
into the war against the Spanish. However, British troops were not on the horizon. Rather, a
sizable Spanish force from Louisiana led by the West Florida Governor Vicente Folch arrived at
St. Marks. Unprepared for the swiftness of the Spanish response, Bowles was forced to retreat
from the fort and take up residence with his staunchest ally, the Mikasuki headman Kinache.
With the loss of San Marcos de Apalachee Bowles became dependent on his Mikasuki
benefactors and would experience more hardships. He had hoped to retake the fort once Folch’s
forces retreated but it never became an option. However, the Spanish were also in no position to
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apprehend Bowles since the Mikasuki were one of the most numerous Seminole groups and their
raids upon the plantations of Spanish citizens during this period earned a healthy respect for their
military prowess. Following the events of 1800 and leading up to his apprehension in 1803,
Bolwes remained with his Indigenous allies, desirous of a more advantageous geopolitical
situation. The Mikasuki conducted raids along the St. Johns River, including a famous incident
on Francis Philip Fatio’s plantation, which occurred in August of 1801 and resulted in the loss of
African slaves. Bowles sought to encourage slaves to join the ranks of his Indigenous allies.
However, Spanish officials’ pláticas with the Seminoles, as discussed in the previous chapter,
were quick to blame Bowles for these acts. They failed to consider the possibility that the
Mikasuki seizure of property was a protest to the colonial regime or the Panton, Leslie, and
Company trading firm. Bowles may have served as convenient pretext for the conflict between
the Mikasuki and the settlers.
Indigenous allies remained faithful to Bowles as long as it served their strategic interests.
However, Bowles was losing much of his prestige due to the difficult position of his Nassau
backers and the 1802 Treaty of Amiens, which established peace between the British, French,
and the Spanish. This effectively ended any possibility of official British intervention into the
Southeastern Borderlands. With supplies from the Bahamas not arriving as consistently as
promised and with British assistance lacking, Indigenous support began to wane. In early 1803 a
Creek conference was called at Hickory Ground in Upper Creek territory to discuss various
issues such as Creek’s trade debts. Despite the presence of his enemies; Panton, Leslie, and
Company traders; Spanish officials and U.S. agents; Bowles felt he needed to make his case for
leading a Southeastern Indigenous coalition against those very groups.54 Considering that the
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meeting concerned the debt that the Creeks owed and that they would probably have to
relinquish land to pay the account, Bowles may have considered this an opportune time to make
his appeal.
Nonetheless, the British adventurer had walked into a trap especially considering that he
no longer garnered much Indigenous support. In fact he never held much sway with the Upper
Creek. Wright states that while U.S. representative Benjamin Hawkins, the West Florida
governor’s son, Estevan Folch, and trader John Forbes were all pressing for Bowles’ arrest, it
was strictly a decision of the sovereign Creek council.55 The verdict against Bowles was not
taken lightly, for he was able to press his case against the parties mentioned above and the Creek
council deliberated on the proper course of action. In the end the Indigenous leaders felt that
stable relations with neighboring colonial powers were preferable to Bowles’ leadership.
Although uncertain, the Creek headmen may have also been seeking to utilize Bowles’ arrest to
coax concessions during debt negotiations with Forbes. The Mikasuki delegation that escorted
the British adventurer to the conference would not risk confrontation with the other Indigenous
groups by resisting his apprehension but were apparently disappointed by this development.56
With the filibuster’s failure in bringing competition to the commercial deerskin trade and the
unwillingness of the British to officially endorse and support his endeavors, the existence of the
“State of Muskogee” ended. While Bowles claimed to be a representative of all Southeastern
Indigenous peoples, it was their lack of faith in his usefulness that led to his final defeat.57

3.2 Encroachment of the Nation-State
Bowles’ capture at Hickory Ground was symbolic of the larger processes developing in
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the Southeastern Borderlands. Lurking beneath the issue of Bowles arrest was the settling
of Creek debts with Panton, Leslie, and Company, during this period renamed the John Forbes
and Company. Also present at the meeting was Hawkins, the U.S. agent to Southern Indigenous
groups. He had befriended the firm and they both sought a mutually beneficial agreement.58 In
1802, the U.S. government had received land grants from the Creek and was pressuring for more
territory. 59 Forbes hoped that the U.S. would purchase a new grant with the payment being
applied towards the Creek’s debts. Forbes and Hawkins represented the expanding reach of the
market economy and the power of the nation-state and they targeted Bowles, since he
championed opposition to further land loss and indebtedness. With the advent of the commercial
deerskin trade, the economy of the Southeastern Borderlands became orientated towards the
commodification of goods and land. Hides exchanged at the various trading posts enabled
Indigenous access to manufactured goods that the firm purchased in London and routed through
the Bahamas. Traders extended credit to hunters, which led to the accumulation of debt when
deliveries failed to match the value of the initial advances. When the Forbes and Company
began insisting for repayment, land became a commodity and a piece of property that could be
exchanged for hard currency or the cancelation of debt.60 With the firm’s cooperation with the
Spanish and the U.S., the extension of the market economy became intertwined with the project
of the nation-state to control its territorial borders.
Although removal efforts in the 1830s revealed the “supreme exhibition of state power
over native peoples,” the U.S. had already attempted to assert its power through a series of
treaties, land grants, and efforts to “civilize” Indigenous peoples.61 For instance the second
article of the 1790 Treaty of New York asserted that the Creeks could have no agreements with
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other states and were “under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other
sovereign whosoever.”62 Signed by various Upper Creek leaders, but mainly supported by
McGillivray, the document represents efforts by the U.S. to project a Euro-American national
structure upon the Creeks in order to facilitate agreements and eventually removal. Despite
many objections, especially among the Lower Creek and Seminoles, McGillivray and the U.S.
argued that Southeastern Indigenous groups had a degree of centralization making the agreement
valid.63 In other areas, the Creek leader and the U.S. hoped to further encourage “civilization”
by promoting intensive agriculture, and consequently the abandonment of hunting, by supplying
the Creek “with useful domestic animals and implements of husbandry.”64 Saunt states that this
stipulation resonated with McGillivray’s vision for Creek economic development, but it would
“disturb, but perhaps not surprised, many Muskogees.”65 With McGillivray passing away in
1793, Hawkins’ appointment as U.S. agent in 1796 meant he took up the mantle of “civilizing”
the Creek.66 For this reason, he detested Bowles whose campaigns only served to encourage the
Creek to resist further treaties and land grants. A majority of Creeks continued to hunt as a
means of supplementing their agricultural production and few utilized intensive agriculture
designed for accumulating a surplus for the market economy.
An increased U.S. presence and the spread of a nationalist discourse in the Southeast
resulted in efforts to enforce borders and boundaries. Bowles had disrupted U.S. surveyors and
agents that sought to demarcate the geographic borders stemming from the Treaty of New York
and the 1795 Pinckney Treaty. In addition to geographical borders these agreements also
touched upon metaphorical borders as well. Articles from the Treaty of New York focused on
maintaining the emerging racial order in the U.S. Under the third clause of the accord the Creek
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were obligated to extradite fugitive whites or African slaves to the U.S.67 Slaves who escaped
bondage and sought refugee among Indigenous groups were an acute threat to the nation-state.
African and Indigenous peoples’ relationships blurred racial lines that demarcated the emergent
racial hierarchy/order central to the construction of the nation. As Circe Sturm’s work
demonstrates, nationalism is often intertwined with processes that stress racial and cultural
homogeneity.68 Especially in the U.S., a political and economic hierarchy stressed the cultural
and social separation between racialized groups. The Treaty of New York sought to present the
Creek as a unified nation based on a perceived homogenous racial group, thus ignoring the
various ethnic and cultural divisions among the Upper and Lower Creeks. Through the efforts of
figures such as McGillivray and Hawkins, Southeastern groups were being acquainted with
nationalist discourses that sought to gain ascendancy.
Nationalist discourses were not solely propagated by U.S. agents or through treaty
agreements: as mentioned above, McGillivray was one of the Creek elite to embrace the “New
Order.” Although he was racially classified as a mestizo due to his Euro-American father and
Indigenous mother, under the guidelines of matrilineal decent he gained his Creek clan identity
through his mother regardless of his father’s status. McGillivray’s life however was not typical
of most Creek men of that period. For instance his father was active in his upbringing, a role
usually handled by the male relatives of his mother, and as a result he interned at several trading
houses.69 As an adult he had accumulated property in the form of land, livestock, and slaves.
With a position of leadership, McGillivray parlayed his connections to become a compensated
agent of the Panton, Leslie, and Company, the Spanish, and the U.S. These entities were eager
to find a partner who could present a single voice to “represent” the Creeks and Seminoles.
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Undoubtedly colonial powers and merchants found their designs frustrated by the decentralized
nature of Indigenous political systems and their need to reach consensus. In addition these
groups were seeking to impose upon Indigenous peoples a political structure that resembled
Euro-American governments. McGillivray adopted nationalist discourse as a way to civilize the
Creek and also to consolidate his position as leader. Saunt illustrates how McGillivray’s life, his
plantation holdings, Western style residence, utilization of African slaves, appreciation for
literature, and his treaties and service for the U.S. and Spain demonstrated his commitment to
construct a Creek nationalism based upon western principles.70 The Creek leader’s fondness for
reading and writing were central to his ability to consolidate power. His letters to the other
Creeks, the Spanish and the U.S. placed him in a position to be the spokesperson of the nation.
With this ability to communicate to various parities McGillivray was an important actor in
foreign policy. After his death, being literate was seen as a prerequisite for Creek headmen
seeking to take up his mantle.71 Nevertheless, McGillivray’s frustrated ambitions led to his
distant and disillusioned demeanor during the years of his life.72
Saunt has portrayed Bowles’ campaigns as resistance movements against the “New
Order” promoted by McGillivray and the U.S.73 The British adventurer is thus positioned as the
champion of the Lower Creeks and Seminoles against Upper Creek centralization efforts.
However, this narrative should be problematized when Bowles’ goals and motives are
considered. While Bowles rhetorically criticized McGillivray’s aspirations for power and his
duplicity with the U.S. and land speculators, Bowles nonetheless sought the same power as his
rival.74 Historians have even suggested that Bowles’ vision for “Muskogee” was influenced by
McGillivray’s own designs to craft a civilized Indian nation.75 At first glance the British
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adventurer’s use of nationalistic language was merely a pretext for his filibustering efforts in the
Southeast in order to gain wealth and favor from Bahamian traders and the British government.
However Bowles did invest considerable intellectual effort in crafting the contours of Muskogee.
The project only developed superficially because his Indigenous allies never shared the desire to
construct the nation of Muskogee, at least upon western terms. Nonetheless, similar to
McGillivray among the Upper Creek, Bowles did propagate nationalist discourse among Lower
Creek and Seminoles.
Bowles embarked upon the creation of the “State Muskogee” through his official
correspondence, legal codes, and military forces. As the “Director General,” the filibuster often
wrote to Spanish, British, and American officials. He presented himself as the official
representative of Muskogee with varying degrees of acceptance. Spanish authorities viewed him
as illegitimate while the British were willing to acknowledge him only if it proved convenient to
their designs. Despite skepticism in Bowles’ leadership claims, the volume of letters between
the East Florida governor and the captain general in Cuba prove the Spanish did take him
seriously as a threat. In addition to written correspondence to colonial leaders, Bowles often
issued proclamations, especially declarations of war. Against the Spanish he stated that their
present state of belligerency was due to the King’s “evil intentions against this nation
(Muskogee).”76 In a communiqué to the U.S., Bowles threatened the U.S. if they supported any
efforts to “subvert or change the sovereignty” of Muskogee.77 Within the same document he
offers an alliance while simultaneously threatening a declaration of war. Bowles’ writing is
filled with legalistic language as he cites various treaties and the “law of nations.” Numerous
statements addressed topics ranging from the free trade status of Muskogee to disapproval of
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U.S.-Spanish treaty agreements.78 As Director General, Bowles desired to write a constitution
and to begin the publication of a newspaper. Since Bowles believed that “printing was a
characteristic of civilization” he sought the services of English printer John Owen.79 However,
the Bahama Gazette proved a more attractive employer for Owen and Bowles was left without
the means to publish his documents. The loss of the newspaper was indeed a setback since
scholars have discussed the importance of print capitalism in creating a national consciousness.80
Bowles also had a respect for the creation of national laws and attempted to enforce his own
legal codes.81 He had drawn up documents pertaining to the conduct of his privateers in the
Muskogee Navy.82 In an incident over furniture with a subordinate, Hugh Ferguson, Bowles
threatened him with prosecution under Muskogee law.83 In addition to legal codes, the British
adventurer had claimed the existence of elections, crafted symbols such as the Muskogee flag,
and constructed two Muskogee ports on the Gulf of Mexico that allowed free trade with friendly
nations. It is only possible to surmise the evolution of these institutions and the State of
Muskogee had Bowles been more successful.
At the turn of the century, larger processes such as nationalism took root in the Atlantic
World. Although both Floridas were on the Spanish imperial periphery, these territories were
nonetheless accessible and in constant contact with the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa. In
comparison to an interior colony such as New Mexico, Florida received relatively swift
communication and reinforcements from Cuba and goods from other North American ports and
even London via the Atlantic trade routes. Bowles’ travels illustrated how quickly Caribbean
based ships could reach West Florida. In other words, Florida remained a borderlands yet
positioned in close proximity to strong transnational political, social, and economic trends of the
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period. The second Spanish Florida period is often portrayed as a respite from the processes
mentioned above which took hold once the U.S. annexed the territory in 1821 thus ushering in a
new order. However, this work argues that these changes were rooted much earlier and were in
constant dialogue and negotiation with established structures.

3.3 Indigenous Borderlands
Despite McGillivray’s and Bowles’ respective efforts, neither figure managed to
centralize power over Southeastern Indigenous peoples or impose a nationalist structure. Even
established national powers such as the U.S. and Spain who claimed jurisdiction in Florida were
unable to control its physical and social boundaries. The Southeast continued to be characterized
by mobility of not only Indigenous peoples but also numerous Euro-Americans and Africans.84
Bowles’ campaigns underscored the interaction and contact between various peoples. For
example, his mercenaries, although never numerous, were present among Indigenous
settlements, especially in Mikasuki. When Ferguson became disillusioned with the British
adventurer and eventually abandoned him, he disclosed that the filibuster had approximately
twelve white followers.85 Francis Philip Fatio Jr.’s account of his trip to Mikasuki describes a
few of Bowles’ Euro-American adherents as well as a ship captain bringing in trade goods from
Georgia.86 Towards the end of 1801 Edward Wanton was writing on the behalf of Lewis Joe, a
Frenchmen having been “an inhabitant of Latchua Amongst the Indians.”87 The man claimed he
had lived among the Seminoles for three years, which would coincide with the first few months
of Bowles return in 1798. In all likelihood the man may have been another partisan who
withdrew to Alachua. Euro-Americans were not the only ones traversing political, social, and
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geographic boundaries. African slaves and refugees through their escape from Euro-American
settlements or seizure during raids subsequently gained residency among the Seminoles. Fatio
Jr. recalled that in Mikasuki he encountered recently seized Africans residing there. Various
Indigenous groups had long traversed the region in seasonal patterns or established more
sedentary settlements. The Seminoles had already demonstrated their mobility when in the
middle of the eighteenth century they had immigrated to Florida and maintained contacts with
the Lower Creeks.
Nations sought to control the movements of various peoples through mechanisms such as
the Treaty of New York and the 1795 Pickney Treaty.88 However, raiding and the seizure of
property represented an even more serious threat than various groups’ physical mobility.
Destruction and acquisition of citizens’ possessions illustrated that national power was limited
and control of borders illusionary. Captive taking and raiding were prime indicators of EuroAmerican national weakness and demonstrated that a region operated under different socioeconomic systems. Brain Delay writes that Andrew Jackson utilized incidents of Indigenous
raiding to condemn the Spanish for failing to uphold the “laws of nations” on the FloridaGeorgia border. With this justification the U.S. invaded northern Florida and attacked Spanish,
Seminole, and African settlements in what became known the First U.S.-Seminole War.89 Delay
argues that this pattern, the undermining of national legitimacy due to continued Indigenous
autonomy, would be an important component of the 1846 U.S.-Mexico War.
During the Spanish colonial period in the Southwestern Borderlands, captive taking and
the adoption of slaves facilitated diplomatic, cultural, and economic exchanges.90 Indigenous
groups and Europeans found a middle ground in their negotiations through shared notions of
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honor and gender as well as the important roles played by captives as intercultural mediators.91
In Texas, Barr argues that the Spanish were confronted with an imbalance in the region’s power
dynamics and were forced to negotiate on Indigenous terms. Lacking a strong market economy
in the region, Indigenous and European groups seized goods that could not be sufficiently
acquired through trade.92
A market economy based on the export commodity of deerskins made the Florida
Borderlands different from the Southwestern Borderlands. It also explains why captive taking in
the former occurred on a much smaller scale. Goods could be acquired through trade, but the
Spanish and the Panton, Leslie, and Company had difficulty meeting demand and in some cases
placed an embargo on Indigenous trade during periods of conflict. The suspension of trade, as
was the case in 1801-1802, also provided an added incentive for further raids upon plantations.93
While scholars such as Kenneth Porter and Kevin Mulroy have argued that Africans among the
Seminole experienced a different type of slavery described as a form of “democratic feudalism,”
nonetheless slaves were still commodities with a recognized value. For instance in the aftermath
of a particular raid in 1801, John Forrester questioned the Seminole leader Payne as to whether
he was involved in the act. He explained that it must have been the work of white “vagabonds,”
likely Bowles partisans, not the Seminoles since it was horses that were stolen rather “Negroes.”
In his opinion, if Indigenous peoples had been involved they would have seized the slaves not
the horses.94 Payne’s statement highlights the value placed upon African slaves, often a specific
monetary sum. Seminoles were in constant contact with traders and lived in the vicinity of
planters, groups responsible for the commodification and sale of African slaves.95 Native
peoples were frequently asked to retrieve runaway or seized slaves and received ransom
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payments. Indigenous slavery had existed at the beginning of the eighteenth century but its
practice soon faded and eventually only Africans were ransomed, with some noted exceptions.
While it is correct to argue that the Seminoles never adopted chattel slavery, the frequent
ransoming of African slaves categorized them as property similar to horses and cattle.
Spanish concern over Indigenous raiding took an urgent tone during the waning years of
Bowles’ final campaign. However, the impetus for the raids came from the Mikasuki and their
headman Kinache, an ally of the British adventurer. Bowles’ power came from his association
with the Indigenous leader and not the other way around. From the Mikasuki perspective
Bowles’ enemies were also their rivals and they maintained an uneasy peace with the Spanish
while attempting to keep their independence from the Creeks.96 From their base in northern
Florida near Lake Miccosukee, the Mikasuki were one of the most politically and militarily
powerful groups that were later considered Seminoles. During the First U.S.-Seminole War, the
population of the Mikasuki was roughly 1,000. Similar to Payne, Kinache owned property
including cattle and African slaves. While neighboring headman John Cannard was known for
harsh and oppressive treatment of slaves, Kinache did not practice chattel slavery, although his
negotiations for the return of captured slaves demonstrated that he knew Euro-American
commodified slaves.97
In contrast to the Alachua Seminoles, the Mikasuki did not assign as much importance to
their Spanish alliance. Relations between both groups reached a nadir with the August 1801 raid
on the Fatio plantation and the subsequent capture of the Bonelli family in 1802.98 Before the
conflict, Creek leader John Galphin had warned that the Mikasuki remained the only Indigenous
group in the area opposing the Spanish, although he had predicted Mikasuki fears over a possible
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U.S. invasion would drive them back to the Spanish.99 His analysis proved somewhat inaccurate
and in the immediate aftermath of the Fatio slaves’ seizure U.S. agent Timothy Bernard reported
that the arrest of Mikasuki leader Macloggy, considered second-in-command to Kinache and
probably his brother, had motivated the raid.100 Cannard also wrote to Governor White
informing him that the release of jailed headman would cease all hostilities and procure the
release of the slaves.101 These accounts, though incomplete, problematize narratives that stress
Bowles’ role as the sole motivating factor in the turmoil. As Fatio and the Spanish would come
to appreciate, Kinache not Bowles drove the negotiations for the release of the slaves.
Towards the end of August 1801, Fatio discovered that sixteen Mikasuki Seminole had
left his plantation with thirty-three African slaves.102 While raids of plantations occurred
throughout the Southeastern Borderlands, the Fatio case, due to the planter’s prominence and the
number of slaves taken, received special attention. Bernard counseled that the Spanish follow
the proper channels in retrieving the slaves and meet the ransom demands.103 In other words,
Fatio and the Spanish would have to operate on Mukasuki terms. Indigenous leaders such as
Cannard and Payne were prodded to intercede on Fatio’s behalf. Eventually trader and Spanish
agent Forrester was appointed as the representative in the ensuing negotiations, not only for Fatio
but for other aggrieved planters as well.104 Spanish subjects on the St. Johns River were
apprehensive after the incident and more than a week later an Indigenous party claiming to be
hunting were detained and warned to leave.105 Colonial officials pressured their Alachua
Seminole allies. The Spanish suspected Payne and Bowleg of covertly selling munitions to the
Mikasuki.106 A detailed account of a delegation sent to Mikasuki to negotiate the release of the
slaves was recorded in letters from Fatio Jr. to his father. Despite the son’s condescending tone
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and his desire to illustrate to his father his capabilities, the letters provide valuable insight. Fatio
Jr. traveled first to Alachua and met with Payne, Bowleg, and Forrester and was subsequently
offered an escort by the Seminole headman to meet Bowles and Kinache.107 Since he needed to
inform his father and the Spanish governor of these developments the group did not leave until a
month later.108
Although Fatio Jr.’s journey to Mikasuki did not result in the release of the African slaves
his experience sheds light on the Alachua Seminoles’ influence with the Mikasuki, Bowles’
power, and Kinache’s motives behind the raid. While Payne had promised to handle the
situation, Fatio Jr. wrote that the Alachua leader was ineffective and did not seem to have any
authority among the Mikasuki. Bowleg seemed more concerned with carrying on a clandestine
trade in munitions. When he did speak in favor of Fatio, the Mikasuki rebuked him and asked
why the matter was of any relevance to him.109 Fatio Jr. was then led to Bowles and the two
carried on a conversation in which they discovered they had previously been acquaintances in
New York. After listening to Bowles’ plans for Muskogee, undoubtedly a presentation he
regularly gave, Fatio inquired about the slaves. Bowles responded that he did not have the
authority to release the captured slaves, implying that it was Kinache’s decision. Although Fatio
Jr. likely viewed Bowles’ reply as evasive, in all likelihood it was the truth. Through his travels
in the region, Fatio Jr. had observed that the Mikasuki with the exception of Kinache were
resentful of Bowles. His presence was a source of difficulty with the colonial powers and the
Mikasuki were burdened with maintaining his mercenary band. When Fatio Jr. finally received
an audience with Kinache, the Indigenous leader bluntly expressed his grievances against the
Spanish. He felt they had raided his settlements and harmed his people, and consequently his
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brother had been sent to St. Marks to protest when he was captured and imprisoned. Kinache
made Fatio Jr. aware that he had the power to hold him in retaliation but he would allow him to
leave. In addition to his disdain, the Mikasuki headman disclosed that he had little respect for
Spanish military prowess. They felt they were like “old women who did not dare to fight but
could only scold.”110 During a council Kinache and the other leaders decided not to accept the
ransom and continued holding the slaves.111
By early 1802 further raids led to increased animosity between the Mikasuki and the
Spanish, especially after the capture of Joseph Bonelli’s family from the Matanzas region.
Bonelli had been part of the Mediterranean contingent recruited to Andrew Turnbull’s large
plantation during the British Florida period. Philip Solana testified, years later, that Thomas
Bonelli, Joseph’s son, had been killed in the encounter and his body taken to the San Augustine
market place.112 Maria Antonia Bonelli was thirteen years old when she and her mother and
siblings were captured. She recounted her experience in 1835 to the St. Johns County Justice of
the Peace, Joseph S. Sánchez, during hearings to determine whether Mikasuki had been located
within the territorial boundaries of Spanish Florida before 1821. She describes an arduous fourday journey with a Mikasuki party that could not travel fast because they had to carry the young
captives. Once they arrived at Mikasuki, Indigenous women came and met the family. Bonelli
unfortunately does not delve into daily life among the Mikasuki, especially whether any of the
captives were in the process of being adopted into Seminole society, a possibility for some
captives. Sánchez stated that Bonelli’s experiences were so “peculiar” and “barbarous” that
Bonelli will never forget them until she dies.113 However the judge did not feel it was proper to
detail any specific incidents at Mikasuki, considering that as a woman living among a group
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considered “barbarous” and “savage” the experience could be interpreted as a stain upon Mary’s
honor and virtue. As Brooks notes, in the Southwest Borderlands redeemed captives were
viewed with suspicion by their communities since they feared “barbarous” conditions meant
victims were no longer “civilized” and were culturally degraded.114
Joseph Bonelli, similar to Fatio, utilized official channels in order to secure the return of
his family. Forrester was once again the designated negotiator and the Alachua Seminoles,
especially Payne, were expected to facilitate the discussions. Seven months after the raid,
Forrester paid a ransom of 300 pesos for Joseph’s wife Mary and three of the children. However
the Mikasuki felt the payment was not adequate and continued to hold Mary and her brother
Joseph Jr.115 Forrester slowly began ransoming the captives from the Mikasuki, on the average
paying 50 pesos per African slave. However, a notice posted in January 1803 stated that seven
individuals, including Fatio and Bonelli, were still seeking thirty-three captives from the
Mikasuki.116 Overwhelmingly African slaves made up the majority of the captives and various
planters sought to have their property returned. Efforts continued to re-acquire Mary and Joseph:
Forrester had written that “a great villain” and his four sons had taken Mary. The Spanish
agent’s characterization of the Indigenous man as a nefarious figure aside, this does raise
questions whether Mary had become integrated into a Mikasuki family before she was finally
ransomed.117 Joseph escaped from Mikasuki and made his way to St. Marks and then Pensacola
and eventually returned to San Augustine.118 By late 1803 another 200 pesos had been raised by
Bonelli for the release of his daughter. Bowles had already been captured earlier in the year and
the issue with Kenache’s brother at least in the eyes of the Spanish had been resolved. The
captives were released and Jacobo Dubreuil reported to White that Kenache was satisfied with
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the explanation for the death of his brother.119 Although Mary was released back to her family,
Mikasuki and Spanish relations remained strained. In 1805 the Mikasuki seized thirty-five cattle
as payment for the 160 pesos they felt remained due for Joseph Bonelli despite his escape.120 In
the ensuing years the conflict between the Spanish and the Mikasuki subsided due to U.S.
invasions during the First U.S.-Seminole War.
Captive taking in the nineteenth century Florida Borderlands was mainly restricted to the
seizure of Euro-American planters’ slaves. In the Bonelli case, the white family only constituted
a small faction of the overall captives sought by the Spanish government and local planters: the
others were all African slaves and a few free blacks. Although scholars have traditionally
focused more on the Seminole raids further north and runaway African slaves from U.S. citizens,
Spanish subjects were very concerned with the security of their property. Raiding occurred more
frequently when the normal channels of trade, access to John Forbes and Company goods, were
restricted. Florida’s position in the Atlantic World meant that the captive raiding was imbued
with market economy considerations. However, some similarities did exist with the
Southwestern Borderlands since the African captives served as important cultural intermediaries
between groups whose economic survival was linked. Although it is difficult to delineate the
manner in which individual Africans were introduced among the Seminoles, scholars have
demonstrated that they served as important advisors, translators, messengers and scouts.

Conclusion
Bowles’ life has been fodder for scholars interested in a romanticized version of colonial
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Florida history. More recently, historians such as Saunt have argued that Bowles’ campaigns
represented Lower Creek and Seminole resistance to Upper Creek leaders’ centralization efforts.
This chapter argues that the events of Bowles’ career in the Southeastern Borderlands offers
insights into the spread of nationalist discourse, the market economy, and the commodification
of land and African slaves. However, while Bowles did threaten the Spanish, U.S., McGillivray,
and the John Forbes and Company, Indigenous autonomy was not his primary goal. He sought
to construct the “State of Muskogee,” encourage Euro-American planters to immigrate, and to
“civilize” and convert Southeastern Indigenous peoples. Bowles and his Indigenous allies
concentrated their efforts against the Forbes and Company since they had a trade monopoly and
indebted their Indigenous clients. Muskogee’s Bahamian partners endeavored to break the
Forbes monopoly and insert themselves as the primary merchants in the region’s deerskin trade.
Economic and personal aggrandizement aside, Bowles did devote considerable intellectual
capital in constructing the legal basis, symbolism, and military forces of his nation. Although he
presented obstacles to the emergent political and economic order, the filibuster nonetheless
sought to become a part of the same process.
Concurrently, Indigenous groups such as the Mikasuki utilized Bowles’ presence to
advance their own agenda against Creek rivals and colonial powers. Captive taking and raids
challenged the U.S. and Spain’s ability to claim political jurisdiction in the region. Fundamental
to a nation’s legitimacy is its ability to project power within its territorial borders and to preserve
the land and property of its citizens. Mikasuki raids undermined the stability of the plantation
system and disrupted the economic designs of various officials and elites. Simultaneously,
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Bowles propagated a discourse of Indigenous nationalism while captive taking and raiding
became native peoples’ main tool to subvert the region’s Euro-American nations.
The events highlighting the conflict between the Mikasuki and the Spanish also
illuminate Southeastern economic processes. With the exception of the Bonelli incident, the
majority of captives were Africans, a reflection of the influence of the Atlantic World economy,
which had commodified African slaves. The Florida Borderlands represented a space where
more recent notions concerning property, nationalism, and economic exchange collided and
existed in dialogue with more established ideas of trade and political decentralization. It was an
uneven process where neighboring Indigenous headmen like John Cannard and Kenache could
practice different forms of slavery. While Seminoles utilized slaves as advisors and translators
they also took part in a system that sold and returned African slaves to traders and planters.
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Chapter 4
“LA REPÚBLICA DE BANDIDOS”: CHALLENGING COLONIAL AND
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES IN THE FLORIDA BORDERLANDS,
1812 to 1817
You, no doubt, have already been informed that the notorious Woodbine has
recently made his appearance again at the mouth of the Appalachicola, and that he has an
agent now among the Seminole Indians and negroes in that quarter, stirring them up to
acts of hostility against this country; and that Woodbine himself has gone, in an armed
vessel, to some part of the West Indies for supplies. Connected with this fact is another,
which may serve as an intimation of the future conduct of those people, when once in
possession of the supplies which it is said they expect on the return of Woodbine. About
ten or twelve days ago, a small party of those Indians entered the frontier of Wayne
county, and stole two horses and some cattle. They were pursued by some of the
inhabitants, who peaceably demanded a restoration of the stolen property; and, instead of
a compliance on the part of the Indians, they immediately fired upon the whites, who
retired without returning a shot. One of the whites was mortally wounded.
David B. Mitchell, 18171
During the War of 1812, British alliances with Seminoles, Creeks, and Africans in West
Florida ignited fears similar to those that William Augustus Bowles’ expeditions had instilled
among local officials a decade previously. The adventurer had promised Indigenous leaders they
would receive British political and military assistance in their efforts to undermine the power of
colonial authorities and the Panton, Leslie, and Company trading monopoly. However, the
British were only interested in keeping Bowles and Southeastern Indigenous groups in reserve, in
case the geopolitical situation warranted the need for North American allies. Despite
considerable apprehension in the region, Bowles never received any substantial support and thus
never fulfilled his promises to the Apalachicola Seminoles and Lower Creeks, spelling the end of
his filibustering career. His downfall can be attributed, among other factors, to a lack of timing.
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British foreign policy never aligned with the goals and agendas of Bowles, the Seminoles, and
the Lower Creeks. Several years later, after the death of Bowles, the strategic interests of the
British and Indian nations came into greater alignment as the War of 1812 convinced the British
of the need for Indigenous allies.
British Royal Marine Colonel Edward Nicolls and George Woodbine, a trader and agent,
had raised the threat of African, British, and Indigenous military cooperation through their
alliances and recruitment. Georgia Governor David B. Mitchell and other U.S. officials viewed
this coalition with much apprehension, and they perceived Nicolls and Woodbine as villainous
white men who sought to manipulate naïve and unsophisticated yet dangerous Indians and
Africans.2 The British allied themselves with the Seminoles, Lower Creeks, and Creek Red
Sticks while promising freedom to Africans willing to join their regiments. Indigenous groups
from the Great Lakes region down to the Southeastern Borderlands were cognizant of the
pressures of U.S. expansion and sometimes sought to maintain alliances with British forces in
Canada and the Caribbean.3 Native peoples had become adept at utilizing colonial rivalries in
order to gain important supplies such as weapons. The continuing British presence in North
America rankled U.S. officials because the Europeans’ involvement with Indigenous peoples
inhibited expansionist policies. Similarly, Spain’s reign in Florida was a continual threat
because their tenuous or non-existent control over the Florida interior enabled the development
of autonomous African and Indigenous settlements. A prime example of their autonomy in
Spanish territory was the Prospect Bluff installation on the Apalachicola River, known as the
“Negro Fort.” Stocked with artillery and left to African and Indigenous fighters, the base further
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bolstered Florida’s reputation among Euro-Americans for harboring dangerous non-white
groups.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, while the U.S. sought to project its power through
territorial expansion, it also structured its society through racialized and gendered hierarchies.
The Prospect Bluff fort was a direct challenge to this emergent social, political, and economic
order. Subordinate peoples typically resisted various forms of subjugation through their ability
to shape and control aspects of their lives in both subtle and more apparent actions. However,
Prospect Bluff represented a rare manifestation of overt coordinated military resistance on a
large scale.4 Due to the West Florida geopolitical situation during the War of 1812, Indigenous
and African peoples were able to overcome various obstacles to mass the necessary resources to
sustain a prolonged confrontation with colonial powers.
The “Negro Fort” constituted a threat to the U.S. on multiple levels. Slavery, a labor
system utilized for the plantation export economy, was undermined by the presence of free
Africans and runaway slaves demonstrating their capacity to live independently while
constructing their own sociopolitical systems. This ran counter to planters’ propaganda
justifying slavery because slaves’ intellectual inferiority left them unfit for self-government.
More concretely, Florida offered a possible destination for runaway slaves in Georgia and
surrounding territories, as had been the case during the 1739 Stono Rebellion. The more recent
1791 Santo Domingo revolt seemingly foreshadowed future violent rebellions against
slaveholders throughout the entire Caribbean. Lower Creeks, Red Sticks, and Seminoles, also
present at Apalachicola, compounded the threat. As the U.S. sought to consolidate its land within
Georgia and organize the Alabama and Mississippi territories, the various Creek factions resisted
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expansion and land displacement. After Andrew Jackson’s 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Creek, the
Creek Red Sticks, a group committed to warding off U.S. expansion and influence, also sought
refuge in Florida and further complicated an increasingly tense geopolitical situation.
In addition to African and Indigenous peoples crossing physical borders, they also
crossed metaphorical boundaries. U.S. colonialism encouraged sociopolitical divisions among
and within groups it deemed subordinate. For instance, Andrew Jackson benefited from the fact
that the Battle of Horseshoe Bend was part of a Creek Civil War and that he had Cherokee
allies.5 For this reason, the multi-ethnic coalition at Prospect Bluff was alarming because it
signaled the joint cooperation of various Indigenous and African peoples, which Southern
planters feared would destabilize the region.6 The boundary-crossing evinced at Prospect Bluff
undermined U.S.’ efforts at defining its identity through rigid citizenship requirements based on
class, whiteness and gender. A crucial part of this process was the construction and enforcement
of racial categories creating clear divisions between people classified as white, Indian, and
Black. At Prospect Bluff, people representing these racial groups lived in a close proximity to
each other and could potentially establish kin relationships. These liaisons ran counter to and
undermined the new social and racial order central to U.S. nation-building. Equally galling, U.S.
officials and planters faced the possibility of having to endure the existence of the fort as a
dangerous and continual symbol of resistance and racial intermixture. The fort not only
represented a military threat but also highlighted the porous and superficial nature of racial
categories. Since this development could facilitate Indigenous and African coalitions, the
destruction of the fort became a priority.7
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Historians of the events spanning the War of 1812, the destruction of the “Negro Fort,”
and the First Seminole War, more accurately the First U.S.-Seminole War, focus on the threat, as
mentioned above, that Indigenous and African peoples represented to the U.S.8 Scholars such as
John K. Mahon, Frank L. Owsley, John Sugden, and James G. Cusick have reoriented focus over
the War of 1812 from a matter of U.S. neutrality and economic interest in the Napoleonic
conflicts to the desire of the U.S. to expand into Canada and the Southeastern Borderlands.9 The
War of 1812 as the Second War of American Independence represents the decline of British
influence among native peoples between the Great Lakes and Gulf Coast. In terms of the role of
free and runaway Africans, scholars such as Kevin Mulroy, Larry Rivers, and Nathaniel Millett
have viewed the events associated with the Prospect Bluff Fort within the history of maroon
resistance. The fort’s subsequent occupation by U.S. forces spelled the end of the “African
power base on the Apalachicola.”10 Historians such as Cantor Brown and Jane Landers have
juxtaposed these U.S. invasions with Spanish colonial regimes in West and East Florida. They
cite the latter’s fluid and culturally based notions of race which further facilitated African’s
ability to assert a measure of control and power in their lives.11 This includes rising up in arms
against the mutual enemies of the Spanish crown and those seeking to enslave the region’s
African population. Recent scholarship has rarely diverged from the standard narrative, which
holds that Spanish colonialism’s less restrictive nature offered the social space necessary for
Indigenous and African resistance to the U.S.
This chapter seeks to complicate the larger narrative of Florida Borderlands history
through a reinterpretation of the Prospect Bluff Fort’s significance. Crucial to the chapter’s main
argument are Sebastián Pintado’s accounts, written while the Spanish surveyor of West Florida
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sought to reclaim the Pensacola slaves located at the outpost. The presence of recalcitrant
African and Indigenous groups equally disturbed both Spain and the U.S., especially Pensacola
slave owners seeking to reacquire their property. Although Millett highlights U.S. fears over this
threat, many of the fugitive slaves actually belonged to Spanish subjects.12 Pintado’s presence at
the fort and his subsequent reports only exist because of Spanish trepidation over property rights
and territorial integrity. Spanish officials implicitly supported U.S. efforts to destroy the fort
since its existence overtly undermined their authority and jurisdiction over West and East
Florida. The fact that slaves were willing to leave their Spanish, and sometimes Indigenous
masters to seek independence, raises questions about whether or not the liberal nature of racial
discourse and slavery in Florida has been exaggerated by scholars. Rather than narrowly
interpreting the events of Prospect Bluff through the prism of the African Diaspora or maroon
resistance, a wider lens is needed to see a broader significance. African and Indigenous peoples
were not blithely threatening U.S. hegemony: they were undermining new economic, political,
and social systems taking root in the Southeastern U.S. and Spanish Borderlands.

4.1 Florida’s War of 1812
Scholarly focus emphasizing African and Indigenous peoples’ influence in U.S. history
has yielded new interpretations of the War of 1812. Eurocentric perspectives of the conflict
focused on events such as the Embargo Act of 1807, Macon’s Bill Number 2, and the British
impressment of American sailors.13 Within more established narratives of the war, the southern
theater is typically highlighted during references to Andrew Jackson’s victory at Horseshoe Bend
and the Battle of New Orleans. He later parlayed the memory of these events into a successful
202

political career. This older interpretation has changed with an increased focus on Indigenous
resistance to expansion and land displacement as well as African slaves’ efforts to gain freedom
through their escape from plantations and, though less frequently, challenging their enslavement
through violent confrontations. The events occurring in the Florida Borderlands were relevant to
the outbreak of the War of 1812 and stemmed from processes originating in the Southeast, then
known as the old Southwest. In the year prior to the outbreak of the war, the U.S. covertly, yet
somewhat transparently, tried to annex West and East Florida. Their motives included American
politicians’ expansionist tendencies, efforts to secure fugitive slaves, the undermining of
Indigenous power in the Southeast, and the preemptive acquisition of Gulf Coast territory before
feared British annexation. The Patriot Rebellion of 1811, consisting of mostly Georgian
volunteers and a number of recruited Euro-American Spanish subjects, was an illegal U.S.
attempt to seize the territory. Florida’s involvement in the War of 1812 had little to do with
questions of neutrality or trade embargos; rather it represented the nation-state’s efforts to extend
its jurisdiction over an area with groups whose autonomy and presence were an affront to
nation’s political, economic, social, and racial order. Spain represented an illegitimate nation
because it could not control its borders or its “uncivilized savages,” so the U.S. questioned its
right to rule.14 Simultaneously, the nation is defined at its borders and frontiers where it comes
into contacted with the “other,” in this case Spaniards, Africans and Indigenous peoples, groups
labeled backward and incapable of exploiting the land’s resources and thus could be justifiably
displaced or destroyed.
Euro-American efforts to dislodge parts of northern Florida from the Spanish had a long
history, most notably James Oglethorpe’s 1739 siege of St. Augustine. Each assault took a
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devastating toll on the East Florida hinterlands and plantations, but the Castillo de San Marcos
repelled foreign armies.15 Respective invaders initially carried themselves with self-confidence
because of the lack of Spanish resources and defenses. Nonetheless, Spanish persistence and
defensive posture ensured its continued reign. In 1810 the movement to oust the Spanish began
not in East Florida but in Baton Rouge, territory the U.S. claimed under the 1803 Louisiana
Purchase. American residents, encouraged by U.S. agents, revolted and were quickly
incorporated into the Territory of Orleans. President James Madison was encouraged by this
development and sought further expansion, probably believing that the U.S. could acquire the
rest of West Florida, Mobile and Pensacola.16 The Baton Rouge incident also highlighted the
preferred legal pretext for annexing Spanish territory. Euro-American settlers within Spanish
provinces could declare independence and then request U.S. annexation. A similar formula,
combined with further expansionist discourse, resurfaced in the 1836 Texas Revolution.
With the imminent fall of West Florida, Madison and his advisors appointed George
Matthews as an agent to facilitate an East Florida revolt. The aging but energetic Matthews had
participated in battles against the Shawnee and the British during the American Revolution.17
After returning to Georgia as a planter he became governor and later a U.S. congressmen before
scandal tarnished his political career. Although Matthews, working with his fellow U.S. agent
John McKee, was enthusiastic about his charge in East Florida, he was also quite conscious of
the risks of being a filibuster with only implicit U.S. support.18 U.S. military officers’ confusion
hampered the initial operation as well as plans to quickly capture St. Augustine. General
Mathews had difficulty receiving the arms and gunboats he needed to control the St. Johns River
and the area outside the provincial capital. U.S. commanders were forced to perform an absurd
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dance between supporting the Patriots and yet claiming neutrality in the hostilities. American
forces sought to intimidate the Spanish, yet they could not act without prior provocation. In the
absence of clear orders, the U.S. military were not the reliable support Mathews had
envisioned.19 His success now hinged on a strategy seeking the Spanish colonial
administration’s quick collapse before the intervention’s legality could be questioned.
With the advantage of the Patriots’ early initiative and aggressiveness dissipating,
Mathews focused on taking parts of northern Florida adjacent to Georgia. When Lieutenant
Colonel Thomas A. Smith replaced an uncooperative military officer, Mathews gathered his
allies and directed an occupation of the border city of Fernandina on Amelia Island. The
figurehead of the movement was Spanish subject John H. McIntosh, recruited by Mathews to
lead the “Republic of Florida.” Once the invasion began, gunboats led by Captain Hugh
Campbell menacingly aimed their canons at the town. When the Spanish Captain José López
inquired whether the U.S. forces were a part of the attack he received evasive replies. While the
show of force secured Amelia Island, the ambiguous status of U.S. forces hampered the ensuing
blockade of St. Augustine. Spanish defenders refused to provide the U.S. a pretext for a larger
conflict. They remained behind the Castillo de San Marcos’ walls, which continued to withstand
the siege. Eventually the political fallout of sponsoring a revolution against a friendly
government caused President Madison to disown Mathews.20 As a result, the president
appointed Georgia Governor David B. Mitchell to negotiate with the Spanish and await a more
favorable political climate. However, the Spanish received important reinforcements from Cuba
and the active participation of their Seminole and African allies. Patriot supporters found their
plantations and property vulnerable to attacks and raids. Efforts to punish Alachua and other
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Spanish allies were disruptive but largely ineffective because Patriot supply lines were
vulnerable and strained. When Northern Republicans refused to support a congressional bill to
authorize the seizure of East Florida, Mitchell had little choice but to withdraw after April 16,
1813, when the Spanish Governor Sebastián Kindelán promised clemency for the Patriot Rebels.
While the Patriot Rebellion was unraveling in East Florida, U.S. troops sought to enforce
their claims over West Florida by seizing Mobile, in present day Alabama. This occurred due to
American officials’ intervention in the Creek Civil War siding against the Red Sticks, an Upper
Creek group that objected to U.S. influence and interference within the Creek Confederacy. U.S.
military officials leveled charges against the Spanish for their supposed trade in weapons with
the Red Sticks. The latter were fighting against a Creek faction that advocated adoption of
Euro-American political, social, and economic structures as a response to increased pressure
from U.S. state governments and settlers.21 Although the Red Sticks only received limited
Spanish assistance, the U.S. held Spain responsible when the Red Sticks attacked Fort Mims in
present-day Alabama. The outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and the British led to an even
broader military conflict in the Apalachicola region. British strategists sought to utilize alliances
with the Creeks, Seminoles, and Africans to open a southern theater of operations.
Consequently, Creek attacks and the British presence in Florida supplied the U.S. with the
pretext to further encroach upon Spanish territory. Specifically, Spanish acquiescence to the
British occupation of Pensacola, led by Nicolls, meant to deter Jackson’s potential invasion. In
fact the British officer went on the offensive and besieged Fort Bowyer at Mobile with his force
of Red Sticks and slaves from Pensacola.22 The attack was ineffective and only served to
antagonize Jackson. Upon the expedition’s return to Pensacola, Governor Don Mateo González
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Manrique could no longer stomach the presence of his British guests and ordered Nicolls out of
the town, despite the aggressive posture of the U.S. No longer welcomed, the British officer
evacuated Pensacola with much of the settlement’s slave population filling his ranks.23
Consequently Jackson took Pensacola in November of 1814 and then moved to New Orleans to
intercept Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane’s invasion, an engagement that famously occurred
after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.
Before the Battle of New Orleans, Jackson and U.S. forces had evacuated from
Pensacola. Although the War of 1812 was over and most of West and East Florida superficially
remained Spanish, the conflict clearly gauged the tenuousness of the Europeans’ hold on the
province. They only managed to avoid territorial dispossession because of Creek, Seminole, and
African military support, as well as Americans’ lack of political will in favor of annexation. The
Seminoles understood that U.S. expansion guaranteed greater pressure upon their territory from
Euro-Americans. Meanwhile, Africans would have had to deal with a U.S. that had the power to
enforce rigid racial hierarchies and intensive labor regimes, unlike the Spanish.24 Both groups
played key roles in disrupting U.S. plans, yet their resistance simultaneously provided the pretext
that the U.S. used to justify further intervention and eventual occupation.
Due to the Alachua Seminoles’ tenuous geopolitical situation, an alliance with the
Spanish had been advantageous to counterbalance larger and more powerful Indigenous groups,
the Mikasuki and the Creek. Stable relations with Spain meant the Seminoles received gifts and
the Spanish granted trade concessions to Panton, Leslie, and Company to consistently supply the
Indian trade. In addition, Spanish weakness also meant that the Seminoles exercised sovereignty
in Alachua while the Spanish were limited to the east coast of Florida. Seminole headman Payne
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went to great lengths to maintain this arrangement and often mediated between larger Indigenous
groups and the Spanish.25 Before the War of 1812, an Alachua leader, known as Bowlegs,
gained a stature similar to that of Payne, his half-brother.26 He also sought to maintain the
Spanish alliance but his posture was more aggressive than the cautious Payne. Although both
leaders had sworn loyalty to St. Augustine in an early 1812 letter transmitted by Juan Huertas,
they were still open to see what the Patriots were willing to offer.27 Apparently Mathews’ skills
of persuasion consisted of informing the Seminoles that he was involved in “a quarrel among
white people and he did not want their assistance.”28
General Matthews’ abrasive behavior, the lack of details concerning a post-Spanish East
Florida, and the uncertain status of Seminole lands under a new territorial government confirmed
Seminole suspicions about the Patriots’ motives. Some sources even state that the Patriots
resorted to threats in a misguided attempt to intimidate Bowlegs and Payne.29 In response the
Seminoles crippled the Patriot rebellion by punishing its members with the sacking of their
plantations in July 1812 while they had been maintaining the siege of St. Augustine. These
attacks struck the invasion’s Euro-American supporters close to home and demoralized their
ranks. The raids were not restricted to the Spanish subjects sympathetic to the revolt but also
those that remained loyal to the province. As a result the Spanish governor sent a letter to
Bowlegs requesting that slaves belonging to Francis Philip Fatio and Jorge Flemming be
returned.30 Reacting to their dire situation, the Patriots emulated the Seminoles’ strategy by
attacking their enemies’ settlements when they were at their most vulnerable. Payne anticipated
Colonel Daniel Newnan’s expedition to Alachua and warned Governor Kindelán that the
Seminoles were on the verge of abandoning the war to return home, since they had been fighting
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for six months and feared their women and children were exposed to attack.31 Once the Patriots’
goal of delivering a devastating offensive failed, they ventured out to Alachua. In the ensuing
battles the Seminole leader Payne was seriously wounded and eventually died of his injuries.32
Bowlegs became the principal leader and policy maker for the Alachua Seminoles and he
maintained a more aggressive foreign policy which included visits to Prospect Bluff, use of
African troops, and negotiations with British agents.
During Newnan’s expedition to Alachua his forces encountered Africans among the
Seminoles, labeled by scholars as the Black Seminoles.33 Whether as militias among the Spanish
or Seminoles, Africans were instrumental in providing the forces necessary for stopping the
Patriots’ advance. However, they represented a very diverse group even if they were fighting for
the same basic motivation, freedom from Euro-American control and oppressive labor regimes.
Black Seminoles did not solely escape from plantations in Georgia or South Carolina but also
from Spanish masters in Florida. For instance, raids upon the plantations of prominent citizens
such as Fatio led to the increased numbers of Africans among the Seminoles. Although planters
sought to ransom back their slaves they rarely recovered all of them. In 1820, a slave named
Antonio returned to St. Augustine after he had been apprehended by the Seminoles and resided
with them for a few years until he was ransomed back. In relation to this case, East Florida
Governor José Coppinger commented that the presence of Spanish slaves among the Seminoles
undermined the authority of the government and slave owners.34 During the same period an
incident involving a slave woman named Rosa occurred, she left her two Spanish masters in St.
Augustine. She received assistance from the Seminoles in her escape and later had children with
an Indigenous man named Sam Factor.35 In addition to Spanish slaves, runaway slaves from the
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U.S. also supplemented Black Seminoles numbers. Porter described the relationship between the
Black Seminoles and Seminoles as “democratic feudalism.”36 He draws this conclusion because
Black Seminoles generally lived in adjacent villages, paid a small tribute, aligned themselves
with a headman, and enjoyed much sociopolitical space to manage their affairs. It was this
population that Payne and Bowlegs had utilized to fight the Patriots and on occasion even sent to
supplement Spanish forces.37
Spanish colonial officials also utilized free black militias despite Governor Kindelán’s
reservations about reinforcements from Cuba whose moral fortitude he questioned. Nonetheless
their presence did much to alarm Georgian officials of a possible slave rebellion in their state.
The governor preferred the use of his local black militia and Seminole allies. Militia captains
Jorge Jacobo, Juan Bautista Witten, and Benjamín Seguí performed admirably in harassing the
Patriots’ supply lines, which were vital to the siege. In an engagement at Twelve Mile Swamp,
in the northern vicinity of St. Augustine, Witten with his fellow black militia and a few Seminole
and Black Seminoles disrupted an important supply convoy, causing the Patriots to retreat.38
Black militia leaders received rewards and promotions for their service. However, the situation
with the Cuban militia was probably not as positive since various reports exist of soldiers
deserting their units.39 Despite the benefits of militia service for Blacks in Spanish Florida, it
was still a very demanding occupation with little support. Kindelán tried offsetting these
burdens with proposed rewards to his Black militia by establishing settlements close to the
Georgia border, which he hoped would serve in the same capacity as the Gracia Real de Santa
Teresa de Mose Fort once did.40 During the First Spanish Florida period, the base had been
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established by the Spanish for its African and runaway slave population and had been
instrumental in ending the 1739 Oglethorpe invasion and siege of St. Augustine.

4.2 Prospect Bluff
Although the Spanish in East Florida had previously established Fort Mose and
contemplated settling members of the Black militia near the border, ironically, the “Negro Fort”
did not factor into their strategic planning. Spanish Florida’s contradictory policy of utilizing
Black militias yet also encouraging an increase of the Euro-American planter population,
through efforts to guarantee slave property, required difficult sociopolitical maneuvering.
Spanish officials were often met with disdain from U.S. planters since Florida served as an
official and later virtual slave sanctuary, which undermined slave property in neighboring areas.
However, the British in West Florida alarmed Spanish slave owners when they recruited local
slaves to their military force. After the British evacuated from Pensacola they retreated in late
1814 to Apalachicola to a location known as Prospect Bluff. The Creek Red Sticks in the area
advocated the building of a fort to ward off potential U.S. attacks.41 Various groups such as the
Creeks, Mikasuki, and “fugitive” African slaves cooperated and utilized British support in order
to challenge U.S. and Spanish authority. The structure came to be known as the “Negro Fort,” its
name betraying a focus on the fort’s Black inhabitants, most likely due to obsessive U.S. fears of
slave uprisings.42 Those fears were compounded by the fact that the British stocked the fort with
cannons, firearms, and other supplies necessary for its effective occupation. In conjunction with
the local geography, the fort promised to be a formidable challenge to any potential attacker.
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Once the Treaty of Ghent had been signed in 1814, Prospect Bluff lost its value as a base
of operations for British attacks into the Southern U.S. and it took on a new role as a base of
power for Indigenous and African peoples on the Apalachicola River. More alarming for the
U.S. and the Spanish was the lack of European supervision over the Africans and Indians, which
in their minds only exacerbated the situation. Actually, there were British officials such as
Nicolls, General Isaac Brock, and Colonial Secretary Earl Bathurst who spoke of protecting the
interests of their Indian allies and even envisioned the creation of Indigenous nation.43 However,
the British lacked the political will to continue waging a war to assist native peoples.44 British
negotiators abandoned their demand of an Indian state and settled for the ninth article of the
Treaty of Ghent. The clause declared that the U.S. cease all hostilities with native peoples and
restore “all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled
to in 1811.”45 Nicolls and the Creeks interpreted this as negating the 1814 Treaty of Fort
Jackson, which ceded 23 million acres of Creek land to the U.S. Determined that the
Southeastern Indigenous peoples should regain their lands to prewar boundaries, Nicolls
remained at Prospect Bluff to enforce the stipulation. He quickly realized that the U.S. had no
intention of repudiating the Treaty of Fort Jackson and never intended to restore Creek lands.
Once British forces evacuated from Prospect Bluff, U.S. officials completely ignored the treaty
clause and planned for the destruction of the fort.
In recent years the events at Apalachicola concerning the “Negro Fort” have garnered
much scholarly attention. The size and significance of the Indigenous and African resistance
have compelled a number of authors to interpret its larger meaning. Scholars such as Saunt,
Millett, Owsley and Gene A. Smith have sought to demonstrate that the fort’s history has
212

substantial analytical value, with Saunt arguing that the destruction of the fort was part of a
larger Creek Civil War and that it represented “the end of the movement against the new
order.”46 Previous Indigenous political, economic, and social systems were replaced by political
centralization, the rise of private property, wealth disparities, and rigid racial discourse.
Meanwhile, Millett argues that Africans at Prospect Bluff were “aware of the language and ideas
of republicanism and revolution” that had swept through North America and the Caribbean in
recent decades. Additionally they learned of the “potential power of combining Revolutionaryera ideology with violent action.”47 Smith and Owsley argue that the destruction of the Prospect
Bluff Fort was part of the larger movement of Jeffersonian expansionism and ideology of
Manifest Destiny usually associated with the West during the course of the nineteenth century
rather than the Gulf Coast in the 1810s.48
Although Saunt’s interpretation that the dismantling of the outpost was a key moment in
the expansion of the “new order,” he did not gauge whether the incident also demonstrated that
similar processes were occurring in Spanish Florida. This chapter argues that discourses of
property, race, and control of territorial borders had become widespread and not strictly limited
to the U.S. Spain’s Florida provinces have been characterized as the antithesis of the U.S. in
terms of its racial discourse, relationships with Africans and Indigenous peoples, and a limited
preoccupation with private property. However, the sociopolitical systems in the Florida
territories preclude broad generalizations. While expediency forced the hand of colonial officials
to rely on African and Indigenous peoples, Spanish Florida officials still believed in their
superiority within a system based on whiteness, despite the fact that racial and ethnic categories
were never as starkly conceptualized as they were in the neighboring northern territories.
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Nonetheless, the Spanish were similarly concerned as the U.S. with the developments occurring
at Prospect Bluff, where the majority of slaves had fled from Spanish subjects not U.S. citizens.
Although free black militias had saved East Florida, the Spanish could not tolerate a free Black
military outpost outside of their supervision or immediate control. These conflicting positions
illustrate the multifaceted nature of Spanish colonial policy.
Acting within his official capacity as the surveyor general, Pintado traveled from
Pensacola to the “Negro Fort” with two main objectives. He primarily sought to secure the
return of the Pensacola slaves who had left their masters when the British had entered the city
and then later evacuated to Apalachicola. Secondly, he sought to map out the fort and gather
intelligence about its physical and demographic characteristics. Pintado was well suited for this
assignment since he was an experienced surveyor and had been in command of both naval and
cavalry units.49 Thus he had a balance of intellectual skills with the physical stamina needed to
partake in substantial travels. While crafting maps for treaties and land grants represented his
primary profession, Pintado served as a special envoy delivering correspondence to the Captain
General in Cuba.50 He was also familiar with issues associated with the control of slave
populations. As alcalde in Bayou Sara in the Feliciana District he had debated the increase of
militia patrols to disrupt nocturnal slave meetings.51 He later became concerned with measures
to confiscate weapons from slaves.52 In his position as a town official he often dealt with the
introduction of foreign slaves into the territory.53 When a position as surveyor general became
available in Pensacola he moved there.
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4.3 Sebastián Pintado and Prospect Bluff
After Pintado arrived at Prospect Bluff in early 1815 he immediately established
communication with local British officials. His papers recounting the journey have become
valuable sources for insight into the sociopolitical dynamics between the British, African, and
Indigenous inhabitants, but scholars have not inferred any larger meaning to his presence there.54
The surveyor general’s mission had been proceeded months earlier by Lieutenant José Urcullo,
who was given the opportunity to go among the slaves and inquire whether they were willing to
voluntarily return to Pensacola. Very few had agreed to depart from Prospect Bluff, despite the
dismal conditions and limited supplies.55 This refusal to return to supposedly benevolent
Spanish masters was an indication that slaves at the fort were willing to face an uncertain and
dangerous future if it meant possible freedom. When Urcullo attempted to board his ship, the
few who had agreed to follow him back reconsidered their decision. The reluctant slaves stated
that “if they returned to Pensacola they would be slaves and here they were free.”56
West Florida Governor Manrique had essentially sent Pintado on a similar mission
hoping the agent would have better results than Urcullo.57 The surveyor general arrived in late
March and quickly discovered that all the principal officials in the area were absent and he had to
communicate with Captain Richard Spencer whom lacked the power to approve any slave
seizures. The British officer could only offer Pintado the same proposition that was given to
Urcullo: he could approach the slaves to see if they would return of their own volition to
Pensacola. Spencer warned Pintado that the slaves were “very violent and say they will die to a
man rather then return.”58 He felt that Pintado would be fortunate to convince more than three or
four slaves to return. The following day Pintado responded to Spencer and thanked him for his
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assistance while simultaneously proceeding to harangue the captain over the illegality of the
British occupation of Apalachicola. He argued that the British should evacuate since they had no
right to be there, especially with the end of the war. Equally worrisome were reports that the
British had relocated slaves to other colonies, including areas in the Caribbean. Pintado warned
that Spanish slaves must be returned to their owners and be excluded from British offers of
sanctuary.59
Besides fearing the loss of property, Pintado also had a greater concern for the security of
the colony. He informed Spencer that if the British were to leave the fort intact then it would
“form a new republic of bandits which will come to destabilize the King’s dominion in this part
of the globe.”60 Through his referencing of the “republic of bandits,” Pintado utilized the same
language that U.S. officials used to justify their attacks against Indigenous and African peoples
within Spanish Florida. Governor Mitchell of Georgia had similar fears that the “Negro Fort”
would unsettle the political and social order in his state. Andrew Jackson had argued that the
region would never progress until the Indians were pacified and removed.61 Owsley and Smith
even argue that Spanish consternation aside, they secretly condoned the U.S. destruction of the
fort a year later. Rather than bemoaning the destruction of possible allies, “they were relieved
that the Americans had removed the menace.”62 Undoubtedly the Spanish still harbored
resentment towards the British for their heavy-handed tactics in Pensacola and for Vice Admiral
Cochran’s proclamations. Although targeted at U.S. runaway slaves, the British officer had
issued an edict that any slaves joining his ranks would receive their freedom. 63 He argued that
he never intended for Spanish subjects’ slaves to utilize the order as a legal basis for their
freedom. Nonetheless slaves from Spanish masters frequently argued that the Cochran decree
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had granted their liberty. Prospect Bluff represented a threat to the Spanish because unlike the
Black militia in East Florida, which despite giving Africans a measure of agency, nevertheless
operated within the colonial system, whereas the “Negro Fort” was not under Spanish control.
With these concerns in mind, Pintado urgently wrote once more to Spencer. He quizzed
the British officer on a series of topics. Were Spanish territorial claims, property, and slaves to
be restored? Could the British officer foresee the eventual fate of the slaves: were they to remain
in Florida or continue to serve in the British Army? If the British planned the demolition of
Prospect Bluff was it possible for the Spanish to gain verification? In fact Pintado insisted that
the “Negro Fort” be destroyed and that if the slaves were left in the fort once the British left it
would unleash a “series of evils.”64 The letter illustrates that the recovery of the slaves, although
important, was not the sole motive driving Pintado. Many of his questions were focused on the
future of Apalachicola and securing the destruction of the fort as well as the disbanding of the
Black troops. Spencer responded to the aggressive questioning by arguing that Nicolls and the
other military officials had acted in good faith and wanted to return the Pensacola slaves to their
owners. Conceding that a party of slaves had been taken to the nearby St. Vincent’s Island,
Spencer assured Pintado that they would remain together and stay in the vicinity. Finally he
invited the surveyor general to Prospect Bluff but warned him not to adopt a confrontational
stance since the inhabitants were in a state of alarm.65
In a subsequent letter to the new West Florida Governor José de Soto, Pintado recounted
his trip to Prospect Bluff. He set off on April 7th with a surgeon, Eugenio Sierra: and a Forbes
Company representative hoping to reclaim company slaves.66 While inspecting the grounds
Pintado noted that slaves from the U.S., Indian settlements, West Florida, and East Florida were
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present at Apalachicola along with a number of native peoples. 67 He most likely encountered
ninety East Florida slaves from an area near the Mosquito River where they embarked from for
Prospect Bluff in February 1815.68 Pintado had inquired about the overall number of East
Florida slaves present at the fort only to be confronted by Nicolls’ evasive answers. The British
officer did concede that a number of families were making their way to Prospect Bluff but that
they were from Indian settlements.69 Turning his attention to the Pensacola slaves, the surveyor
general sought to persuade them to return to their masters. He reported that 28 slaves agreed to
return but a substantial number refused. Sierra only managed to convince 12 out of 128 slaves to
follow him. Pintado witnessed a number of slaves coming out of hiding only to inform him that
they were free and would never return to their masters. Admiral Cochran’s proclamation
granting slaves their freedom greatly hindered Pintado’s mission. Additionally a number of
slaves had received British licenses granting them liberty regardless of whether they had Spanish
or U.S. masters.
The Pintado mission to Apalachicola failed to recover slaves but it did manage to shed
light on British plans for the retreat. A number of slaves were to be evacuated to British
colonies, some Africans would remain at Prospect Bluff, and others were to be resettled at
Tampa Bay. Slave masters arriving before the evacuation could reclaim their property but
without the use of force. British officials told Pintado that the outpost would not be destroyed
and would remain intact. In response he protested that the whole of the Gulf of Mexico would
be destabilized and the fort would become a haven for nefarious characters and piracy. Upon
learning about this negative turn of events, Pintado made his last visit with Indigenous leaders.
They questioned him over possible Spanish intentions to assume authority over the fort once the
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British retreated. While their posture toward the Spanish official was amicable, the headmen
were explicit in their stance that this should not happen and that Pintado would be best served to
leave the area, for his own safety.
Although Pintado heeded the advice of Indian leaders, he continued issuing further
reports to Governor Soto and to the captain general of Cuba, even after conditions changed at the
fort. In May he wrote to Pensacola that the British had attempted to separate the West Florida
slaves from the fort’s general population but when their names were called out they refused to
identify themselves. Nonetheless, the surveyor general continued to send out reports through
1816, right before the U.S. destroyed the fort.70 As a fact-finding mission, Pintado’s efforts in
Apalachicola were worthwhile in the sense that his correspondence provided Spanish authorities
with important intelligence. His objective of reacquiring the Pensacola slaves nonetheless faced
numerous obstacles. The British officers at the fort were fairly transparent in their determination
to do the minimum effort required so they could claim some semblance of cooperation. Scholars
have posited that Nicolls and Woodbine had become sympathetic to the cause of African and
Indigenous peoples and were not willing to release them, while others felt they sought to exploit
both groups for their personal gain.71 While the British played an important part in the
development of Prospect Bluff, their role has often been over-emphasized. European observers
of the time would have had difficulty fathoming that African and Indigenous peoples were as
important as their European allies in the decision-making process. As a result, Spencer was most
likely truthful when he told Pintado that slaves’ unwillingness and hostility to repatriation, not
British reluctance, kept the Spanish from reclaiming their slaves. It was the slaves’ decision to
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reject bondage in Spanish Florida, not villainous white men, behind Pintado’s failure to return
the slaves.
The decision of West and East Florida African slaves to stay at Prospect Bluff must not
have been made lightly. With the British defeat in the Battle of New Orleans and plans to
evacuate from the Gulf Coast, they could not rely on British protection. Clearly the Patriot
Rebellion and Jackson’s invasion of Pensacola proved that the U.S. was willing to support future
invasions to annex Florida. Africans seeking relocation to one of the British colonies also faced
incredible uncertainty and required significant trust in the British to keep their promises.
Nonetheless Spanish slaves weighed their options and either allied with the British or decided to
independently defend their freedom from their Pensacola masters. Scholarship on the Florida
Borderlands tends to focus on the movement of slaves from U.S. states to Spanish colonies, but
this narrative is too simplistic. African slaves left their Spanish masters for life among the
Seminoles, free black communities, or in this particular case, the Prospect Bluff Fort because
these locations offered more sociopolitical opportunities. Consequently scholars have mentioned
various incidents of Spanish slaves running away but rarely see any greater meaning in these
actions.
The “new order” observed by Saunt stressed the security of slave property and
increasingly rigid racial hierarchies, processes that were not yet dominant in Spanish Florida but
influential enough to help explain African slaves’ resistance in the “Negro Fort.” Although the
Spanish still utilized Black militias, they concurrently sought to encourage the establishment of
plantations in order to develop the economy of their Florida colonies. As a result, a number of
Euro-American planters had been welcomed into the province, and were even pardoned when
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they participated in the revolts against the colony, such as the Patriot Rebellion. Consequently,
the Spanish were torn between more established policies of utilizing Africans as military
resources yet simultaneously needing to placate their slave holding population, specifically in
this case Pensacola masters, by securing slave property in the Florida territories. The Prospect
Bluff Fort underlined these ongoing tensions and contradictory policies and forced Spanish
officials to decide whether to support a new formidable border militia or seek to protect slave
owners’ property.

4.4 The Destruction of Prospect Bluff and the First U.S.-Seminole War
As Pintado left Apalachicola, the British were relinquishing control of the post to its
African and Indigenous defenders. Although the British left William Hambly, a former
employee of John Forbes and Company, in command, he soon abandoned his post.72 As the fort
organized its own political structure, three former Pensacola slaves, Garçon, Cyrus, and Prince,
emerged as the principal figures. Their elevation to leadership positions was due to their skills,
each was a carpenter and at least one, Cyrus, was literate. Furthermore, Millett argues that they
were well versed in the recent political currents and were cognizant of revolutionary era
discourse. He also states that in all likelihood at least one of the three had been born in Africa,
which meant they had the life experiences to relate with both recent African arrivals and slaves
born in North America.73 Despite the pressures of limited supplies and foodstuffs, the fort was
able to maintain political and military order. However, very few sources can illuminate aspects
of daily life as well as the fort’s sociopolitical structures, making any conclusions speculative.
Undoubtedly it was a community centered on defense since its presence ignited consternation
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from surrounding nations, especially the U.S. Simply existing and encouraging the growth of
nearby settlements and agricultural fields along the riverbanks stood as a testament to free
Africans’ ability to exercise their autonomy. For U.S. slave masters the “Negro Fort” was an
embodiment of their fears, a sanctuary for runaway slaves, a base for raiding plantations, and a
stark rebuke to the propaganda of Black inferiority.74
Andrew Jackson used Spain’s inability to destroy or control Prospect Bluff as a pretext
for ordering U.S. forces to conquer the fort and re-enslave its African defenders. By July 1816
Edmund Gaines had constructed a military post at the confluence of Apalachicola River with the
Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers. Supply ships from New Orleans escorted by gunboats
attempted to pass Prospect Bluff on its way north to the new outpost. Confident that the fort
would open fire on the ships, the U.S. sought to use the incident to justify the destruction of the
fort. Simultaneously, Colonel Douglas Clinch descended south from the U.S. fort and demanded
that the defenders surrender. Garçon was defiant and famously raised the Union Jack and a red
flag while refusing to surrender. During a meeting under a flag of truce he contemptuously
announced that he would “sink any American vessel that should attempt to pass, and would blow
up the fort if he could not defend it.”75 Unfortunately for Garçon the ensuing battle did not give
him the opportunity to demonstrate his military prowess. An early artillery barrage from the
gunboats hit the munitions depot in the fort and caused immense destruction. Garçon was one of
the survivors but the Creeks took custody of the leader and then executed him. The nature of the
victory only served to bolster the opinion that the “Negro Fort” had indeed been an abomination.
Undoubtedly sentiment also existed that its destruction was divinely sanctioned, ideas that would
be frequently replicated during the era of western expansion and Manifest Destiny. 76
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Following the reduction of Prospect Bluff and subsequent Indigenous reprisals against
squatters upon on their lands, Jackson set forth to form an army to “stabilize” the region.77
Mikasuki and Seminole attacks on the border were often in response to violence committed
against them. However, U.S. officials such as Gaines overlooked the actions of the squatters and
highlighted native “atrocities” in order to produce the policy that they wanted, the seizure of
Florida.78 They had been engaged in a repeated pattern of commanding troops into Florida on
dubious legal grounds in hopes of producing a reaction from the Red Sticks, Seminoles,
Africans, and Spanish, which would then serve as the primary justification for a future invasion.
Jackson in particular managed to always find a pretext for war, often portraying Indigenous
defense of their homelands as evidence of “savage” behavior. Additionally, he often sought to
entangle his European rivals, the Spanish and the British, in these conflicts by charging them
with collusion, supplying and supporting his Indian adversaries. Secretary of State John C.
Calhoun instructed Jackson to declare war on the Seminoles but avoid attacking Spanish subjects
and settlements.79 Utilizing multiple justifications for his advance, Jackson audaciously
maintained that the U.S. was allied with the Spanish and that he simply sought resolution to the
problem of Indian raids since the Spanish were too feeble to do it themselves.80
Although Jackson was a central figure in the First U.S.-Seminole War, General Gaines’
attack on Fowltown is often considered the initial campaign of the war. Disputes had arisen
between Indigenous leaders and U.S. officials over squatters, loss of cattle, and land ownership.
Conquering the Mikasuki towns, the Indigenous power base in the territory, was essential to the
real motive of the war, Euro-American settlement and economic incorporation of those lands.
Historically, the Mikasuki in the eighteenth century had been the dominant East Florida
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Indigenous group over the numerically inferior Alachua Seminole. One of the principal
headmen, Kinache, had garnered respect and fear through Mikasuki raids and seizure of Spanish
plantation property, especially African slaves. Additionally he was said to have sent his people
to help build Prospect Bluff.81 By 1817 Neamathla joined Kinache as the principal headmen of
the Mikasuki, with the former headquartered in Fowltown on the Georgian side of the boundary.
Neamathla challenged the U.S. claim that his settlement was located within the Creek land
cession outlined in the Treaty of Fort Jackson. When General Gaines called upon him to
conference at Fort Scott, Neamathla questioned his motives and rejected the meeting. Gaines
utilized the Indigenous leader’s refusal as the justification for the start of his military offensive,
an event often viewed as the beginning of the First U.S.-Seminole War.82
The opening phase of the war caused the destruction of the Mikasuki towns and led to
U.S. forces entering Alachua Seminole territory. Recognizing the long odds against them in the
face of significant U.S. forces, the Mikasuki and later the Alachua Seminoles began to retreat
into the southern region of East Florida. As they evacuated the area, the Indian settlements were
plundered and destroyed. Jackson had gathered his force and constructed Fort Gadsden on the
previous spot of the recently destroyed Prospect Bluff Fort. Beginning in March 1818 he
invaded the Mikasuki towns near present-day Tallahassee. However, before Jackson could
descend upon the settlements, the Mikasuki had received advance warning and withdrew to the
south. Jackson could not resist attacking Spanish positions as well and he advanced on the St.
Marks Fort. He claimed that the retreating Mikasuki had entered the fort and that he feared they
would gain control of it. In order to “protect” the Spanish base he felt he needed to occupy it.83
After some communication with the Spanish commander, Jackson gained control of the outpost
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and its inhabitants. One of the men in the fort was Alexander Arbuthnot, a British trader,
unassociated with the John Forbes Company. He had been transacting business with the
Seminoles and had become an advocate for them with the British.
With St. Marks in his possession, Jackson then advanced on Bowlegs’ settlement on the
Suwannee River. As his force approached they engaged Black Seminoles and Seminoles in a
few skirmishes. Despite a number of disadvantages, the defenders held off the invading force
long enough for the majority of the town’s population to cross the river and retreat further
south.84 Nonetheless, Jackson destroyed the buildings as he had done with the Mikasuki and he
also captured another British subject, Robert Ambrister. He hastily returned back to St. Marks
and quickly put both Arbuthnot and Ambrister on trial in a military tribunal for being foreign
agents provoking the Seminoles to attack the U.S.85 Both defendants were executed and the trial
was widely criticized, especially among the British, for its dubious legality and lack of fairness.
Upon returning to Fort Gadsden, Jackson decided to once again invade Pensacola on May 28,
1818. He quickly sacked the town, marking the last major engagement of the First U.S.Seminole War.
In a similar fashion to the aftermath of the War of 1812, U.S. forces withdrew and
returned Spanish territory. However, East and West Florida would never truly recover from
these repeated invasions and filibusters. The Spanish accepted the wisdom of selling the
territories in the 1819 Adams-Onís Treaty. It would have been difficult for the Spanish to
remain, especially after the U.S. interventions proved the vulnerability of their colonial defenses.
For the Mikasuki and the Seminoles, the First U.S.-Seminole War destroyed settlements that had
existed for decades and demonstrated that the border between the Florida provinces and Georgia
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would no longer deter the U.S. as it sought to project its power over the region and incorporate it
into the nation. While U.S. annexation was forestalled for a few years, the First U.S.-Seminole
War was a harbinger of a later conflict, the Second U.S.-Seminole War, which sought to
completely remove Seminoles and Africans from Florida.

Conclusion
Standard narratives about the War of 1812, Prospect Bluff, and the First U.S.-Seminole
War continue to have significant explanatory power. These conflicts were indeed incited by U.S.
expansion into the Florida Borderlands. Various factors propelled U.S. officials to secretly covet
these territories. During the early nineteenth century the U.S. was experiencing the effects of the
market revolution, Northern industrialization and an upsurge of Southern cotton production. The
U.S., a young nation, was in the process of defining itself, which was done through expansion
and its encounters with the “other.” American society was increasingly structured along racial
hierarchies. If white Americans were civilized, progressive, and modern then Indigenous
peoples and Africans were “savage,” backward, and impediments to U.S. development. The
U.S. viewed Florida as an area whose rich lands were destined for prosperity once EuroAmerican settlers could exploit its resources. Indigenous and African peoples were to be either
removed or utilized for labor. Their ability to exercise autonomy and undermine many of the
processes taking shaping in the U.S. represented an affront to the nation and constituted a
concrete danger. Consequently, the U.S. sponsored filibusters and military officials who sought
to wrestle control away from the Spanish, a nation considered too weak to exert control over its
borders and subordinate peoples.
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Within this interpretation, Spanish Florida seems dialectically opposed to the
transformations occurring in the U.S. Although the U.S. developed a rigid racial hierarchy, the
Spanish are often depicted as remaining faithful to culturally based markers of identity rather
than adhering to categories based on biological difference. Unlike their American counterparts,
the Spanish were not averse to utilizing Indigenous and African military allies. The majority of
Spanish plantations did not utilize intensive labor regimes and its moderate treatment of slaves as
well as militia recruitment allowed Africans spaces for agency and a measure of autonomy.
It is nonetheless inaccurate to say that the Spanish colonial administration in Florida and
the actions of its inhabitants were unaffected by the economic, social, and political changes
occurring in the region. Previous liberal policies during the First Spanish period that encouraged
the sanctuary of slaves, the formation of Black militias, and the integration of Africans in
Spanish society did exist simultaneously and in an uneasy dialogue with emerging notions of
race. This explains why Spanish officials celebrated free black militias in East Florida for their
service to the crown, while simultaneously, Pensacola slaves seeking to build their own
community at Prospect Bluff were viewed as bandits who menaced the Borderlands. Scholarship
has focused on the movement of African slaves running away to find sanctuary in West or East
Florida. Certainly the “Negro Fort” has been part of that larger narrative, a military outpost that
stood defiantly for freedom against the U.S. and its institutions promoting slavery and stringent
racial codes. However, the majority of the slaves at Prospect Bluff were not from the U.S. but
from Pensacola, and when they were offered the ability to return to their Spanish masters they
chose instead an uncertain life at a military outpost bracing for an attack from an even more
powerful slaveholding nation. If slaves voted with their feet when they left the U.S. for life in
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Spanish Florida, they sometimes recast those votes. The slaves at the “Negro Fort” rejected
bondage under Spanish, and less frequently Indigenous, masters and rejected any system of
control, especially one based on whiteness, no matter how flexible that system might have been.
Consequently scholars should analyze the complexity of slave holding systems in the
Borderlands and not simply position the Florida territories as a bipolar counterweight to an
oppressive U.S. racial society.
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Chapter 5
“SHE RAN AWAY FROM HIM AND WENT TO THE NATION”:
CONTESTING AFRICAN AND SEMINOLE IDENTITIES IN
TERRITORIAL FLORIDA, 1823 to 1835
It is further advantage, that the Indians within our Southern limits, are now safe
from the malignant influence and of our enemies, to which they were previously subject;
and will be thus rendered more docile to the humane measures, that have been adopted by
our Government, for their civilization and improvement.
The Negro property, also in the South, is now surrounded with greater security,
and rendered less susceptible of being converted into a source of domestic danger.
William H. Simmons, 18221

I Samuel Factor being of a sound desposing mind and having a wife a black
woman of color . . . I do grant and give my wife Rose her entire freedom to enjoy all the
freedom and privileges of the tribe of Indians which they are now living with, and also
my Sarah and my two sons Billy Daniel and Paladore.
Samuel Factor, 18322

In the early 1820s a series of Euro-American men traveling into the Florida Borderlands
envisioned themselves as the vanguard of civilization. They ventured into an area
simultaneously considered untamed and dangerous and yet also a potential Eden because of its
climate. With the expansion of the nation-state, they reasoned that Florida’s resources could be
secured and fully exploited. During their journeys into the interior of the territory to visit with
the Alachua Seminoles and Black Seminoles, individuals such as John Forbes Grant commented
on the suitability of the region for certain cash crops, especially sugar, coffee, and cotton.3
William H. Simmons echoed those sentiments. He felt the province was valuable to the United
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States because “the soil and climate being well adapted to the cultivation of sugar, will contribute
to render us independent of other nations, for the supply of an article, which is as well a
necessary of life, as an elegant luxury.”4 Simmons served as an agent for the territorial
government, alongside his political contemporary John Lee Williams, who also wrote effusively
about the people and terrain of the newly acquired territories.5
These individuals sought to document Florida’s physical and cultural geography in order
to assess the region’s value to the nation-state. Eric Meeks describes a similar process that
occurred nearly a hundred years later in Arizona, where individuals and institutions sought “to
map and classify material resources and human inhabitants according to their value to U.S.
interests and their potential for citizenship.”6 Benedict Anderson argues that the nation-state
seeks to impose its political and social order within its borders through surveillance and
regulation of subordinate people’s relationship with the government. Part of the process of
control and integration involved the mapping and classification of groups into distinct racial
categories. The fluid ethnic and cultural identities of the peoples of the Florida Borderlands
became classified simply as “Negroes,” “Indians,” and “whites,” erasing more than a century of
cultural interaction and mixture. Since power was structured along racial lines, hierarchies and
categories had to be enforced in order to give them any concrete meaning. As Anderson notes,
“Identities imagined by the (confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial state, still awaited a
reification which imperial administrative penetration would soon make possible.”7 Indigenous
peoples such as Samuel Factor and his wife Rosa encountered this system when U.S. officials
were adamant in classifying their children as either “Indian” or “Black” and were reluctant to
recognize their mixed racial background.
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Although the mapping and categorization of subordinate peoples is often associated with
the U.S. annexation of Florida, it occurred much earlier. In fact, Forbes was born during the
British colonial occupation of Florida and was named after Governor James Grant. His
description of Florida included a history of British efforts to establish plantations and populate
the province.8 When the British acquired Florida they also produced a group of authors seeking
to map and classify the land and its inhabitants. Most famously, William Bartram’s Travels
Through North and South Carolina, Georgia, East and West Florida, became a valuable primary
source for historians since Bartram visited with the Alachua Seminoles in the 1770s.
Nonetheless, William Robert, William Stork, and Bernard Romans’ texts concerning Florida had
predated Bartram’s efforts. Governor Grant’s letters to the Board of Trade and Plantations also
contained descriptions of the geography and called for the development of plantations.9 During
the Second Spanish Florida period, colonial officials relied on Panton, Leslie, and Company
employees, John Hambly and John Forrester, to report on the terrain and the Seminoles.10 The
Spanish endorsed Grant’s economic vision by initiating policies that allowed the Panton, Leslie,
and Company to continue trading. They also allowed planters such as Francis Philip Fatio to
remain in the province while simultaneously encouraging new Euro-American immigration.
Emerging ideas associated with political centralization, property, and race met and
negotiated, on a situational basis, with Seminole and more traditional Spanish political and social
systems. This contingency helps explain why Africans’ experiences in the territory varied
widely. The 1819 Adams-Onís treaty did not immediately change the power relationship
between the Seminoles, Black Seminoles, and the new U.S. administration. While the Treaty of
Moultrie Creek in 1824 portended the nation-state’s efforts to enforce its social and political
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order, the Seminole and Black Seminoles retained enough autonomy to negotiate aspects of the
agreement. The treaty did not call for Seminole removal since the U.S. was not in a position to
force the Seminoles and Black Seminoles out of the region. Additionally, territorial officials
later enlarged the boundaries of the Seminole reservation. However, by 1837 the U.S. marshaled
the necessary force to remove the Seminoles and Black Seminoles from Florida, utilizing the
treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson. After the U.S. effectively exerted its power to
enforce its physical borders it then solidified metaphorical boundaries as well. In order to make
racial classifications more meaningful, Indians, Africans, and whites had to exist in separate
political and social spaces. Conversely African and Indigenous peoples’ fight against colonial
control ranged from violent confrontation to the refusal to recognize Euro-American settlers’
claims over the Black Seminoles. Both groups sought to define their own identities in the face of
racialization.
The Second U.S.-Seminole War in Florida is one of the most prominent topics of
scholarship on early Florida History because it is one of the most obvious manifestations of state
power. Consequently, few scholars have centered their studies on the territorial period before the
war began, 1821-1835. This was a critical period when borderlands, contested spaces between
nations and non-state political entities, gave way to more clearly delineated borders and the
“transition narrowed the scope for (subordinate peoples’) political independence.”11 The few
texts that do focus on this period have emphasized has been on the U.S.-Seminole relationship,
conflicts brewing over the Black Seminoles, and tensions over Euro-American immigration into
Florida. John K. Mahon’s lengthy work, History of the Second Seminole War, devotes ample
space to the treaties between the Seminoles and the U.S. prior to the conflict. He gives a
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complete summary of the events that led to these agreements. Mahon’s focus is on the treaties
and the extent to which U.S. agents acted unscrupulously toward the Seminoles and whether
Indigenous peoples were deceived.12 George Klos and Canter Brown Jr. have written about
events that foreshadowed the coming military conflict. Klos writes that the presence of the
Black Seminoles and constant efforts by U.S. citizens to re-enslave them was the major cause of
Seminole removal.13 Meanwhile Brown writes that Seminole resistance to reservation
boundaries, planter protests over “depredations,” and runaway slaves living among the
Seminoles led to Major Francis Dade’s punitive expedition in 1827. The physical and emotional
toll from the attack led to resentment among the Seminoles and Black Seminoles, which they
later avenged during their successful attack on Dade, which sparked the Second U.S.-Seminole
War.14
Scholarship concerning the early territorial period has emphasized the causes of the
Second U.S.-Seminole War, but it overlooks the larger processes associated with the expansion
of the nation-state and the development of Indigenous and African identity in light of hardening
racial categories. In contrast to previous scholarship, this chapter analyzes how the U.S.
established an Indian agency to police and supervise the Seminoles and thus enforce slave claims
on the Black Seminoles.15 It also seeks to address Susan Miller’s critiques of previous
scholarship pertaining to this time period. Miller argues that the focus on the Black Seminoles
has de-emphasized Seminole agency while shifting focus away from other factors, not related to
the Africans, that led to the conflict with the U.S. She disagrees with scholars who argue
Seminole efforts “to remain in their homeland with the bones of their ancestors was of trivial or
no consequence compared to their dependence on the advice of their black allies.’”16 While she
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is correct that internal Seminole political dynamics help explain the events of the territorial
period, there is a danger of falling into a similar problematic position as the scholars mentioned
above by isolating only one factor for the resistance. When analyzing the Florida Borderlands
scholars tend to reproduce the racialized categories of white, Indian, and Black that colonial
powers sought to impose. Nonetheless, groups in the Florida Borderlands did not exist in a
vacuum regarding their histories, especially in terms of their identity. African and Indigenous
peoples had significant interaction with each other and engaged in transcultural exchanges,
meaning neither group can be viewed as primordial. Concurrently, subordinate peoples were a
part of the same struggle to resist, negotiate, and come to terms with the expanding reach of the
nation-state.
In order to address some of the historiographical arguments mentioned above, this
chapter analyzes the expansion of the nation-state and its impact on racialization and identity
formation: two processes that are interrelated and in constant dialogue. With the transfer of
Florida from the Spanish to the United States, state institutions sought in the following fifteen
years to establish their jurisdiction over Seminoles and Black Seminoles. As a result,
subordinate peoples had to negotiate with the U.S. through new treaties that undermined
Seminole sovereignty, involved the presence of Indian agents, and included the demarcation of
reservation borders. These physical borders marked the spaces reserved for a particular “race” of
people, even though those people crossed the physical boundaries of the reservation as much as
they transcended the metaphysical borders of blood. U.S. officials and citizens sought to impose
social order based on the imposition of rigid racial categories. When planters sought to claim
Black Seminoles they were perpetuating a system of chattel slavery that ignored the cultural or
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racial complexity of those it enslaved. This was a marked contrast from the Florida Borderlands
where Indigenous and African peoples lived in variety of relationships that included crosscultural kinship. Through resistance, Seminoles and Black Seminoles rejected Euro-American
notions of race while forging their own identity rooted in their own local cultural realities.

5.1 The End of the Second Spanish Florida Period
The U.S. repeatedly invaded Florida after the War of 1812 only to later grudgingly
remove its forces from the province because they lacked sufficient legal pretext for their actions.
Towards the end of the First U.S.-Seminole War, the political opponents of Andrew Jackson had
utilized his Florida activities as an opportunity to score points against him.17 Nonetheless, the
U.S. general had essentially secured the territory by destroying the only competing power base in
the area, the Seminole settlements of northern Florida. Many Indigenous groups migrated south
of the Suwannee River away from the border areas. Spanish recognition of this situation led to
the opening of negotiations between Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and Spanish minister
Don Luis de Onís in order to formalize the U.S. annexation of Florida. Due to delays the U.S.
did not actually take possession of the province until 1821. Although St. Augustine had never
capitulated during a military conflict, the provincial capital fell victim once more to diplomatic
maneuvering.
Although Indigenous and African groups had utilized the “middle ground” and negotiated
within political, economic, and social spaces between colonial powers, the strategy had its
limitations. Seminoles, specifically the Alachua settlements, had established close relationships
with the Spanish and English colonial administrations in St. Augustine. These relationships gave
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Seminoles access to trade goods and mutual defense pacts that buttressed their autonomy from
the Lower Creeks. And yet the prospect of forced reintegration into the Creek Confederation
continued to loom over the Seminoles. It was one of the reasons they utilized borderlands areas
to their advantage. However, as the Seminoles first discovered in 1783 when the British
abandoned East and West Florida, colonial powers were unwilling to sacrifice their larger
interests in order to fulfill their commitments in areas they considered peripheral. The British
retreat from Apalachicola after the end of the War of 1812 once again illustrated this lack of
political will to support Indigenous allies.18 Seminole reaction to the Adams-Onís Treaty must
have been similar to the earlier cases of British withdrawal.19 Indigenous peoples had militarily
resisted expansionist efforts emanating from the U.S. since 1795 and in the most recent conflict
suffered incredible losses. Nonetheless they were not consulted in diplomatic talks that annexed
land they clearly felt was under Indigenous, rather than Spanish jurisdiction.
With the transfer in 1821, Seminoles and Black Seminoles found that the borders of the
U.S. extended into Florida. A number of U.S. citizens began to seek an advantage in the political
transition and sought to seize land and enslave Black Seminoles. In fact the acquisition of
Seminole land had begun under the Spanish. The John Forbes and Company had received a
grant in 1810 from the Seminoles and Lower Creeks in order to collect a debt they were owed for
purchases in company stores. Additionally they gained an extra 1,275,000 acres in 1818 near the
Apalachicola River, adjacent to their earlier grants.20 A year earlier, while U.S. forces led by
Andrew Jackson were threatening to launch further attacks into northern Florida, a Spanish land
grant of 289,645 acres encompassing Alachua was awarded to Don Fernando de la Maza
Arredondo.21 Once the Arredondo family gained possession of the grant they sold parcels to
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other settlers, such as Moses Elias Levy, especially as the transfer of Florida became evident.
Levy’s land grant would be contested by the U.S. government and settled by the Supreme Court
in 1832. Forbes also sold his lands as quickly as possible and some of his buyers included
merchants from Savannah, Georgia. Ironically U.S. military excursions had made it possible to
secure these grants by breaking the power of the Indigenous groups that would have contested
them.
Troubles gripping the Seminoles and Black Seminoles were not restricted to land
displacement. According to Florida’s Territorial Governor William Pope Duval, many U.S.
citizens preyed on Indigenous fears over the political transfer of power. They convinced a
number of Seminoles that they would be dispossessed of their “slaves, horses, and cattle, and
urging them to sell in order to save some parts of their property and these advisers then became
purchasers for trifling sums of valuable slaves and other property.”22 Various bills of sale were
completed in 1821 for Black Seminoles that Euro-Americans later sought to validate in U.S.
courts. According to Duval a number of the sales were conducted in bad faith or amounted to
the robbery of desperate Seminoles. He was later confronted with the difficult decision of
whether or not to uphold suspicious slave claims in the face of intense pressure from U.S.
citizens. Although British and Spanish Florida colonists had previously sought the return of
slaves living among the Seminoles, U.S. citizens were particularly persistent in their demands
that local and federal authorities act upon their grievances.

5.2 The Rise of the Nation-State
After 1824, the geographic and political borderlands shifted away from the Georgia
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border to the newly established boundaries of the Seminole reservation in central Florida. Once
U.S. invasions destabilized the region, state institutions sought to control the newly acquired
territory. American agents, pressured by the increasing numbers of settlers and planters, quickly
sought a treaty with the Seminoles. As a result, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek negotiated in 1823
and signed early the following year, strove to change the relationship between the Seminoles and
the U.S. Although the Seminole were not completely powerless and were able to force
concessions from U.S. agents, a shift in power dynamics had clearly occurred. With the
onslaught of Indian agents, superintendents, annuity payments, contractors, and slave claimants,
the Seminoles experienced the ever-increasing reach of the nation state. In the same year that the
Treaty of Moultrie Creek went into effect Secretary of War John C. Calhoun formed the Office
of Indian Affairs, later known as the Bureau of Indian Affairs. U.S. policy now sought to fulfill
the vision laid out by the British General Jeffrey Amherst in the 1760s. Its basic tenets held that
Indigenous groups should no longer be treated as fully sovereign nations completely outside U.S.
political jurisdiction with the same standing as other nations. Rather, Indigenous peoples would
be under the “protection” of the nation-state whose authority superseded its own sovereignty.
Later in the nineteenth century, U.S. policy would alternate between recognizing “domestic
dependent nations” and encouraging assimilation and acculturation, in other words “Kill the
Indian, and Save the Man.”23 However, Indian policy in the 1820s and 1830s was centered on
controlling groups previously outside the state and then sponsoring removal to areas where
Indigenous groups could be further controlled and monitored.24
The U.S. quickly sought to make Florida’s Indians, groups accustomed to their
autonomy, to accede to U.S. political jurisdiction. Although the British and Spanish had claimed
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large swaths of territory their actual holdings were more limited. The Spanish often referred to
land west of the St. Johns River as the “Indian nation” or “Indian country.” This language
revealed the fact that the Seminoles as well as free Africans were effectively outside the reach of
the Spanish. Although the Spanish did have avenues to pressure the Seminoles, especially
through the Panton, Leslie, and Company trading company, the Indigenous settlements retained
their autonomy and freedom of movement. U.S. officials, specifically James Gadsden, sought to
curtail native people’s independence by restricting the Seminoles to reservation lands.

Figure 5.1 The Seminole Reservation. Source: Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 290.
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At the heart of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek was the removal of the Lower Creeks and
Seminoles from Northern Florida. With Simmons, Forbes, and Williams’ respective texts
serving to promote the land, there was a demand for territory devoid of Indigenous peoples and
other “impediments” to economic development. Preliminary discussions about removing the
Seminoles from the Florida Peninsula included whether or not the Seminoles could be unified
with the Creeks in Georgia and Alabama. Although acting Governor William Worthington
quickly recognized Seminole hostility to being subsumed under Creek authority, this plan was
constantly revisited.25 Immediately preceding the treaty negotiations, U.S. negotiator Gadsden
carried on a series of correspondence with Calhoun. Outlining his plans for an agreement with
the Seminoles, Gadsden felt that establishment of reservations in Florida was more feasible but
he hoped that removal from the territory remained a possibility. He preferred this solution
because it eliminated the threat of the Seminole whom he felt were potentially “dangerous” to
settlers and their property. He also cited other larger concerns when he asserted that “it is
possible that all the Florida Indians might be induced to remove and if so an object so vitally
important in a national or territorial point of view.”26 As borderlands scholars have
demonstrated, the nation-state gauges its power by its ability to confront any unregulated
movement and commerce, viewed as illicit, and considered a subversion of the state.27 Seminole
access to the Atlantic or Gulf Coast represented a national security threat because they could
communicate, trade, and travel to British and Spanish possessions. Gadsden did not take this
danger lightly and highlighted his fears by citing the presence of Spanish fishermen in
Indigenous settlements on the west coast of Florida.28 Complaints about the interaction between
Cuban fisherman and Indigenous peoples originated with the British in 1769 and continued until
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removal in the 1830s.29 Unlike the British, the U.S. eventually allocated the necessary force to
disrupt these relationships.
Calhoun agreed with Gadsden that the removal of the Seminoles was desirable but
unfeasible for the immediate future. Both men were unsure where the Seminoles could be
relocated. The Secretary of State recommended that the Seminoles could be sent among the
Cherokee and Choctaws groups that immigrated to the Arkansas Territory in the 1820s.30 Since
both men already viewed removal as ideal, they probably felt the establishment of the Florida
reservations was only a temporary solution. Even this strategy was problematic, since the
Seminoles resisted leaving their homelands and were divided amongst the various settlements
over the possible location of the reservation. In particular the Mikasuki and Apalachicola
Seminole were unwilling to leave northern Florida for land in the interior.31 One additional
impediment to enacting U.S. policy was the lack of personnel and institutional structure among
territorial agencies. Governor and Florida Superintendent of Indian Affairs Duval had been out
of state and Indian agent Glad Humphreys had only recently taken his post. As a result, treaty
negotiations did not begin until late 1823 when Humphreys met with a delegation of Seminole
headmen.
The diplomatic discussions and the subsequent 1824 treaty reveal the important political
processes that distinguish the Florida Borderlands from other regions. Gadsden as the lead
negotiator sent updates to his superiors in Washington, D.C. regarding the discussions with the
Seminole delegation. As with previous treaties between Europeans and native peoples, Gadsden
wanted to deal with one Indigenous spokesman. He must have been pleased with the designation
of Neamathla, leader of a Mikasuki settlement, as the principal headman for the Seminoles.32
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The American agent opened the treaty discussions by making his case for restricting the
Seminoles to reservations. He also noted that the Seminole were originally part of the Creek and
had immigrated to Florida, essentially questioning the legitimacy of Seminole land claims by
implying that they were not indigenous to Florida. Years later the American agent remarked that
the “history of the Florida Indians is not involved in the mists of antiquity.”33 Gadsden also
asserted that the Seminoles “drove the Spaniards into Saint Augustine; … burnt their forts,
destroyed their fields and exterminated the Yamassee nation.”34 He portrayed the Seminoles not
as victims of U.S. expansion but rather a conquering nation whose fortunes had waned. As a
result of the new balance of power Gadsden argued:
The white men are now strong and the Seminoles are weak. The white men are like the
fruit and leaves on the trees which blossom and increase annually. The Seminoles like
the deer of the forest that might be hunted to their destruction, the white might take
vengeance for what you did the Spaniards and Yamassees but we will not. We will
forget what has passed, like a kind father the president says to you there are lands enough
for both his white and red children.35
Following the popular belief of policy-makers during the early 1800s, Gadsden claimed that the
creation of reservations was a benevolent act that showed sympathy to the Seminoles. He
implied that the U.S. could simply displace the Seminoles without offering them any restitution.
The Seminole response to Gadsden’s opening remarks centered on the unrealistic
portrayal of reservation lands and the refusal of the Apalachicola groups to relocate. Neamathla
displayed his understanding of the political situation by utilizing Gadsden’s own fears in his
rebuttal. He stated that if his people were relocated to the reservation, they would be susceptible
to foreign influence from the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, specifically the Spanish and the British.
Gadsden had previously confided to Calhoun his desire to isolate the Seminoles from contact
with the Europeans. Neamathla warned that his “young men,” under foreign guidance and
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forced by their destitute condition, due to an inadequate land base, would turn to violence. When
engaging in colonial Southeastern diplomacy, Indigenous people invoked their “young men”
when they wished to defuse a tense situation and avoid a wider more destructive conflict:
blaming impulsive youth served to maintain peace. Neamathla invoked the possible actions of
his “young men” in order to subtly threaten Gadsden if he refused to negotiate over the
reservation’s boundaries. Nonetheless, the main message the headman sought to convey was the
limited agricultural potential of the terrain. He insisted that the land was unsuitable for
producing foodstuffs such as “hickory nut, acorn, and persimmon,” important parts of their diet.
Indeed the Seminoles’ knowledge of the environment proved to be correct while Euro-American
assessments proved to be exaggerated. Ultimately Neamathla argued for a reservation near
Apalachicola, since “I am old and . . . too poor to move from my village to the south, my cabin
has been built with my own hands, my fields cultivated myself.”36 A final agreement could not
be reached until various headmen secured land in West Florida. Along with Neamathla, this
included leaders John Blunt, Tuski Hajo, and Econchatimico, all of whom Gadsden described as
“men of industrious habits and who have made some advances in cultivation” and “rendered
influential services to General Jackson” in the First U.S.-Seminole War.37 Eventually the
agreement called for the creation of two reservations with boundaries to be enforced by U.S.
agents and the military.
Although the Seminoles managed to gain a few concessions, the 1824 Treaty of Moultrie
Creek highlighted their new relationship with the nation-state. Even as the U.S. gained
influence, vestiges of the language of colonial Southeastern diplomacy inflected the talks
between Gadsden and Seminole leaders. The U.S. negotiator utilized many of the metaphorical
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phrases meant to connote fictive kinship and peaceful intentions. For instance Gadsden stated
that your “father the president” wished to smoke the “pipe of eternal peace.”38 In addition to the
language of the agreement, the U.S. was forced to make two major concessions, which illustrated
that the Seminoles were able to maintain some leverage. The Seminoles, despite being relegated
to reservation lands, were able to remain in Florida despite the desire to remove them west or
force their reintegration with the Creeks. In addition, Apalachicola groups were able to further
negotiate for their own smaller reservations near their homelands. Seminole refusal to relocate,
and the inability of the U.S. to gather the necessary resources to evict them, meant that
Indigenous peoples remained in Florida for more than a decade and some evaded removal
altogether. The Treaty of Moultrie exemplifies the ever-increasing presence of the nation-state
while serving as reminder that transitions in the Florida Borderlands occurred gradually and
unevenly.
While Gadsden superficially followed the protocols of colonial Southeastern diplomacy,
his tone and the treaty’s terms point to a shift in the relationship between the state and the
region’s Indigenous peoples. Preceding the talks he sent a stern warning to Florida’s Indigenous
groups that despite a possible boycott of the meeting the treaty would still be binding.39 The
metaphorical language in Gadsden’s speech is not as integrated into the main body of his address
but rather supplements his message. In other words, adhering to Indigenous diplomatic
procedure was not as vital because he felt he had a stronger position. As illustrated by
Gadsden’s words cited above, he felt that the “whites” were now stronger and would impose
their will as supposedly the Seminoles had done with the Spanish and the Yamassee.
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Consequently the Treaty of Moultrie Creek imposed conditions on the Seminoles that could not
have been imposed years earlier.
One of the most important treaty provisions stipulated that the Seminoles were now
“under the protection of the United States.”40 During the British and Spanish colonial
administrations, both powers made treaties with Florida’s Indigenous peoples under the pretense
that they had political jurisdiction over the entire territory. However, it was generally agreed,
beginning with the 1765 Treaty of Picolata, that land west of the St. Johns River was “Indian
Country.” With the exception of interactions with traders and occasional visits to St. Augustine
to collect gifts, the Seminoles had autonomy within their territory. The Treaty of Moultrie Creek
reflected the changing circumstances of the past few years. The U.S. placed an agency with an
official within the Seminole reservation to “watch over the interests of said tribes.”41 Agents
became central to the enforcement of the treaty’s article calling upon the Seminoles to deny
sanctuary to runaway African slaves and to return any “fugitive” slaves to their owners. The
agency would also be responsible for distributing annuity payments, which increased the
involvement of the state in Seminole political and economic affairs.42
Initially, the most pressing issue for the Alachua Seminoles was disputing the boundaries
of their reservation. According to the treaty, the Indigenous lands began south of the “Big
Hammock”; in other words the boundaries excluded the Alachua prairie, much of it now
belonging in the Arredondo grant. This had been the location of the majority of Seminole
settlements in the area. Micanopy and Jumper, the headmen present at the Treaty of Moultrie,
knew that the land south to Lake Okeechobee was incapable of sustaining their communities.
Consequently, many Seminoles refused to leave Alachua and others were immediately dealing
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with hunger. Indigenous leaders began appealing to the ninth article of the Treaty of Moultrie
Creek which stated that the boundary limits could be extended if U.S. Indian agents deemed the
land “insufficient.”43 Beyond the reluctance to leave agriculturally productive land, the
Seminoles promised to resist removal since “a network of sacred obligations bound the Seminole
people to the land in Florida.”44 The Seminoles maintained an intimate connection to the land
since the spirits of their ancestors resided there. As a result American officials complained that
the Seminoles refused to honor the new boundaries and committed “depredations” on the
property of U.S. citizens, which had recently been Seminole homelands.
For over a decade the U.S. had pressured and harassed the Seminoles, destroying their
settlements, attempting to seize the Black Seminoles, and supplying native peoples with
inadequate agricultural land. However, these affronts against the Seminoles were never
considered when Indigenous groups refused to abide by the new boundary lines. Their actions
were simply labeled as depredations without any consideration to their precarious situation. U.S.
officials typically portrayed Seminoles as “savages” who attacked and murdered their citizens
because of an irrational hostility toward the nation. President James Monroe utilized the
discourse of Seminole savagery to justify the military interventions commanded by Jackson in
1817. In a message to Congress, the President argued that Indigenous “ravages” had been
“unprovoked” and stemmed from a long running animosity.45 Around the time of the transfer of
Florida to the U.S., Jackson had planned another incursion to punish the Creek Red Sticks who
that had immigrated south, and he also wanted to displace free African settlements. Advocating
restraint, Jackson’s superiors did not approve the action but allied Creek factions led by Peter
McQueen launched their own attacks. Consequently this caused more instability among
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Indigenous settlements in northern Florida. The regional economy based on agriculture, cattle
ranching, and the deerskin trade was undermined since the Seminoles were confined to the
reservation with poor land and no coastal outlets.46 These impositions increased the likelihood
that the Seminoles would have to “raid” plantations to overcome their losses. Subsequently U.S.
officials highlighted the loss of property to call for additional measures against the Seminoles,
thus creating a cycle of violence and vengeance.
Since the Seminoles received an annuity, many settlers sought to claim property losses
during “depredations” in order to be reimbursed from the government payments to the
Seminoles. As a result, numerous settlers in the 1820s submitted claims to the Seminole agent
and the Florida Superintendent of Indians Affairs with testimonies of apparent Indigenous
attacks and seizures of property. Settlers John Day and Anthony L. Molyneux had purchased an
interest in the property of Horatio S. Dexter, the original owner having mortgaged his holdings.
They then enlisted the services of Peter Mitchell, the District Attorney of East Florida, to help
with their claims against the Seminoles. They sought compensation for cattle, hogs, and horses
that Dexter claimed the Seminoles had taken from him in 1821.47 The situation remained tense
and led to a petition signed by planters in Alachua County accusing the Seminoles of further
depredations. Planters cited a case of a man in the country who was “scalped” and murdered by
a Seminole hunting party outside the reservation lands.48 Although the apparent crime lacked
details, the planters nonetheless emphasized the loss of property and Indigenous “savagery.”
Florida’s Indian agents thus found themselves in a difficult situation when confronted with the
disputed claims.
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Territorial Governor Duval often had in the politically uncomfortable task of mediating
U.S. citizens’ property disputes with the Seminoles. He served as both the principal Indian
Agent in Florida and the territorial governor, roles often at odds with each other. Duval was
flexible on certain points in his dealings with the Seminole, especially after he personally
familiarized himself with their difficult situation.49 On the larger question of Seminole removal
to the newly established reservations, he nonetheless remained adamant and even threatened to
arrest Seminole leaders who refused to relocate.50 Word began to filter to him that the central
reserve lands were inadequate for agriculture. Even Gadsden, the U.S. commissioner in the
Treaty of Moultrie Creek, had to admit after touring the area that the current boundaries were not
sufficient.51 He wrote Calhoun to tell him that the boundary should include an area known as the
“Big Hammock,” the site of previous Seminole settlements. Soon thereafter Lieutenant Jeremiah
Yancey surveyed the countryside with the newly installed Seminole agent, Gad Humphreys. His
conclusions bluntly contradicted Florida’s image as an agricultural paradise and he admitted that
the previous assessments of the land were inaccurate. He expressed his great disappointment and
realized that the “numerous erroneous accounts given of this country, which originated in fancy
rather than fact.”52 Returning from the journey, Humphrey informed Duval that the Seminole
leaders were insistent on an extension of the northern boundary as stipulated in the Treaty of
Moultrie Creek. Despite the possible political fallout, Humphreys endorsed the Seminole
position.53
Having received considerable advice concerning the issue, Duval decided to take his own
excursion into the reservation lands.54 He came to the same conclusion as the other officials and
alerted Calhoun of the need to include the “Big Hammock” in the reservation.55 A year later the
254

governor further advised that the area known as the “Big Swamp” should also be added.56
Nonetheless, Duval received unending pressure from U.S. citizens to confine the Indigenous
settlements within the reservation boundaries. Historian Cantor Brown Jr. describes the tension
between planters and Indigenous peoples in 1826-1827 as “The Florida Crisis.”57 Although
Duval was aware of the problems facing the Seminoles, he had to contend with the territory’s
emergent political and economic elite. Many of its members had been accumulating land in
Alachua and establishing plantations. In Middle Florida a group known as “the Nucleus”
consisted of prominent men such as Benjamin Chaires, Richard Keith Call, John Bellamy,
Gadsden, and others that had acquired land and plantations.58 It was in their interest to have the
Seminoles relocated south. Due to constant pressure from U.S. citizens over “depredations” and
claims for lost property, Duval called for stricter measures. In December 1825, he wrote to
Secretary of War James Barbour and requested military assistance to force the Seminole onto
their new reservations.59
Although Duval and other U.S. officials advocated for policies such as the extension of
reservation boundaries to alleviate the Seminoles’ displacement, landholding U.S. citizens began
calling for the westward removal of Indigenous peoples. The governor exchanged talks with
Seminole leaders in early 1826 to discuss the current tension. In a tone similar to that taken by
Gadsden with the Seminoles in the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, the governor delivered an
ultimatum. Either the Indigenous groups followed the stipulations of the treaty or they would
face his “wrath.” If continued U.S. settler claims were made concerning the loss of property,
then the Seminoles’ “annuity will be taken . . . to pay the white people.”60 In comparison to
Gadsden’s message years earlier, Duval utilized even fewer diplomatic metaphors, which had
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been a staple of Southeastern Borderlands diplomacy. He made passing reference to “friends
and brothers” and invoked the role of father for the U.S., but the shift in his language reflected a
change in power relations. Statements like “listen to my words” or threats to “strike with a
mighty arm,” which had never been used in diplomatic speeches in the Spanish and British
Florida periods, gave new meaning to U.S.-Seminole relations.61
Apalachicola headman John Hicks, having recently staked his claim to leadership,
delivered a retort to Duval’s talk. He informed the governor that the Seminoles were dealing
with a failed corn crop and land displacement.62 He recognized that some Seminoles had seized
property but that the Indigenous groups would enforce the laws regarding theft. In return Hicks
referenced a future trip by a Seminole delegation, in 1826, to Washington, D.C., in which he
hoped to gain more land. U.S. officials felt that a trip to the national capital would impress the
Seminoles of “the power or numbers of the country” and presumably lead to their compliance.63
Officials in the Office of Indian Affairs had hoped that the visit could facilitate the removal of
the Seminoles to the west.64 Much to their dismay, the visit did not produce an agreement for
western removal but actually enlarged the Florida reservation by extending the boundary north to
include the “Big Swamp.”
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Figure 5.2 Seminole delegation to Washington, 1826. Source: Mulroy, Freedom on the Border, 91.

U.S. citizens’ hostility to the Seminole presence outside the reservation lands continued
after the headmen returned from Washington, D.C. Planters sent the president a memorial
highlighting the killing of “cattle and hogs, the robbing of their plantations, and the enticing
away of their slaves.”65 A few months later, John Rodman represented a group of citizens
petitioning Secretary of War Barbour to protest the withdrawal of military units from St.
Augustine.66 Many of the planters focused their displeasure on agent Humphreys for not using
the military to restrain the Seminoles. Duval believed that the U.S. official half-heartedly
restrained Indigenous groups, and he faulted the Mikasuki for the conflict.67 An impending land
sale near the Suwannee River motivated Florida officials to order Captain Francis Dade and a
contingent of troops to secure the area. In November 1826, a report of Creek violence against
two white men in Georgia gave Dade the pretext he needed to expel the Mikasuki from northern
257

Florida.68 He forcibly relocated them to the reservation, despite the fact that U.S. officials had
already admitted that the land could not sustain the Indigenous population. As a result, a number
of Seminoles allegedly retaliated and the ensuing “depredation” narratives were used as a
justification for military action and forced removal. Additionally the Seminoles were
continuously threatened with integration with the Creek and the loss of their autonomy.

5.3 Seminoles and Africans
In the 1820s various factors such as land displacement, increased number of planters,
settlers’ demands for Indian removal, and proposed Seminole political integration with the Creek
caused considerable tension. Susan Miller argues that these issues have been overshadowed by
scholars’ shortsightedness “and an exaggerated estimation of the importance of Africans to the
Seminole government.”69 Although this position correctly argues that the internal dynamics of
Seminole politics and identity formation have been ignored by historians of Florida’s territorial
period, Black Seminole and Seminole history cannot be separated, as has been the tendency of
scholars interested in the African Diaspora or American Indian history. Even though both
groups generally lived in semi-separate communities, they both resisted and adapted to the same
processes of colonization and nationalism. They were respectively racialized as “Indian” and
“Black” by Europeans and later the U.S. to suit the emergent social, political, and economic
order structured along racial lines.
As the British realized in the 1760s, the successful development of a plantation export
economy in Florida was dependent on stable relations between Euro-Americans and Indigenous
nations. 70 Slave holding in the territory was impossible if agreements were not in place to
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ensure peace between colonists and native peoples.71 Gadsden warned in 1823 that removal of
the Seminole would be necessary since “an Indian population under these circumstances
connected with another class of population (Africans) which will inevitably predominate in
Florida, must necessarily add to natural weakness and endanger the security of one of the most
exposed but most important section of the union.”72 Plantations were large financial investments
that required stable sources of labor, and the ability of native people to seize cattle and slaves
undermined that stability. As scholars such as Nancy Shoemaker have shown, the development
of African slave labor meant the construction of blackness and consequently, whiteness. The
system was based on a racial order, and for the new classifications to have any meaning a
physical and social space had to be enforced between groups. Consequently, a rise of antimiscegenation laws occurred in Virginia and Maryland during the eighteenth century, which
separated various groups. The prospect of Indigenous and African relationships and alliances in
Florida threatened to blur these racial lines and weaken the system. More concretely, military
cooperation between groups made it difficult to remove Indigenous peoples and enslave Africans
since their combined force presented a formidable challenge. A historical narrative of the
Florida Borderlands solely focusing on free Africans or the Seminoles only presents a partial
picture of the larger processes occurring in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Kenneth Wiggins Porter’s The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People,
published in 1996 but written throughout his lifetime, is an influential book that first interpreted
the Seminole-Black Seminole relationship. Porter argued that the Black Seminoles lived in a
state of “democratic feudalism.” As vassals of the Seminoles, the Africans lived in separate
villages, contributed a tribute in the form of crops, and were free to manage their own affairs.73
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However, because of the diversity of experiences within both African and Indigenous groups, it
is difficult to argue that one standard arrangement existed.74 Within areas considered “Indian
territory,” Africans lived in a variety of sociopolitical situations that included autonomous
settlements, Black Seminole villages adjacent to Seminole communities, and also cases of
kinship in which Seminoles and Africans lived together. Each individual’s circumstance most
likely depended on a range of factors especially considering that some Africans had lived among
the Seminoles for many years while others only recently arrived. Prior to 1821 a number of the
Africans among the Seminoles had arrived from Spanish owners, while the newest arrivals were
from U.S. owners. Interpreters and advisors, such as Abraham who served Micanopy, held
important positions while others are simply mentioned in colonial documents as slaves of
Seminole leaders.75
Government sources do not provide a full account of Seminole and the Black Seminole
relationships. Aside from the difficulty of gauging the range of relationships that existed, U.S.
officials produced accounts that were filtered through their cultural lenses. They proved unable
to comprehend individuals and groups whose lives blurred racial categories because of their dual
Indigenous and African ancestry. Rather they placed most people they encountered in categories
they were familiar with: Indian, Black, and White. In a few cases Euro-Americans utilized terms
such as “Indian Negroes” and “Seminole Negroes” but they rarely specified whether these terms
spoke to these individuals’ racial lineage, hybrid culture or their political relationship to the
Seminoles.76 Importantly, territorial officials encouraging settlement of the area and the growth
of the plantation export economy had a motive to limit Black Seminoles’ ability to claim an
Indigenous identity as a means to claim an identity not synonymous with enslavement.
260

U.S. agents frequently misunderstood the complex cultural situations that they had
encountered among the people they were charged to control. In the 1820s American officials
admitted that they had greatly erred in their assessments of Florida as an agricultural paradise,
especially in the interior reservation lands. U.S. agent Humphrey once thought the Seminole
could not distinguish between the U.S. and Spanish colonial administrations.77 Meanwhile
Florida Governor and Indian Superintendent Duval once remarked that the Seminoles could not
be individually compensated for their property because the “Indians have no name.” 78 In all
likelihood he rarely interacted with Seminoles beyond their leaders and misunderstood the lack
of hierarchies that he could recognize as a sign that Seminoles lacked individual identities in
their society. An equally troubling miscalculation was the belief of some government agents that
the Seminoles could easily be reincorporated into Creek society despite their recent conflicts and
the fact that the Seminoles had established their autonomy from the Lower Creek.79 Even after
the U.S. relocated the Seminoles to Indian Territory in the 1830s, the government still sought to
incorporate them within Creek borders and political structure. These instances demonstrate the
problematic nature of utilizing U.S. government documents to illuminate the lives of Indigenous
and African peoples through the eyes of Euro-American men. U.S. agents were conditioned to
see political, economic, and social structures they could recognize and often did not judge
Seminole and African society on its own terms. Government officials were not motivated to
gauge cultural and social nuances but rather to provide stability for the economic development of
the territory, and thus they viewed African and Indigenous peoples within that context.
U.S. officials often seemed puzzled at the status of the Black Seminoles and viewed their
presence among the Seminoles as a threat. Americans objected to the close proximity of African
261

and Indigenous peoples since they were concerned that the Black Seminoles corrupted the
Seminoles and caused them to commit “depredations,” seize property, and offer sanctuary to
runaway African slaves. In 1826 Governor Duval wrote to McKenney concerning an effort to
persuade the Seminoles to relocate from Florida. He felt that the only way to facilitate removal
was for “the Florida Indians . . . to sell all their slaves, I am convinced that it is owing to them
that the Indians have not acted properly.”80 A month later Duval chastised Indigenous leaders
when he called on them to “fulfill the treaty (Moultrie Creek), you are not to mind what the
negroes say they will lie and lead you astray in the hope to escape from their right owners . . .
they care nothing for you”81 During the Second U.S.-Seminole War military commanders often
felt that the Black Seminoles were the true force behind the hostilities. Famously General
Thomas Jesup once justified freeing a portion of the Black Seminoles because they “exercised an
almost controlling influence over them (Seminoles).82
Colonial powers viewed Indigenous peoples as either noble savages or irrationally violent
groups. Euro-Americans did not believe Indians were capable of actions rooted on complex
calculations based on political, economic, and social factors. When resistance to removal began
in the 1820s, Euro-Americans believed the Black Seminoles were the instigators of the conflict,
thus ignoring Seminole displeasure with land displacement and loss of autonomy. Simmons
offered an explanation for this line of reasoning. He argued that Africans were semi-civilized,
owing to their previous residence among whites, and were familiar with society’s vices and evils.
Meanwhile Indigenous peoples unexposed to “civilization” retained their “simplicity of
character.”83 Consequently, Euro-Americans believed that removing the Seminoles from such
corrupting influences would make them more malleable and facilitate future assimilation.
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Euro-Americans were not only concerned with Black Seminoles’ influence on the Indians
but also with what they perceived as the lax Seminole system of slavery. Many Euro-Americans,
aside from financial considerations, felt they were protecting their own system of chattel slavery.
Duval complained that Seminole slave masters “derive no advantage from their (Blacks) labor”
and that “one chief who has 70 slaves has not received corn to feed his own family.”84 To Duval
and other Euro-Americans in the early nineteenth century slave ownership was a sign of
civilization and illustrated the ability to create a hierarchical society with elites that could
accumulate wealth through the exploitation of African slave labor to produce goods for the
market economy. Consequently, factions of Creek and Cherokee leaders became slave owners
and acquired vast land holdings partly as a means of demonstrating their ability to adhere to
principles of property and political centralization. Leaders such as the Cherokee Major Ridge
and the Creek William McIntosh hoped that the restructuring of their societies would stave off
U.S. efforts to remove Southeastern Indigenous groups. These maneuvers did not forestall
removal since settlers and U.S. states coveted Indigenous property and land holdings. In
contrast, the Seminoles’ unwillingness to adopt chattel slavery served to justify their removal
based on their lack of “civilization.”
The Seminoles also frustrated Euro-American slaveholders by refusing to sell the Black
Seminoles and impeding any efforts to recover runaway slaves. The Treaty of Moultrie Creek
had stipulated that the Seminoles were required to prevent the entry of any “fugitive” slaves and
assist in their apprehension. Seminole headmen usually proclaimed their adherence to the treaty
stipulation. During his 1826 talk to the governor, John Hicks addressed the issue of the
“runaway negroes” by stating that the Seminoles “will not keep them but bring them to the agent
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that they may be given to their owners.”85 However, Seminole leaders resented the treatment
they received when they requested the return of Black Seminoles in the possession of U.S.
citizens.86 Euro-American claimants ignored these grievances and soon became resentful that
despite Seminole assurances, they continued to have difficulty in reacquiring their slaves.
Indigenous leaders argued that they expended great effort to recapture Africans but they
experienced great difficulty finding them. Those slaves that they could locate expressed a great
reluctance to return. Indian Agent Humphreys even remarked that returning slaves was a
“thankless” duty in which Seminoles “risked their lives.” To illustrate this point he cited an
incident in which one of the Seminole leaders was killed while trying to apprehend a slave.87 In
other occasions the Seminoles disputed the ownership of the slaves and often argued that
individual Seminoles were the legal owners or had been defrauded.88
Despite assurances to Indian agents, the Seminoles reluctantly retrieved and returned
Black Seminoles. This situation provides insight into the relationship between both groups.
Two main factors explain why the U.S. government, specifically the Department of War, in both
1826 and 1835, failed to purchase and remove the Africans from the Seminoles.89 Firstly, as
Humphreys’ quote above illustrates, Seminoles could not simply order runaway slaves to return
to their former masters. Seminole slavery was unlike chattel slavery, Black Seminoles had the
ability to shape their lives. As a result the analytical value of the term slavery, which conjures up
images of chattel slavery, is called into question when examining these particular groups.
Although Euro-Americans labeled the Black Seminoles as slaves, this term fails to encapsulate
the complexity of their relationship, which went beyond that of master and slave. Terms such as
“democratic feudalism” have more value, but any classification attempting to characterize the
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wide range of relationships that were present is problematic. Secondly, the historical record
underscores the reluctance of most Seminoles to remove the Black Seminoles, at least until after
the Second U.S.-Seminole War, in the 1830s. Seminole leaders probably viewed the Black
Seminoles as useful resources in their struggle against removal and integration with the Creek.
Thus the Seminole-Black Seminole relationship was interconnected with other Seminole political
concerns.
Among the various slave claims made to the territorial government and the Seminole
agency, a few cases are prime examples of the changing racial landscape. These cases illustrate
the type of claims that were made, the pressures upon the Indian agents to act, Seminole
resistance, and brief descriptions of the African slaves involved. The claim of Margaret Cook
and her son-in-law, lawyer, John Hanson, to a slave known as either Jack or John, demonstrates
the confusing nature of these cases.90 In 1821 Samuel Cook and an individual named Francisco
Ferreira apparently took advantage of the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. annexation of Florida.
They convinced a man they identified as Nocusily, a Mikasuki, to sell his slaves named Kelly
and her unnamed son, Peggy with her unnamed child, George, a ten year-old, and Fanny, five
years his elder. Cook believed that the slaves lived “among the Indians” at a place known as
Peas Creek. After purchasing the slaves, Cook felt that since they followed the condition of their
mother, any children were also his property. He also claimed to have purchased rights to another
slave named George from someone named Peter Rodriguez and that the slave resided at the “Big
Swamp” where many Seminoles resided.91 Finally, Cook asserted that Ferreira had purchased a
slave named John from an Indigenous man and that he had purchased the rights to this individual
as well. One could infer that Cook had been in the province in 1821 and partnered with Spanish
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subjects in order to economically exploit the geopolitical situation.92 Although Governor Duval
eventually helped Cook settle the claim, he originally cited this case as an example of one of the
unscrupulous efforts to dispossess the Seminoles.93
After Cook died, his widow Margaret took up the claim and pressured the Seminole
agency to retrieve all of her husband’s slaves. She received all the slaves except one, whose
name she knew as Jack or John, despite repeated attempts to reacquire him. Although she had
received the majority of the property, Mrs. Cook remained adamant about recovering the final
slave. Either she must have been determined to receive her full claim on the point of principle or
as a widow she was in a difficult financial situation. Having been thwarted, Mrs. Cook and her
representatives, most notably Hanson, submitted their case to the Superintendent of Indian affairs
and the Secretary of War. They argued that the Seminoles were willing to deliver the slave but
“it is a fact notorious in Florida that Colonel Humphreys throws every obstacle in the way of
owners obtaining their negroes from the Indian Nation.”94 The agent denied his role in
obstructing the apprehension of the slave and attempted to notify his superiors and Mrs. Cook of
his difficulty duty in convincing the Seminoles to submit the slave to him. He simultaneously
recognized that Seminole leaders were also being placed in an undesirable situation of trying to
persuade slaves to return, one that had become dangerous when slaves physically resisted.95
In August 1828, Humphreys spoke with John Hicks and other Seminole leaders
concerning an order by the U.S. Secretary of War that fugitive slaves hiding within its borders
must be turned in. Recently, Humphreys captured the slave involved in the Cook case near the
Tampa Bay area and returned to the agency. In each occasion he escaped with the help of an
“Indian Negro” and returned to the “Indian Nation.”96 While Hicks argued that the Seminoles
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exhausted every avenue to present the slave to Humphreys, they nonetheless continued to contest
the validity of Mrs. Cook’s claim. Ferreira’s original purchase of the slave had never been
finalized because the man had not paid the full value. Thus Mrs. Cook owed the Seminoles
some form of compensation if she desired to remove the slave. Hicks was displeased with
threats from the Secretary of War to pay the Cook claim from the annuity which he already
viewed as insufficient. Furthermore the Seminole headman remarked that the slave was “not a
runaway but was raised in the Nation out of which he never has been, he was bought from the
brother of the Indian with whom he was living at the time we caught him.”97 Hicks had utilized
a diplomatic stance that both feigned compliance and yet reiterated his resistance to the seizure
of the slave. The response that the man was raised in the nation and was living with an
Indigenous individual speaks to a more intimate relationship than that of a master and a slave,
but unfortunately little else is revealed about the man’s life among the Seminoles.
Harkening back to Euro-American misconceptions of Seminole leaders’ capacity to make
political calculations, U.S. officials and citizens could not fathom why the Seminoles refused to
release the slaves. Euro-Americans could not understand the complex relationship between
Seminoles and Africans, especially in connection with this issue. Hanson remarked that he could
not believe that “the whole Indian nation is afraid of one Negroe” or rather that Humphreys’
statements that the Seminoles would not release the slave could be accurate.98 Frustrated
claimants such as Hanson focused their ire on Humphreys, who played the role of the nefarious
white man misleading the naïve Indians. Hanson wrote to Duval to warn him of “something
rotten” occurring in Humphreys’ accounts with the government. Despite having no relevance to
his drive to recoup his mother-in-law’s slave, he disclosed information that Humphreys had used
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Indigenous labor to build a sugar mill for his private use and billed the costs to the government.99
A more series charge would later be made that the agent was purchasing the Black Seminoles for
himself.100
In a similar case during roughly the same period, another widow, Mary Hannay, hired
Archibald Clark to act as her representative in securing a slave named Sarah and her children.
They were extremely persistent in their efforts to recover the slaves because of Hannay’s
impoverished state.101 Once more Indian agent Humphreys stood at the center of the controversy
and drew the ire of the claimant. Eventually the pressure that Mrs. Cook and Hannay placed
upon Humphreys led to an official investigation of his conduct. An evaluation of the Indian
agent’s actions and records proved inclusive, but Humphreys was nonetheless terminated from
his post. John Phagan replaced him but also faced charges of insubordination before being
dismissed.
The Cook and Hannay cases differed significantly in the locations of the slaves that they
were claiming. Whereas the Cook slaves lived among the Apalachicola and Mikasuki Seminoles
in the northern reservation, Sarah lived with the Alachua Seminoles in the central reservation.
When Humphreys spoke to Hicks about Sarah, the headman excused himself from the discussion
and gave the floor to a representative from the Alachua Seminoles and Micanopy, to present their
position to the Indian agent. He related how Sarah entered their territory and legally belonged to
a Seminole woman. Since the bill of sale that Clark presented for Sarah was thirty years old, she
most likely entered Alachua at the turn of the nineteenth century.102 The Seminoles argued that
Sarah had belonged to a man named Blount who was traveling through Alachua to St. Augustine.
During his travels the sister of Seminole headman Bowlegs offered to purchase one of his slaves.
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After acquiring permission from the Spanish, Blount exchanged Sarah for one hundred cattle.
He was assisted by Bowleg’s “black people” to Picolata, where Blount sold the cattle to a Mr.
Solano and was paid in gold and silver, which the Seminoles considered the end of the
transaction for Sarah.103
Micanopy’s representative emphatically stated he would “not give them up (Sarah and
her children) and I will stand to it because we got them honestly.” He demonstrated his grasp of
the American legal system by demanding due process before being stripped of their property.104
Without a tribunal or court trial, the Seminoles would not release Sarah and her children.105
Seminole objections centered on the procedures for deciding the case. U.S. citizens could leave
a bond at the Seminole agency and would be given the slaves while the case was being decided.
The Seminoles feared that even if they won the case the claimants would flee with the slaves,
demonstrating that the Seminoles valued the slaves over the bond. Conversely, U.S. officials
would not allow the Seminoles to post a bond and keep slaves during litigation. Humphreys was
convinced that unless the Seminoles received a trial on their terms they would not release Sarah
and her offspring. Their resolve meant they “never will consent to be instrumental in a surrender
which they evidently think would be construed in a measure as an abandonment of their claim,
until the ownership has been decided by a judicial tribunal.”106 Although Humphreys believed
that the Seminoles would be restrained from physical resistance to the removal of Sarah because
of their small numbers, he advised against this course of action. Hannay and her agent would
unsuccessfully fight to seize Sarah until 1837.
This particular episode demonstrates how the Seminoles resisted slave claims and the
value they placed upon certain slaves. The Seminoles had developed a sophisticated
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understanding of U.S. law. Although their status as non-citizens meant they did not have access
to due process, they nonetheless appealed to American notions of justice and demanded a fair
hearing before whites dispossessed them of their property. They attempted to hold U.S. officials
to the legal standards that they had claimed to represent and desired to establish in Florida. This
offered them an avenue to protect an individual with whom they clearly did not want to part.
They could have turned Sarah over to the agent and forced the slaveholders to post a bond for her
value. If the claimants refused to return with her then the bond would have been given to the
Seminole owner. Indigenous refusal to submit to this system meant that they valued the Black
Seminoles more than the financial compensation. Since Sarah belonged to a prominent woman
in Seminole society, the sister of a Seminole headman, Sarah must have also been a valued
member of her community. Unfortunately the documents do not discuss Sarah’s children and
whether their father had been an African or a Seminole. What can be discerned is that the
Seminole were willing to sacrifice retribution from the U.S., such as the withholding of the
annual annuity, in order to protect Sarah and her children, which demonstrates that their interest
in her and her family went beyond financial considerations.
Slave claims such as those mentioned above provide only a limited glimpse into the lives
of the Black Seminoles. The claims rarely mentioned the fathers of the African slaves that U.S.
citizens sought to seize. Planters and slave owners were merely content to note that since slaves
followed the condition of their mother, then the children of African female slaves were their
property. One of the major exceptions, in the sense that a substantial amount of information is
available, is the case of Rosa Factor, whose escape from St. Augustine around 1821 at the age of
30 initiated decades-long legal battles. An Indigenous man identified as Ystejacho apparently
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sold her to Mateo Solano and Miguel Papy.107 One of the witnesses on the bill of sale was
Ferreira, the same man involved in schemes with Samuel Cook to purchase Seminole slaves.108
In all likelihood Rosa was taken to a plantation near St. Augustine, because Solano owned a
plantation about 30 miles from the settlement. During a trip to Georgia to buy cattle, Solano,
accompanied by Joseph S. Sánchez, sought to sell Rosa. When his efforts proved ineffective he
deposited the slave at a plantation near present-day Jacksonville where Sánchez’s brother owned
a plantation. Perhaps out of a fear of being sold in Georgia, Rosa and two slaves from the
plantation ran away to the “Indian Nation.”109
Rosa travelled through Seminole lands and established herself among the Apalachicola
Seminoles. Solano initially chased Rosa and soon discovered at the St. Johns River that a
number of Seminoles had assisted in her escape. They freely admitted that they had given her a
horse “and that she had gone on to the nation.”110 Tony Proctor, a well-known Black Seminole
interpreter, testified that he later found Rosa in Tampa Bay, the site of various Indigenous and
free African settlements. He stayed in her home for three days and she admitted “that she ran
away and that the Indians furnished her with a horse.”111 Rosa was in Apalachicola a few years
later while Solano and Papy continued their efforts with U.S. authorities to recapture her. Their
objective became more complicated when a Captain William Miller, a “Creek-white,” seized
Rosa in Tampa Bay and sold her to a Chilly McIntosh.112 From McIntosh, Rosa became a slave
of the Lower Creek leader Philatouche, known to Euro-Americans as the Black Factor. He
passed away and left his slaves to a prominent Indigenous woman known as Nelly Factor. Either
through negotiation or conflict, Rosa became the slave of Sam Factor.113 Sam chose Rosa as his
wife and the pair had three children, Sarah, Billy, and Paladore, whom Factor freed through a
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written declaration. He sought to give his wife and children “all the freedom and privileges of
the tribe of Indians which they are now living with.”
Solano and Papy pressed their claim to Rosa and her children, even as Sam Factor
contested their claim. Their status hinged on whether the original seller of the slave, Ystejacho,
was legally Rosa’s owner, which, if he were not, would invalidate the sale to Solano and Papy.
Exacerbating the situation was the fact that Solano was also pursuing other slave claims as well.
He expended much energy to recapture a slave named Hannay, whom he had purchased from the
heirs of an Alachua Seminole who had recently passed away.114 Hannay and her young son
Joseph, described as a “mulatto,” born to her in the “Indian Nation,” were taken to the Solano
plantation. Hannay apparently married another Solano slave named Dick and gave birth to a
daughter, Maria Garcia.115 This would become a point of contention since U.S. officials had
suspicions the girl was born before Hannay came to the plantation.116 This meant that Solano
could not claim Maria and her later offspring; thus he went to great lengths to present testimony
that she was born after he purchased the mother.117 The family lived on Solano’s plantation until
the disruptions of the Second U.S.-Seminole War caused him to move the estate to St.
Augustine. Leaving in the middle of the night, Hannay and her two children left Solano’s
household. Andres Papy could only later confirm from an African that had recently returned
from Seminole territory that Hannay ran away in that direction.118
Similar to Rosa, Hannay eventually made her way with her children to Tampa Bay. In
1840, Sánchez went to Tampa Bay and saw both Rosa and Hannay, as well as the children of the
latter. To his dismay the slaves were emboldened by certificates they had received from the U.S.
military declaring them free. Both Hannay and Maria Garcia had husbands serving as military
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interpreters, which might have facilitated the granting of their liberty.119 Concurrently, the U.S.
military realized in the late 1830s that freeing and relocating Black Seminoles to Indian Territory
was necessary for ending the current conflict. Within a year both Hannay and Rosa would leave
for Indian Territory and the Solano estate was confined to seeking financial compensation from
the U.S. government. For Rosa, removal might have seemed as a positive development since the
preceding years among the Apalachicola Seminoles had been harrowing.
Solano and Papy were not the only slaveholders seeking to claim Rosa Factor and her
children. Despite the fact that Factor had freed his children and considered them part of his
Apalachicola band, they remained vulnerable to enslavement. They lived under a headman
known as Walker who had appealed to the Indian agent over the appearance of “land pirates”
that used dogs to raid and capture Africans. Levin Brown was claiming Factor’s children
although the governor had rejected his claim.120 His brother Isaac had attempted to forcibly seize
the family but his attack was repulsed. Ezekiel Robertson then sought to gain possession of the
slaves through subterfuge, but when he failed to show the necessary records he resorted to force.
He directed a group of men to capture the family and in the ensuing skirmish Rosa and Billy
escaped but Sarah and her two sons were taken, and would never be recovered.121 By 1837 Rosa
was in Tampa Bay, both Rosa and Billy were in the service of the U.S. military, as interpreters
and guides, until they were removed to the West a few years later.122
Ignoring their hybrid culture, Euro-Americans continued to see Rosa and Sam’s children
as simply “negroes.” Since the children were being treated as property it would make sense that
there was an inclination to ignore their Indigenous heritage. On one occasion Rosa’s
grandchildren from Sarah were called “Indian boys” but in territorial Florida they were largely
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considered Black. Thus in the nineteenth century Florida Borderlands, individuals were being
increasingly confined to one of the rigid racial categories with little social space available to
claim dual racial identities. As the slave claims illustrate, Black Seminoles lived mobile and
varied lives. They intimately interacted with former Spanish subjects, Seminoles, EuroAmericans, and other Africans. Their relationships with these groups ranged from master-slave,
to allies, adversaries, and kin. It would be difficult to argue that one standard identity existed
among the Black Seminoles or that one uniform relationship existed with the Seminoles.
Nonetheless, the discourse of property through the ever-increasing slave claims made against
Africans sought to create a society structured along racial lines. Although their interactions were
varied and identities fluid, the rise of the nation-state and the plantation export economy sought
to enforce the creation of Indians and Blacks.

Conclusion
By the early 1830s, U.S. citizens’ slave claims for the Black Seminoles represented only
one of the many factors that Euro-Americans cited in their desire for the westward removal of
the Seminoles. Disputed slave ownership in conjunction with “depredations” and Seminole
refusal to be confined to reservation boundaries led to a crisis in the early Florida territorial
period. Seminoles and Black Seminoles were increasingly placed in an untenable position that
combined the encroachment of settlers and planters with an inadequate land base for subsistence.
Sensing an opportunity, U.S. agent Gadsden sought to “assist” the Seminoles during their time of
dire economic need by encouraging them to relocate west of the Mississippi River to Indian
Territory.123 In 1832, when Humphreys assembled the Mikasuki and Alachua Seminole leaders
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from the interior reservation: he had already decided to deal with the Apalachicola Seminoles
separately. As a result, a tentative agreement stated that if a Seminole delegation toured Indian
Territory and expressed their satisfaction with reintegration into the Creek Confederation, then a
new removal treaty would became legally binding. Gadsden sought to take advantage of
Seminole weaknesses by offering them financial support and guaranteed their annuity for a set
amount of time. Equally importantly, the U.S. offered to settle the slave claims by reimbursing
claimants, an issue that had caused much consternation. However, there was one aspect of the
treaty that led to resistance. The Seminoles would be under the jurisdiction of not only the U.S.
but also the Creeks. Although their annuity would be guaranteed it nonetheless fell under the
control of their adversaries. Since the late eighteenth century the Seminoles had been vigorously
defending their independence from the Creek. This treaty stipulation as well as Seminole
spiritual and cultural connection with the land sparked the Second U.S.-Seminole War.
Florida in the 1820s did not suddenly become exposed to hardening racial hierarchies,
political centralization, and the centrality of private property, specifically African slaves. In fact
there existed some similarities and continuity with previous historical periods. The British had
been the first to envision Florida as a location for efficient and productive plantations. Authors
such as Grant and Simmons mapped the territory, while British treaty negotiators desperately
sought stability with Indigenous peoples in order to encourage economic growth. The diplomatic
language that Gadsden had used in the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, at least superficially, had been
first articulated by the British. While Americans were faulted for the tenacious slave claims
made after annexation, many similar cases had previously been made by Spanish slaveholders,
who then sold their rights to third parties, seeking to profit from the transfer of power. Thus the
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expansion of the nation-state, market capitalism, and racialization stemming from slavery did not
materialize solely after 1821 but were rooted in earlier trends. What did change shortly after the
annexation of Florida was simply a shift in power dynamics. Unlike the British and the Spanish,
the United States because of various factors, such as proximity and resources, could project its
power onto the territory. Whereas previous colonial powers had to reach an accommodation
with the Seminoles and Black Seminoles, the United States viewed these groups’ autonomy
outside of its jurisdiction as an affront to the nation-state and its ability to control its borders.
Policing these groups was important in U.S. Southern society, since the cooperation of
Seminoles and Africans threatened to undermine its racial hierarchy.
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek represented a crucial moment when the Seminoles fell
under the jurisdiction of the United States. Government agents created territorial reservations
that were insufficient to sustain the Indigenous population, yet they sought to restrict them within
those physical spaces. Forced to resist the treaty terms in order to survive, Seminoles and
Africans became “savages” lacking respect for the rule of law. This in turn fed the ambitions of
Euro-Americans who promoted a much larger removal of non-white groups in the region. Partly
fueling the effort to remove Indigenous peoples were efforts to claim the Black Seminoles.
Various claims seeking to seize the Africans among the Seminoles illustrated the diverse
positions that Black Seminoles held within Seminole society. Analyzing both the SeminoleBlack Seminole relationship and the exact identities that individuals and groups held is
complicated. What can be said with some certainty is that the Seminoles were willing to resist
the seizure of the Africans because they represented an important resource in their shared effort
to resist colonial processes that both groups were experiencing.
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Chapter 6
SEPARATING AFRICANS AND INDIANS:
DEFINING PHYSICAL AND RACIAL BORDERS, 1835-1850
I would respectfully recommend that some measures at once be adopted for the
removal of these misfortunate people from the vicinity of the Indian Country. Their
presence is an evil which will continue to increase the longer they are permitted to remain
where they are. And I consider the plan suggested, their transportation to Liberia, a very
good one, and one, too which as it appears to meet their wishes, is fully entitled to the
serious and favorable consideration of this department.
Matthew Arbuckle, 18481

By 1850 the United States government successfully removed the majority of Seminoles
and Black Seminoles to Indian Territory, in present-day Oklahoma. Although the U.S. strove to
divide and conquer both groups, efforts to physically separate the Black Seminoles from the
Seminoles were ineffective.2 U.S. officials remained motivated to seize Blacks because they
viewed their “evil” presence among native peoples as a disruptive force. Brigadier General
Matthew Arbuckle felt that the situation called for a drastic solution such as the colonization of
the Black Seminoles to Liberia, an African colony established by the American Colonization
Society to settle freed slaves from the United States.
This proposed plan of action highlights the larger project of reinforcing and strengthening
racial categories in the U.S during the nineteenth century. U.S. officials desirous of repatriating
the Black Seminoles to Liberia were essentializing their cultural and racial identity as simply
African or Black. They ignored or were unaware that the slaves living among the Seminoles
came from diverse origins. Black Seminoles and/or their ancestors came from various African
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regions and subsequently from U.S., Spanish, and Indigenous settlements. U.S. racial discourse
allocated limited space for individuals’ dual racial identities or for the larger hybrid culture to
which they belonged. Although Black Seminoles had lived in close proximity to Indigenous and
Euro-American groups, Arbuckle had assumed that they remained culturally pure Africans and
thus could be simply transplanted to Liberia.3 Since Africans were viewed as “Black” this also
meant that their political and legal rights were severely constrained, with the possible exception
of free Blacks. However, U.S. officials and planters were often wary of free Black populations
as well and placed limitations on their liberty. They served as a subversive influence to slaves
because autonomous Black communities undermined planters’ rhetoric of African inferiority.
Furthermore, Seminole-African cooperation represented a viable obstacle to the nation-state’s
project to bring both groups within its jurisdiction and control. Part of this project involved the
enforcement of racial hierarchies which kinship between African and Indigenous groups
threatened to destabilize by blurring racial lines and problematizing existing classifications.
While Arbuckle contemplated African repatriation, the U.S. had already subjected the
Seminoles to a similar process. Although Florida’s territorial officials were aware that the
Seminoles were independent of the Creeks, they continued to pursue a policy of reintegration. In
Indian Territory, present-day Oklahoma, U.S. officials sought to relocate various Indigenous
peoples, such as the Creek, Cherokee, and Seminoles and ideally witness the eventual “extinction
of tribes, and their amalgamation into one mass . . .”4 Placing the Seminoles within Creek
designated lands in Indian Territory not only failed to recognize the Seminoles’ distinct identity
but also threatened their political and economic autonomy. Equally galling, Seminole leaders
displayed hostility toward the Creek for their participation in recent U.S.-Seminole conflicts.
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Creek parties were encouraged by the U.S. to conduct raids into Seminole territory. They had
claimed ownership over the Black Seminoles and been granted bounties by the U.S. for each
African they captured. Thus it seems perplexing that the U.S. expected the Seminoles to accept
subservience to their rivals who occasionally viewed the Seminoles as a subordinate component
of the Creek Confederacy. However this episode can be explained in light of the broader process
that sought to homogenize not only Africans but also Indigenous peoples. To U.S. officials they
were considered “Indians” and thus their settlement with other Indian groups made sense despite
existing sociopolitical divisions.

Figure 6.1 Map of Indian Territory, 1830-1855. Source: David La Vere, Contrary Neighbors: Southern
Plains and Removed Indians in Indian Territory (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 65.

During the Second U.S.-Seminole War, the military developed a strategy based on
weakening the Seminole and Black Seminole resistance by separating the interests of both
groups and firmly placing them in categories of “Indian” and “Black.” The Treaty of Fort Dade
offered to guarantee Seminoles’ slave property, while a year later a contradictory policy offered
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slaves their freedom if they surrendered. Until the 1830s, Africans’ status in Florida had greatly
varied due to the fact that they were kin, advisors, interpreters, neighbors, and slaves to the
Seminoles. They alternatively lived in maroon communities, settlements adjacent to the
Seminoles, and within Seminole settlements. Politically their status varied between independent
settlements, tribute-paying members of Seminole society, to being associated with a Seminole
master. For Africans, being racialized as “Black” had concrete political and social
consequences. After removal to Indian Territory they faced a greater possibility of being
confined to the status of chattel, thus limiting the range of relationships open to them.
Concurrently, Indigenous groups throughout Florida enjoyed relative autonomy and were
only loosely affiliated with each other. While the discourse and rhetoric of political
centralization and Indigenous nationalism had been introduced respectively by figures such as
William McGillivray and William Augustus Bowles among the Lower Creek and Seminoles,
individual Seminole leaders continued to retain much power.5 In fact, the Apalachicola,
Mikasuki, and Alachua settlements largely became known as Seminoles because each colonial
power considered them all to be Seminoles. Native peoples’ settlements on the west coast of
Florida disputed their classification as Seminoles and accordingly argued that U.S.-Seminole
treaties did not apply to them. The U.S. government refused to make any exceptions and sought
to ignore Indigenous political and cultural diversity through Creek reintegration. During the
1830s Euro-American notions of race became the region’s dominant discourse coinciding with
the contraction of Florida’s geopolitical borderlands.
The Second U.S.-Seminole War was a central event in the displacement of Africans and
Seminoles from Florida and brought these groups completely within the political boundaries of
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the nation-state. Unfolding U.S. policy and developments in Indian Territory furthered the
official project of creating “Blacks” and “Indians.” Nonetheless, this process of racialization has
been given scant attention in previous historiography dealing with Florida during the removal
period. Rather, previous historians focused on the military campaigns of the Second U.S.Seminole War. The conflict produced a substantial textual record for historians to examine.
John K. Mahon utilized these materials to produce a comprehensive account of the war. He
addressed a historiographical oversight by scholars of the early nineteenth century that had
focused on topics such as Jacksonian democracy rather than U.S. wars of conquest against
Indigenous peoples.6 Mahon emphasized the significance of the conflict by noting its cost of 40
million dollars as well as the 1466 U.S. causalities. Kenneth Wiggins Porter, as noted in earlier
chapters, emphasizes Black Seminole participation in the wars.7 Both Mahon and Porter strove
to illustrate that protecting U.S. slavery was a significant motivating factor in the commencement
of hostilities. They presented various quotes from military commanders expressing their fears of
the Black troops and that the conflict was “a negro, not an Indian war; and if it be not speedily
put down, the south will feel the effects of it on their slave population before the end of the next
season.”8 Porter also produced a number of articles on Black Seminole interpreters, prominent
figures, and advisors such as John Caesar.9 More recent work from scholars such as Kevin
Mulroy examines the events of the war to gain insight into the Seminole-Black Seminole
alliance.10
This chapter seeks to emphasize key events during the Second U.S.-Seminole War
associated with the enforcement of Euro-American racial categories and hierarchies. While prior
scholarship has already provided a comprehensive treatment of the conflict’s military events,
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certain crucial decisions speak directly to the process of racialization. Most prominently, the
1837 Treaty of Fort Dade between Thomas Jesup and various Seminole and Black Seminole
bands was a significant event since it began to reshape the Seminole-Black Seminole relationship
in terms of master and slave, Indian and Black. Similarly, episodes such as the removal of
Indigenous settlements on the west coast of Florida, attempts to seize the Black Seminoles, and
the debates over Creek-Seminole reintegration inform the simultaneous processes of removal,
colonialism, and the imposition of Euro-American notions of race.

6.1 Removal Treaties
During the 1820s the U.S. lacked the political will and military capability to remove the
Seminoles from Florida. However, the situation changed when Andrew Jackson was elected
president and the Indian Removal Act passed Congress in 1830.11 The favorable national
climate bolstered Florida officials and citizens’ chances of realizing their goal of Seminole
removal. Residents incessantly protested against Indigenous seizure of their property and filed
claims for slaves they argued Seminoles illegally possessed. An area known as Middle Florida,
consisting of lands in the region of previous Apalachicola and Mikasuki settlements, witnessed
an increase of planter immigration. Prominent families from other southern states established
primarily cotton but also tobacco and sugar plantations.12 Planters throughout the territory began
to pressure Governor William P. Duval over the security of their property.13 Although the
governor initially demonstrated a measure of sympathy over the Seminoles’ plight, political
expediency led to his staunch support for removal. Indian Agents such as Gad Humphreys were
effectively neutralized as Seminole advocates because of accusations of corruption and
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obstruction in slave cases involving Seminoles and U.S. citizens. Without any active
government supporters Indigenous groups were susceptible to the discourse of the “savage”
Indian threatening white families, which eventually created the political will for removal.
James Gadsden was appointed by the War Department in 1832 to be a commissioner in a
new treaty seeking Seminole removal. Having presided over the 1824 Treaty of Moultrie Creek,
he had previously harbored a desire to relocate the Indigenous population from the new territory.
Gadsden viewed native peoples’ presence in the territory as a threat to national security.14 With
President Jackson in charge of crafting policy, the commissioner had free rein to pursue the
expulsion of the Seminoles. He also sought to further control the Seminoles by relocating them
to Creek lands and placing them under the authority of the latter.15 The Creeks, unlike the
Seminoles, were more uniform in their treatment of Africans since slaves in Creek society were
likely to be considered chattel. Creek groups had already made efforts to acquire Black
Seminoles, both through raiding expeditions and through their arguments that the Africans
legally belonged to them.
Creek attorney John Winslett wrote to the Secretary of War Lewis Cass in 1832 asserting
the Creek claim over the Black Seminoles. The Creeks argued that many of the Black Seminoles
were actually descendents of runaways from their settlements. Additionally, any Africans that
ran away from Georgia planters were also Creek property since the fourth article of the 1821
Indian Springs Treaty provided restitution for those slaves and effectively purchased the slaves
for the Creeks.16 Although the Creek claim stood on dubious legal grounds, it nonetheless
created trepidation among the Seminoles. For example, Winslett aggressively pursued William
Cannard’s and Stephen Richards’ slave claims. Cannard felt that he was the heir to the Lower
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Creek leader Black Factor’s slaves. The Apalachicola Seminole Sam Factor was quite concerned
with Winslett’s activities since his African wife Rosa had been the property of his father, the
Black Factor.17 As a representative for various slaveholders, Winslett made excursions to
Florida and Tampa Bay in search of their property.18 Reintegration with the Creek meant that
the seizure of the Black Seminoles from the Seminoles was more likely.
Seminole leaders were displeased with Gadsden’s proposals for various reasons, such as
Creek hostility, Black Seminole vulnerability, and land dispossession. Unlike previous treaty
conferences, the agent did not keep notes of the negotiations.19 Nonetheless, it can be inferred
that the treaty was unpopular since Gadsden only secured a conditional agreement and Alachua
Seminole leader Micanopy denied signing it. The basis of the agreement called for the
Seminoles to cede all their lands in Florida for 15,400 dollars and remove to Indian Territory. A
couple of the stipulations dealt with compensation for property, mainly cattle, and financial
support during and after the relocation. Article six relieved the Seminoles of territorial settlers’
claims of lost property and slaves. Claimants’ cases and monetary settlements were now the
responsibility of the U.S. government. This was significant because attempted seizures of the
Black Seminoles caused much tension and resistance. The possibility of removing both
Seminoles and Black Seminoles was now available since the U.S. could compensate claimants.
However, the most controversial treaty article stipulated that the Seminoles were to become “a
constituent part of the Creek nation, and be re-admitted to all the privileges as members of the
same.”20 Undoubtedly threatened by this prospect, the Seminoles could take solace in the fact
that the treaty was not binding if a Seminole delegation to Indian Territory returned dissatisfied
with the land and the deposition of the Creek.
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A number of Seminole headmen, the Black Seminole interpreter Abraham, and the new
Indian agent Major John Phagan were selected to inspect the treaty lands.21 They were sent on a
long journey to present-day Oklahoma and arrived at Fort Gibson. A clear record of the ensuing
events remains elusive but certainly a level of coercion occurred. Seminole leader Jumper and
the rest of the delegation expressed concern over the location of their assigned land, prospective
Indigenous neighbors, the Seminole annuity, and they requested separate territory from the
Creek. According to second-hand accounts, Phagan, and possibly Arbuckle, pressured the
delegation in order to coax their approval to the Treaty of Payne’s Landing.22 Given the larger
political climate favoring removal, U.S. officials were unwilling to allow the Seminole to nullify
the treaty. The Indigenous diplomatic mission was barred from returning to Florida and
conferring with their fellow headmen. Seminole leaders could only return once until they signed
the Treaty of Fort Gibson, which they did in March 1833. The substance of the pact reaffirmed
the earlier Treaty of Payne’s Landing and meant the Seminoles had three years to prepare for
removal.23

6.2 Second U.S.-Seminole War
Shortly after the return of the Seminole delegation to Florida, U.S. officials began
planning for the removal of all Indigenous groups from the territory.24 Gadsden quickly reached
an accord with the remaining Apalachicola bands that had managed to keep small tracts of land
near the Apalachicola River. They had the option of either joining John Blunt’s group heading
to Texas, remaining in Apalachicola under the jurisdiction of territorial officials, or relocating to
Indian Territory under the terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing.25 Facing pressure from Euro293

American raids and the seizure of his African slaves, Blunt eventually decided to move to Texas
where his uncle resided.26 He nearly changed his mind, however after other Apalachicola bands
refused to follow him and were adamant about staying in Florida.27 These settlements remained
and subsequently assisted the U.S. during the Second U.S.-Seminole War before also facing their
own removal.28
Seminoles located in the larger interior reservation began to mount a protest against the
approaching removal deadline at the end of 1835. During the Fort King Council, Seminole
headman argued that since the annuity payments for the Treaty of Moultrie Creek were
scheduled for twenty years then the agreement remained valid for another ten years.29 They
argued that the Treaties of Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson illegally breached the previous
accord and were thus voided.30 Some Seminole leaders such as Holata Emarthla, Coihadjo, and
Jumper later claimed they had not signed the Treaty of Fort Gibson. Meanwhile, those admitting
to signing the document argued that it should not have been binding unless the remaining
Seminole headmen signed as well.31
While the Seminole leadership questioned the legitimacy of the new treaties, they also
critiqued the manner in which the diplomatic process had occurred. Specifically, Black
Seminole interpreter Abraham was criticized for his inability to accurately explain the treaty
stipulations, especially the proposed union between the Seminoles and the Creek.32 Porter
argues that Abraham’s ineffective performance as an interpreter was due to miscommunication
as well as the Indian agent Phagan’s nefarious schemes.33 Nonetheless, Miller asserts that
treaties “abused the interests of the Seminole Nation and suggests clearly that the interpreters
accepted bribes to betray their ‘allies.’”34 Central to the matter is the amount of 200 dollars paid
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to both Abraham and another interpreter named Cudjo from the U.S. for their services during the
negotiations.35 Scholars have debated whether the payment was simply compensation for their
work or an incentive that caused the Black Seminole interpreters to align their interests with the
U.S. rather than the Seminoles. Clearly sympathetic to Abraham, Porter insists the translator
feigned his cooperation but continued to make secret war preparations such as encouraging
slaves to leave plantations and join the resistance movement.36
Although some scholars argue that the Seminoles and Black Seminoles were simply allies
out of expediency and maintained a socio-cultural distance, they nonetheless concede that
Abraham had strong ties to the Seminoles. He was an important advisor to the Alachua
Seminole leader Micanopy and married one of his close female relatives. Abraham is considered
to have been adopted within Seminole society and was given a ceremonial name.37 While his
exact intentions and motives are difficult to ascertain, what is clear is that Abraham’s situation is
informative of the larger process occurring to Seminoles and Black Seminoles. Increasingly he
was being integrated into a society and racial order that did not recognize his status in Seminole
society. Despite his elated position with Micanopy and marriage with a Seminole woman, his
status as Black and a slave remained. Accordingly, the Black Seminole leader had to remain
cognizant of his racial classification and its consequences for his family. Whether Abraham was
bribed at the Treaty of Payne’s Landing can be debated. Nonetheless he later offered his
services to the U.S. during the Second U.S.-Seminole War and secured his freedom through a
decree by General Jesup.38 Many other Black Seminoles and Seminoles faced a changing reality
and difficult decisions.39
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Figure 6.2 Abraham. Source: Porter, The Black Seminoles, 135.

Seminole headmen not only voiced their immediate concerns about the recent treaties but
they also harbored larger objections. They generally highlighted three main issues including the
seizure of the Black Seminoles, the Seminole-Creek relationship, and land displacement. U.S.
polices demonstrated an ignorance or unwillingness to see the sensitive nature of these
Indigenous positions which further flamed resistance. Eventually the U.S. made concessions
once it realized the full extent of Seminole and Black Seminole opposition. However
government officials only recognized the necessity of adjusting their strategies and course of
action after the beginning of the Second U.S.-Seminole War.
Among Seminole leadership, safeguarding the Black Seminoles only represented one
component of the ensuing conflict to protect their autonomy. However, U.S. officials and
citizens demonstrated an unending preoccupation with the Black Seminoles. They could not
abide the presence of Indigenous and African communities where chattel slavery was not the
dominant labor system. Indigenous and African settlements not based on rigid racial hierarchies
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undermined territorial Florida, which in the 1820s passed legislation to control its African
slaves.40 Consequently in January 1834 Florida citizens issued another memorial accusing the
Seminoles of being in breach of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. They argued that Indigenous
leaders failed to apprehend runaway slaves as outlined in the agreement. Criticism was not
limited to Seminoles’ passive noncompliance but also active efforts to aid “such slaves to select
new and more secure places of refugee.”41 Under the protection of the Seminoles, the estimated
500 Black Seminoles were accused of seeking to assist recent runaways because of their shared
“sympathies.” The memorial asserts that nearly all the Black Seminoles were runaways or
descendents of fugitive slaves.42
Removing the Seminoles and Black Seminoles from Florida was not the full extent of
U.S. strategy. Efforts were underway that sought to completely separate both groups whether
they resided in Florida or Indian Territory. Newly named Indian Agent Wiley Thompson
believed that problems with the Seminoles stemmed from negative influences from “likely
Negroes in this nation.”43 He also identified some “whites” that, contrary to the majority of U.S.
citizens, wanted the Seminoles to stay in the area until they fell under the jurisdiction of the
Territory of Florida. At the Fort King Council Thompson warned Seminole leaders that once
this occurred then claims on the Black Seminoles, fraudulent or legitimate, could be more easily
executed.44 In 1835 Thompson wrote to Secretary of State John Eaton that a movement in the
Florida territorial legislature sought to contest federal oversight over African slave claims against
the Seminoles. He believed that if Florida, rather than federal, courts presided over the cases
then territorial claimants would most likely succeed in gaining possession of the slaves.
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Although the agent did not believe that the maneuver was legal he nonetheless noted the
agitation it caused among the Seminoles.45
Despite local officials and planters’ protestations over federal government interference in
the slave claim cases, War Department and Office of Indian Affairs officials did encourage
seizure of the Black Seminoles. As mentioned above, the relationship between African and
Indigenous peoples was considered a destabilizing force to the nation-state. Aside from
metaphorical concerns over the blurring of racial categories and social hierarchies, U.S. officials
worried about Seminole-Black Seminole military cooperation. The Acting Secretary of War
C.A. Harris feared Seminole resistance because of the “comparatively wealthy negroes mingled
with them and in the facilities for concealment which the extent and character of the country
afford.”46 In 1835 the Department of War debated whether they should encourage the purchase
of the Black Seminoles from the Seminoles. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring felt
that no approval was needed from his agency for civilians to acquire slaves because the
Seminoles were sovereign and could make their own decisions.47
Indian Agent Thompson came to disagree with the Office of Indian Affairs and sought to
convince them of their error in judgment. He wrote the Secretary of War to inform him that
under the 1834 Indian Intercourse Act, U.S. citizens could not engage in trade with Indigenous
peoples without a license or permission from the agent.48 In addition Thompson argued that the
Black Seminoles held considerable influence over the Seminoles. As a result, the Africans
refused to abandon their “present state of ease and comparative liberty, to bondage and hard
labour under overseers on sugar and cotton plantations.” He believed it was inhumane to sell the
Black Seminoles since they were not accustomed to the rigors of chattel slavery. A number of
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Africans lived in autonomous settlements and had the ability to own property. Thompson
emphatically emphasized Seminole disdain over the selling of slaves by arguing that an “Indian
would almost as soon sell his child as his slave, except when under the influence of intoxicating
liquors.”49 Thompson’s warning that the sale of the slaves only served to antagonize the
Seminoles met with citizens’ skepticism and accusations that the agent simply coveted
ownership of the slaves.
A month later President Jackson weighed in and rebuffed Thompson and ordered a
reversal of policy. Acting Secretary of War Harris communicated the president’s position to the
Indian agent. Never afraid to make the rule of law bend to his will, Jackson disputed
Thompson’s interpretation of the Indian Intercourse Act by arguing that the law never envisioned
“the possession of slaves by the Indians, and contains therefore no security for property of this
kind.”50 He desired that the proceeds from the sales of the Black Seminoles would assist in
funding removal and the reunion of the Seminoles and Creeks.51 In a subtle threat, Jackson
inferred that Thompson could only exonerate himself from corruption charges if he proceeded to
allow the sale of the slaves to U.S. citizens.
In an act of political courage, Thompson defied Jackson’s recommendations but he began
to feel pressure from multiple parties. Responding to the president’s positions, the agent
reiterated the impossible task of convincing the Seminoles to sell the Black Seminoles.52
Government legalization of the transactions did nothing to alter Seminole resolve regarding the
dispossession of their slaves.53 Thompson argued that the U.S. would be well advised to offer
guarantees to the Black Seminoles that their relationship with the Seminoles would be
maintained. He disagreed that the slaves were a source of conflict between the Seminoles and
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Creeks, since the latter’s argument for their ownership of the Black Seminoles was convoluted.
In addition to the displeasure of the U.S. government, Thompson began to draw the ire of
Seminole leaders who also questioned his motives. When a census of the native population was
undertaken the headmen felt the agent sought to seize the slaves.54 Surprisingly Thompson won
the policy debate when Harris wrote to him that he indeed could restrict the sale of Seminole
slaves under the provisions of the Indian Intercourse Act. Apparently the Jackson administration
reversed its position when the president’s confidant James Gadsden verified that the Seminoles
were unwilling to dispose of the Black Seminoles.55 With his bolstered standing, Thompson was
reassured of his authority to regulate Seminole-U.S. trade.
Policy debates within the Department of War highlighted efforts by the nation-state to
restructure Seminole society and the status of Africans. Thompson clearly illustrated in his
correspondence that the Seminoles offered their slaves a measure of autonomy. He informed
Harris and Jackson that the Africans had their own settlements, could own and sell property, and
were influential with their masters. Seminole slavery did not serve to duplicate U.S. racial order
and represented a threat because it illustrated an alternative to rigid racial categories and the
oppressive political status of Africans. On the contrary, chattel slavery was not simply a labor
system but served to enforce political, economic, and social hierarchies along racial lines.
Although Jackson revised his policy because it endangered Seminole removal, the U.S.
government did not terminate its efforts to seize the Black Seminoles and pressure Seminole
communities to conform to the U.S. racial order.
As mentioned above, the attempted seizure of the Black Seminoles was interrelated with
efforts to re-integrate the Seminoles within the Creek political structure in Indian Territory. The
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latter’s claim to the Black Seminoles was one aspect of their effort to assert their authority over
the Seminoles. In a May 1835 report the Choctaw agent Frank Wells Armstrong outlined a
dreary situation for the Creek in Indian Territory.56 This was a result of Southeastern native
peoples’ conflicts with Indigenous groups in the Southern Plains. The Osage, Pawnee, Wichitas,
Comanches, and Kiowas viewed the relocated Indians as strangers having no prior kin
relationship with them.57 Southern Plains Indians viewed the Creeks, Cherokees, and other
groups as trespassers on territory considered within their sphere of influence. Consequently
Southern Plains groups raided Southeastern native peoples, which caused much hardship during
their difficult transition in the Indian Territory. Seeking more secure homelands, especially after
Osage attacks, the Creeks began encroaching on territory assigned to the Cherokee and
Seminoles, causing further disputes. Additionally, the Cape Girardeau Shawnee from Missouri
remained on Creek territory. Herring outlined measures, such as the arrest of Indigenous
headmen, until reparations were made to the Creek thus highlighting the seriousness of the
situation.58 Similar to other groups, the move to Indian Territory was fraught with various
difficulties, which led to external and internal Indigenous conflicts. 59 Having access to the
Seminoles and the Black Seminoles in terms of additional population or resources, such as the
proceeds of slave sales, may have factored in Creek willingness to accept the Seminoles in their
lands.
Safeguarding the Black Seminoles was part of the effort to ensure Seminole
independence. Scholars have estimated that Florida’s Indigenous population at the time of
removal roughly totaled 4,500 people, including the Black Seminoles.60 However, the Creek
population was over 20,000 persons, with around 14,000 Upper Creeks and 8,500 Lower
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Creeks.61 U.S. officials recognized that Seminole concerns about the Creek were understandable
since it is “natural for the weak to fear the strong.”62 A further loss of 500 to 1,000 Black
Seminoles would have constituted a significant setback for Indigenous groups in need of military
and economic resources. Seeking to establish an effective resistance against removal required as
many fighters as possible to ward off Creek and U.S. attacks. Conversely, potential Creek
ownership of the Black Seminoles simultaneously sought to deprive the Seminole of allies while
supplementing Creek financial assets.
Despite the Seminoles’ numerical disadvantage, threats of Creek re-integration
nonetheless fueled the resistance. In particular, the presence of the Upper Creek Red Sticks, who
had only years earlier fought a civil war within Creek Confederacy before moving south and
joining the Seminoles, galvanized sentiment against rapprochement with the Creek.63 In late
1835 the Seminoles sent a letter to President Jackson in which they emphatically refused to
remove to Indian Territory without guarantees that they could remain autonomous of the Creeks.
They requested a separate agency, a blacksmith, and the ability to appoint their Indian agent.64
Perhaps one of the least emphasized causes of the Second-U.S. Seminole War was simply
what the loss of the Seminole homeland signified. Gadsden had argued that Florida’s Indigenous
peoples were recent immigrants to the territory and were really breakaway Creeks from
Georgia.65 This argument delegitimized Seminole ownership of Florida lands and
conceptualized them as a transient people accustomed to resettlement. Serving as a justification
to remove the Seminoles, U.S. observers deemphasized accounts of Seminoles protesting the loss
of the land and focused on the issues mentioned above. Nonetheless, Miller writes that the
Indigenous leaders’ responses during the October 1834 Fort King Council focused on the
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cultural meaning of land displacement. Seminoles’ intimate relationship with the land was based
on the location of the final resting places of Indigenous ancestors. These sites were significant
since the “graves of a community link the dead forever to the landscape, for the spirits of the
deceased remain at or return to the site of the burial.”66 U.S. officials underestimated Seminole
resolve to remain connected to the land of their ancestors.
Indian Agent Thompson had informed the Seminoles that they should assemble by the
end of 1835 to sell their cattle and make their way to Tampa Bay. Towards the end of January of
the next year he sought to send the Seminoles to New Orleans and eventually to Indian Territory.
In preparation for removal Thompson had sought to gain Indigenous headmen’s assurances to
abide by recent treaties.67 He only managed to gain the acquiescence of a few leaders, most
prominently Charley Emathla. In an attempt to gain more support from the leadership, the agent
contemplated deposing unsupportive figures. Acting Secretary of War Harris warned Thompson
of the hostility that his actions engendered from non-cooperative Seminole leaders. Towards the
end of November Asin Yahola, known as Osceola, killed Emathla for cooperating with U.S.
officials.68 Shortly thereafter Thompson was found murdered as well for his part in promoting
Seminole removal.
Initial skirmishes of the Second U.S.-Seminole War underscored the nature of the conflict
as the Seminoles and Black Seminoles utilized guerrilla warfare. While Thompson was meeting
his demise, U.S. forces had already been massing and mobilizing to the Seminole agency and
Tampa Bay. They had been ordered to the area as a demonstration of force to facilitate removal
scheduled for the beginning of 1836. An African informant, Luis Pachecho, served as a guide
for Major Francis Dade as his troops moved through the Withlacoochee River.69 Pachecho
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apparently sent ahead intelligence to Seminole units, which consequently planned an ambush.
At the end of December, Seminoles and a smaller contingent of Black Seminoles managed to kill
Dade and a significant number of his men in what became “Dade’s Massacre.” Concurrently,
John Caesar, a Black Seminole advisor to King Phillip of the St. John’s River Seminoles initiated
a raid on nearby plantations. Their efforts devastated the territorial economy and led to the
recruitment of slaves to join the war effort.70 Caesar apparently returned to the Withlacoochee
River in early 1836 to negotiate with General Gaines during a siege of entrenched U.S. troops.
The force withdrew to Fort Drane as the Seminoles moved their families to safer locations in the
south.
During the next year General Winfield Scott and Richard Call would respectively lead
major armies in a conventional strategy to produce a decisive victory. They managed to destroy
Seminole settlements and entered the Black Seminole town of Peliklakaha, the residence of
prominent headman Micanopy. U.S. commanders soon learned that the terrain and the
environment afforded the Seminoles the ability to stage brief skirmishes and strategic retreats.
Adapting to the circumstances, 750 allied Creek soldiers were guaranteed plunder if they assisted
in tracking and defeating the Seminoles.71 Nonetheless, the U.S. was frustrated with the inability
of its military leaders to quickly defeat a relatively small number of Indigenous and African
fighters.
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Figure 6.3 Second U.S.-Seminole War. Source: Covington, The Seminoles of Florida, 105.

6.3 The Treaty of Fort Dade
General Jesup attained military command of the war in order to reverse the protracted
nature of the struggle. His recent suppression of resistant Creek factions in Georgia led to his
Florida assignment.72 He emphasized on capturing Indigenous hostages, both men and women,
in order to gain leverage during negotiations. U.S. troops continued to either destroy or harass
settlements, denying the Seminoles supplies and any respite. The general came to the conclusion
that the Black Seminoles were the true instigators of the war and that their cooperation was
necessary to end it. He famously remarked that he perceived the present conflict being primarily
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“a negro, not an Indian war.”73 This mindset led Jesup to share Thompson’s conclusion that
Seminole emigration could only occur if the Black Seminoles were guaranteed their freedom.
Simultaneously Black Seminole leader Abraham’s personal fortunes began to wane. He
had been temporarily separated from his family, his property seized, and he was dispossessed of
his certificate of freedom. Jesup had sent word that he wanted to meet with the interpreter.
When Abraham entered the general’s camp he overheard the soldiers remarking that he was “the
niger who was going to hang.”74 This comment exemplified the transformations occurring in
Florida and the restrictive cultural and racial space available to individuals perceived as “Black.”
There is a consensus among scholars that Abraham had adapted to Seminole culture on a far
greater scale than other Black Seminoles. He was an advisor to one of the leading headmen,
married a prominent Seminole woman, spoke an Indigenous language, and received a ceremonial
name.75 Within U.S. society his status among the Seminoles held little significance since
Abraham was imbued with blackness due to a system based on perceived innate biological
difference.
Racial discourse in the 1830s was in a transitional phrase as scholars debated multiple
origins of races and whether these groups were products of their environment or the result of
“inherent physical differences.”76 Previous to the nineteenth century, scholars generally agreed
that humankind shared an origin group but racial differences were the result of their respective
environments. This position also reconciled Christian beliefs stemming from the Book of
Genesis that all humans were descended from Adam and Eve. By the 1830s the rise of scientific
racism was evident with the popularity of Phrenology, the examination of racial groups and their
respective traits through the size of their skulls. Although later discredited, the study enjoyed
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academic legitimacy for the first couple of decades of its existence. More importantly authors
such as Charles Caldwell, Thomas Cooper, Thomas R. Dew respectively began to argue for the
existence of four distinct species of humans that were superior and inferior in relation to each
other. They believed that Caucasians were on the apex of a racial hierarchy and that other races
were incapable of “improvement” and “civilization.”77 Consequently in the 1840s the
miscegenation of different races was viewed as a debasement and weakening of the original pure
racial stock and should be avoided. Protecting whiteness was important since emerging white
working class identity was based on its juxtaposition with slavery and blackness.78 In the West
these ideas would support wars of expansion while in the South they served to justify the
continuation of slavery. During the early 1830s the Virginia legislature debated the gradual
emancipation of African slaves. Various speakers argued that Blacks were inherently inferior to
whites and could not be capable of being free members of society.79 As scientific racism became
more prevalent by the mid-nineteenth century, racial designations became more rigid and
stressed biological and cultural separateness.
A significant number of the U.S. officers and troops fighting in the Second U.S.Seminole War were southerners. Volunteer regiments were raised from the states surrounding
territorial Florida.80 In New Orleans a newspaper sought to arouse the local population by
stoking racial fears with the image of “1,000 able-bodied negroes, and about 600 runaways or
outlaws” among the Seminole ranks.81 Similar to the preceding military commanders Scott and
Call, General Jesup was also from the South. Undoubtedly these leaders and their troops viewed
the Black Seminoles through their cultural lenses. This would explain the racial epithet directed
against Abraham as he walked into Jesup’s camp. The Black Seminole interpreter realized that
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under U.S. society he was simply perceived as Black, and it was imperative for him to secure his
freedom if he was to survive his incorporation into the nation. Jesup was cognizant of Black
Seminoles’ fear of re-enslavement and would utilize these sentiments when seeking to strain the
Indigenous-African alliance.

Figure 6.4 Second U.S.-Seminole War description, 1826. Source: Mulroy, Freedom on the Border, 91.

Early negotiations between Jesup and the Seminoles were mired in distrust and only a
few representatives of the major Indigenous leaders went to the first meeting. Eventually
Abraham managed to arrange a meeting for March 4, 1837 which Jumper and representatives of
the prominent headmen attended. They met Jesup at Fort Dade on the Withlacoochee River.
Two days later both parties emerged with an agreement often referred to as the Treaty of Fort
Dade. As part of the accord there was an immediate ceasefire and the Seminoles agreed to
relocate by April. An important clause of the treaty guaranteed Seminole property, especially
their African slaves. Additionally, ambiguous wording in the treaty calling for peace between
“the Seminoles and their allies” implied that recent runaways were guaranteed their freedom or
passage to Indian Territory.82 While Jesup was within reach of ending the conflict in Florida he
nonetheless bent to pressure from planters to seize any African slaves among the Seminoles that
were not explicitly shown to have Indigenous masters. The general arranged with some
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Seminole headmen to turn over the slaves immediately before relocation commenced. Due to
the ensuing presence of Florida planters, many of the Africans became predictably alarmed and
began resisting their apprehension.83 Younger leadership, notably Asin Yahola, Coacoochee,
known as Wild Cat, and Black Seminole John Horse organized the departure of many of the
prominent Seminole leaders from the designated relocation areas. While Jesup managed to
capture a number of Seminoles and Black Seminoles he failed to end the war.84
Continuing Seminole militancy after the Treaty of Fort Dade was based on securing the
best possible terms, specifically a Florida reservation in the southern extremes of the territory.
Jesup had alluded to this possibility but in reality remained focused on capturing the Seminole
and Black Seminole military command and enforcing removal. He began utilizing the
unscrupulous method of using flags of truce and parleys to seize negotiators that had been
assured safe passage. Through this manner the U.S. managed to jail Asin Yahola, Coacoochee,
and John Horse in the Castillo de San Marcos, now renamed Fort Marion, in St. Augustine.
Micanopy had also entered into negotiations and was incarcerated and pressured to order his
followers to surrender. Concurrently, Coacoochee and John Horse mustered a daring escape and
after gathering support resumed their opposition. After a few indecisive engagements Jesup had
sought a negotiated peace instead of a protracted and costly struggle. In March 1838 the general
called together a number of Seminole and Black Seminole fighters and contemplated offering
them a Southern Florida reservation. Once his superiors dismissed the idea, orders were issued
to simply seize the groups that had congregated while awaiting the end of the negotiations.
Jesup had further fueled controversy when he offered freedom to any Seminole slaves
that surrendered. In so doing he directly contradicted the Treaty of Fort Dade, concluded the
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previous year, when the general had guaranteed the Seminoles their property rights. This led to a
confusing situation in which Seminoles having surrendered under the treaty maintained their
slaves in Indian Territory, and Africans that accepted the 1838 amnesty were to be relocated west
as free individuals and remain “part of the Seminole tribe.”85 Jesup’s decision to emancipate a
number of Black Seminoles proved to be an unpopular measure with local planters and later
ignited debate over the Black Seminoles in Indian Territory.86 He had already established a
precedent of sending captured Africans to Indian Territory, including the groups seized by Creek
forces.87
Years later, in the 1840s when the status of the Black Seminoles in Indian Territory
remained contentious, Jesup, then quartermaster general, wrote to the Secretary of State William
Wilkins. Jesup informed him that he had welcomed a delegation headed by Coacoochee and
Eufaula Micco, known as Alligator, who notified him of unfulfilled treaty stipulations. The
general’s letters to his superiors contained his recounting of his history in the Second-U.S.
Seminole War. He felt that U.S. mishandling of the removal process and the “constant
interference with their (Seminole) negroes” made his controversial decisions necessary.88 He
admitted his policies had caused much consternation but asserted the necessity of guaranteeing
the Africans their freedom and passage to Indian Territory. Convinced of their active part in
fostering resistance, Jesup argued that the Seminoles would not surrender unless the Black
Seminoles also submitted. He then elaborated on their service to the U.S. army as guards,
scouts, and interpreters, which he felt merited special consideration. Finally, the general
constructed a dubious legal argument to support his decision to free a number of Black
Seminoles. This rested on the Africans’ status as Seminole property when the U.S. army seized
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them. Jesup claimed that under the “laws of nations” as head of the army in Florida he was
entitled to the enemy’s property, apparently as spoils, and could dispose of the slaves as he saw
proper. He also felt that the decision “comported with the peace and honor of the American
people.”89
As commander of U.S. forces during the war, Jesup simply sought to divide the interests
of the Seminoles and Africans, effectively ending their cooperation and subsequently the war.
He was convinced that the Black Seminoles would force the Indigenous groups to resist as long
as they faced the threat of re-enslavement. Jesup quickly discovered that he was constrained
from seeking the outright seizure of the Africans because it would unravel any potential peace
negotiations. Tellingly, the general could not resist an attempted apprehension of the slaves after
the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Dade. Since this episode led to another intense year of
fighting, he probably concluded that he would have to guarantee the Africans passage with the
Seminoles to Indian Territory.
Nonetheless Jesup’s policies served to restructure the varied and multifaceted
relationships between the Seminoles and Black Seminoles. Within the Florida Borderlands,
Africans and Indigenous peoples had been allies, kin, master-slave, with various variants in
between. Once the U.S. through the Second U.S.-Seminole War extended its power and
jurisdiction over the entire territory, it sought to make both groups adhere to its racial order.
Black Seminoles such as Abraham had spent their lives interacting with Indigenous peoples and
other Africans, both recent runaways and others who had lived among the Seminoles for an
extended amount of time. These groups exhibited a great deal of racial and cultural diversity
depending on their specific situation. Many terms utilized for African and Indigenous peoples
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were inadequate for conveying the complex nature of identity and race during this transitional
period. Although utilized in this work, the designation of “African,” while rightly highlighting
African cultural contributions, de-emphasizes the cultural exchanges and adaptations that
certainly occurred. Simultaneously, the use of “Seminole” to describe all the Indigenous peoples
of Florida also glosses over the diversity among the Apalachicola, Mikasuki, Alachua, and Gulf
Coast peoples who become known as the “Seminoles.” Gauging a general identity that
accurately reflects all the Indigenous and African peoples in the region may not be feasible.
More certain is an examination of the identity and racial categories that colonial powers sought
to impose on subordinate peoples.
General Jesup’s peace overtures to the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles were couched
in the language of master and slave. Previous colonial powers had sought to project their power
over Indigenous and African peoples, but only the U.S. could devote the necessary resources to
do so. Even with significant military spending and numbers of troops, Jesup still needed to
separate Seminole and Black Seminole interests to accomplish the removal of both groups. The
Seminoles under the terms of the Treaty of Fort Dade were convinced to emigrate because as
slave owners they were guaranteed their property. A year later, the general offered Africans
their freedom from the Seminoles if they surrendered. These propositions placed both groups in
diametrical opposition with separate interests that ruptured previous interactions and
cooperation. Consequently in Indian Territory the Seminole-Black Seminole relationship
became increasingly strained, especially since they lived in closer proximity to other groups,
such as the Creek, who did practice chattel slavery and viewed the Black Seminoles more strictly
as property.
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6.4 Removal of the Ranchos
Racialization served to homogenize the sociopolitical diversity among African and
Indigenous people. While the U.S. sought to coerce the re-integration of the Seminoles with the
Creeks in Indian Territory, Florida’s Gulf Coast native peoples were also being forcibly placed
within the Seminole political structure. Since the British period in the 1760s, government
officials had been aware of a trade that existed between Southeastern Indigenous peoples and
Cuban fishermen. Commercial contacts had existed since the 1650s, when inhabitants of the
southernmost coast made quick voyages to Cuba to trade organic materials utilized for perfume
and received in return various iron implements.90 Over the next hundred and fifty years a
constant communication and exchange occurred between Cuban fishermen and various Gulf
Coast Indigenous peoples. This included the establishment of seasonal fishing bases or ranchos
comprised of members of both groups. The ranchos stretched from Tampa Bay and wrapped
around to the territory’s Atlantic coast. Gulf Coast towns traded deerskins and dried fish in
Havana for coffee, sugar, tobacco, and rum. A number of the Cuban sailors began to stay at the
ranchos on a year around basis and were known to have Indigenous wives. It was later reported
that children of these unions were sent to Havana to be educated and baptized.91 When the
British had reviewed the situation they determined the settlements posed little threat but still
occasionally garnered suspicion.92 British officials remained largely unconcerned especially
since their colony had not yet matured to effectively exploit these resources themselves.
Indigenous-Cuban fishing ranchos continued to operate after U.S. annexation in 1821
and proved to be a source of consternation to government officials. American fishermen as far
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as the U.S. Northeast began to ply their trade in Florida waters and even agitated for fees on their
foreign competition. William Bunce was one of an increasing number of U.S. citizens who
established fisheries on the west coast. The Maryland native was based in Tampa Bay and had
established one of the more successful ventures by selling dried and salted fish to Havana. He
employed ten Spaniards and twenty seamen Bunce labeled “Spanish Indians,” either because
they demonstrated a level of Spanish acculturation or were the progeny of Indigenous and
European parents.93 Local rancho populations were said to include Cuban men, their Indigenous
wives, children, and even grandchildren, which spoke to the longevity of the settlements. In
Charlotte Harbor, another active area south of Tampa Bay, there lived respectively sixty-five
Indigenous and Spanish men, thirty Indigenous women, and fifty to one hundred children.94 U.S.
officials suddenly focused on these groups as part of the larger movement of Seminole removal.
Indigenous fishing bases had demonstrated their independence from Apalachicola,
Mikasuki, and Alachua leadership and refused to abide by recent treaties. Indian agent Wiley
Thompson learned that the coastal settlements were refusing to live within the Seminole
reservation, which excluded any areas adjacent to the ocean. More significantly they disowned
any affiliation to the Seminoles and asserted that the Treaty of Moultrie Creek and Payne’s
Landing had no relevance to them. Judge Augustus Steele stated that the fishing villages had
never received part of the annual annuity and they were not “claimed by the Seminoles.”95
William Sturtevant’s ethnographic study of the Indigenous fishermen was unable to pinpoint the
ethnicity of these groups. He posits that they may have been descended from the Calusa, a group
that suffered a severe demographic decline in the previous century. Early theories suggested that
the fishermen were immigrants from groups such as the Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles.96
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Contemporary accounts were unanimous in their assessment that the coastal towns had adapted
to seafaring subsistence patterns and to their Spanish partners, especially in terms of language.
In all likelihood there was more contact between Havana and the ranchos than the villages had
with the Seminoles. Steele remarked that the “Indians and half-bloods,” were excellent sailors
and depriving them of their occupations created an untenable economic situation.97
Gulf Coast Indigenous peoples attacked the legal basis for their removal. However,
officials such as Thompson were hostile to these challenges because they threatened to unravel
the entire removal effort. Seminole leaders would be less willing to relocate if a substantial
group of Indigenous settlements were allowed to remain. Thompson informed Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Herring that he considered the principal headman of the coastal Indians to be a
man named Phillip. While the leader had not personally been given a part of the annuity, he had
been a recipient through “proxy.” Further, the agent argued that the fishermen represented an
entity within the larger Seminole political structure and that the Indigenous population was
accustomed to seasonal migration thus their presence on the coast did not signify their separate
status. Anticipating the contention that the population was Spanish and could not be sent to
Indian Territory, the agent held that the Spanish were “incorporated with the Indians not the
Indians with them.” Moreover Thompson demonstrated his disgust at what he perceived as
racial co-mingling by calling both groups “degraded.”98
By 1837 the Gulf Coast fishing outposts became Jesup’s concern as he sought to end the
Second U.S.-Seminole War and compel all Indigenous peoples to relocate. In March he had
negotiated the Treaty of Fort Dade and by April was anxiously watching the Seminoles enter
relocation centers in Tampa Bay. While this tenuous plan later unraveled because of efforts to
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seize runaway Africans, it was the ranchos that represented the first stumbling block to removal.
The general was confronted with a number of Indigenous women refusing to break up their
families by moving west. U.S. officials suggested that the women and children remain with their
Spanish husbands and that the men register as American sailors. This proposal failed to gain
traction because in a matrilineal society a husband lived with his wife’s family. Leaders from
the ranchos stated that they would not leave their female relatives behind and threatened to defy
Jesup. In response the commander decided to apply a precedent established with the Creek in
which “Indian families of Americans were compelled to remove.”99 He wrote to Bunce
informing him that the Indigenous fishermen were indeed Seminoles and under the Treaty of
Moultrie Creek they must be seized and taken west.100 During the year U.S. troops began raiding
the ranchos and forcing the Gulf Coast groups upon transports to New Orleans. Bunce’s
facilities and the other ranchos were raided and had their buildings razed.101
Around one hundred and fifty of the “Spanish Indians” were eventually taken to Indian
Territory while only a few individuals managed to avoid the voyage. The political, economic,
and social interaction between Southwestern Florida and Havana had been irreparably disrupted.
The nation-state no longer accepted the unregulated commerce and contact between a
subordinate group and a foreign power. Indigenous peoples were being transported to Indian
Territory were they could be better monitored and controlled. With little hope of success,
Spanish husbands of the Indigenous women sent a memorial to U.S. Secretary of State Joel
Poinsett requesting the return of their families. They claimed that as Spanish citizens prior to
1821 they legally could marry Indian women. After annexation they then became U.S. citizens
through the provisions of the Adam-Onís Treaty. However, rather than having their rights
316

respected, the U.S. seized their relatives “sparing none in whom any Indian blood was found.”102
This last appeal also failed to reunite the Spanish fishermen and their Indigenous partners and
children.
Jesup and U.S. policy sought to delineate and enforce the racial designations of “Black”
and “Indian” among Florida’s subordinate peoples in order to facilitate removal. In the Treaty of
Fort Dade, the agreement ignored the multifaceted political and socio-cultural arrangements that
characterized Seminole and Black Seminole communities. Jesup restructured their relationship
to one as master and slave, more closely approximating chattel slavery, and separated what had
once been their joint interests. Concurrently, the general then used military force to homogenize
independent Indigenous fishing ranchos with other Seminole settlements in order to remove
them. Intermarriage between the Florida Gulf Coast native peoples and the Spanish
demonstrated the threat of blurring racial lines and hostility directed towards mestizos. If the
Spanish were successful in arguing for their citizenship and in effect their whiteness then they
would have been able to afford protection to their Indigenous wives and children. However,
these families threatened the entire removal effort since their Indigenous relatives refused to
sever kinship networks. Jesup had decided that the success of the relocation was contingent on
being able to place individuals in rigid racial categories while undermining possible fluidity and
complexity. Although the Rancho populations had developed coastal subsistence patterns, close
connections with Havana, and political autonomy from the Seminoles, removal essentialized
them as “Indians.”
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6.5 Indian Territory
When Jesup relinquished his Florida command in 1838 to Zachary Taylor the war
continued as a protracted struggle with rarely any major engagements. Few Black Seminoles
remained among the Seminole fighters, while figures such as Abraham worked for the U.S.
Army. Africans served as interpreters and scouts charged with convincing or forcing recalcitrant
Seminole leaders to accede to removal.103 Abraham had assisted in convincing Eufaula Micco to
enter negotiations and remove in 1838. The Indigenous headman later returned from Indian
Territory to assist the U.S. by convincing the remaining leaders to emigrate. After a few more
years of the war, Coacoochee, one of the remaining resisting Seminole leaders, was seized and
transported west with his band.104 A parade of generals beginning with Taylor sought to end the
war but only managed to slowly gain a small number of prisoners, which they sent west.
However the protracted war proved costly, and U.S. officials yearned for its conclusion.
Consequently military commanders resorted to different tactics such as the use of Cuban
bloodhounds to track Seminoles in difficult terrain.105 U.S. agents had always known that the
most expedient method for ending the conflict was offering the remaining Seminoles a Florida
reservation. Although hesitant to utilize this option, in 1842 the U.S. ended its active military
operations and declared an armistice, content to allow the remaining bands to occupy
southwestern Florida lands, isolated from the Euro-American population. This was the case until
the 1856 Third U.S.-Seminole War resulting in headman Billy Bowlegs’ surrender to U.S. forces
further reducing the Seminole population in Florida.106 Once U.S. military efforts ended in 1858,
the Seminole leader Arpeika and scattered settlements were able to elude capture and remained
in the region of the Florida Everglades.
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Although Seminole delegations had been sent from Indian Territory back to Florida to
convince resisting bands to relocate, they often disclosed the appalling conditions in the west.
They struggled to grow a suitable crop in the early 1840s as food subsidies were dwindling.
A statement from Micanopy to Alex Cummings explained that the Seminoles had not been given
the territory they were promised and that various bands were living upon the present-day EastCentral Oklahoma lands of the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaws, and the Chickasaws. The Seminoles
were assigned alternative territory near the Deep Fork of the Canadian River but the terrain
suffered from “the scarcity of wood and water.”107 Creeks continued to occupy the area the
Seminoles expected to inhabit and various leaders such as Coacoochee refused to live among
them and instead resided near Fort Gibson within the Cherokee’s domain. Unrelenting fears of
Creek political dominance continued but did not completely displace internal leadership power
struggles, especially after the death of Micanopy in 1848. Interrelated with these issues was the
status of the Black Seminoles, who continued to draw the attention of Creeks and whites seeking
to gain possession of them. Seminole and Black Seminole settlements were now in close vicinity
to groups that practiced chattel slavery and viewed Africans simply as property.
Similar to debates in the 1820s, the U.S. government once more sought to clarify the
status of the Black Seminoles. Much of the confusion stemmed from Thomas Jesup’s handling
of the Second U.S.-Seminole War. Seeking to defuse the potency of the resistance he offered
guarantees to Seminoles under the Treaty of Fort Dade that their property would be protected
while later granting a number of slaves their freedom if they surrendered. In theory, individual
Black Seminoles’ status was dependent on the manner that they entered U.S. custody and
emigrated. However, many Africans claimed freedom through Jesup’s proclamation, but
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verification remained difficult without extensive documentation. Once the Black Seminoles
were in U.S. custody, officials contemplated whether the Africans were prisoners of war or
whether they should be considered the seized property of the combatants of the Second U.S.Seminole War. Shadowing these deliberations were constant complaints from Creek and U.S.
citizens seeking to claim the slaves.
When the first waves of Black Seminole fighters were transported to Fort Pike, New
Orleans, officials deliberated whether the Africans would proceed to Indian Territory. Early
arrivals consisted of the Black Seminoles that had been both captured by the Creek expedition
and Jesup’s initial military operations. White claimants in the city appealed to the civil
authorities and forced General Edmund P. Gaines to act as a defendant for the slaves and argue
that they were prisoners of war not under the jurisdiction of local courts.108 Orders from the
District Attorney of the United States Benjamin Franklin Butler held that all parties in the case
remain in New Orleans until the matter was settled. Eventually the Africans were sent to Indian
Territory but the matter of their status remained unsettled. U.S. officials still considered various
options even Jesup’s suggestion to Secretary of State Poinsett that “they (Black Seminoles) be
sent to one of our colonies in Africa.”109
Once greater numbers of Seminoles and Black Seminoles were sent to Indian Territory,
both groups were anxious to cement their status. Seminoles sought to have their ownership of
the slaves legitimized since they were vulnerable to the machinations of nearby slave holding
groups. This situation also motivated Black Seminoles such as John Horse to press the
government to validate Jesup’s offer of freedom. In midst of these difficult decisions Colonel
Gustavus Loomis, stationed in Fort Gibson, wrote Jesup informing him that the Black Seminoles
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wanted to leave their Seminole masters. He felt that the colonization of Liberia with the Black
Seminoles was an attractive option. Financial backing for the scheme, he reasoned, could come
from persuading charitable groups to demonstrate their “benevolence in transporting them (Black
Seminoles) to Africa where they can be free.”110 Brigadier General Arbuckle supported the
initiative and forwarded the letter to Adjutant General Roger Jones and suggested the possible
involvement of the American Colonization Society.111 Although colonization plans never gained
traction, they appealed to several officials and spoke to the racial attitudes of the period.
When the U.S. had experienced a rising number of free Blacks and slaves after the
American Revolution, African colonization emerged as a middle ground solution that had the
potential to unite sectional divisions. Virginia politician Charles Fenton Mercer formed the
American Colonization Society in 1816 because he feared the inability of free blacks to improve
their position in society. He predicted that they would then form a permanent vice-ridden
population that would de-stabilize the country. In contrast he believed that education could
uplift working-class whites.112 The American Colonization Society received support from a
broad section of the country. To abolitionists, the creation of the Liberia colony for free Blacks
represented an opportunity to promote absolute liberty. Meanwhile slaveholders were attracted
to the idea of expelling free Blacks, whom they perceived as a serious threat to the control of
their slaves. Unifying these respective groups was the underlying belief that “due to innate racial
differences, polarized societal statuses, and pervasive racism (whites and blacks) could not live
together in social harmony and political equality within the same country.”113
Colonization proposals contained many of the broader racial arguments that characterized
the debates over the status of the Black Seminoles. It served to unite both Loomis, a northerner
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from Vermont concerned with the improvement of the Black Seminoles, and Jesup, a Virginian
seeking to limit free Africans’ ability to disrupt the slave holding system.114 From various
sociopolitical perspectives the Black Seminoles represented a threat that various officials sought
to address. Indian agents worried that the slaves caused unending conflict between the
Seminoles and the Creeks, since the latter had shown interest in acquiring them. Regional
slaveholders objected to the subversive influence of autonomous free African communities upon
their own slaves. Racial discourse increasingly embraced the belief of innate racial differences
based on biology. U.S. officials believed that Africans’ inferior mental capabilities meant that
free Black settlements could be detrimental to the “civilizing mission” of uplifting natives from
savagery in Indian Territory. Simultaneously, sending Black Seminoles to Liberia, a region
whose cultural and political systems they were unfamiliar with, somehow made sense to Jesup,
Loomis, and Arbuckle. Accepting notions of innate racial characteristics meant that groups
maintained primordial sociocultural attributes that easily facilitated integration within
essentialized African societies. Conversely, this view also dictated that innate racial differences
meant that Black integration in white or Indigenous societies was difficult or impossible.
Although colonization appealed to many white Americans, it proved unfeasible for the
Black Seminoles. U.S. officials in the 1840s were still left to deal with individuals claiming
freedom through Jesup’s 1838 proclamation. They had sought and received shelter in Fort
Gibson as the Attorney General of the United States contemplated their eventual fate. Jesup had
become a defender of the Black Seminoles, writing justifications for his proclamations in hopes
that they would be honored while instructing the Fort Gibson commander not to release the
slaves to any claimants.115 Concurrently Harriet Bowlegs wrote to Subagent Marcellus Duval
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requesting that her slaves be returned to her since she had surrendered to Jesup and was
guaranteed her property.116 In 1847 Duval received the power of attorney from Seminole leaders
to secure the release of the slaves to their Indigenous masters.117 He embarked in zest upon his
lobbying of officials since he sought to gain financially once the Seminoles recovered their
slaves.118 These efforts were rewarded when Attorney General John Y. Mason nullified Jesup’s
1838 agreement because the “negro slaves had no power to contract, and therefore could not
enter into any treaty or convention.”119 Central to Mason’s argument, the Black Seminoles were
considered property and not prisoners of war. Indigenous groups could enter into nation-tonation arguments but African slaves were given no legal rights.
President James K. Polk and Secretary of War William L. Marcy endorsed the ruling and
asked that preparations commence to enforce its findings. In January 1849 Arbuckle released the
slaves from Fort Gibson, where a number of Seminole owners had gathered. Additionally a
number of Cherokees, Creeks, and Euro-Americans were present and claimed to have bought the
rights of a number of Black Seminoles.120 After the initial handover, 150 Black Seminoles under
the direction of John Horse were expected to travel to Seminole territory and settle at a
designated spot. When they finally left Fort Gibson in April they decided to establish a
settlement at Wewoka Creek contrary to the wishes of Seminole leadership. Duval soon became
irritated at the Black Seminoles’ independence and defense capabilities and promptly declared
them in a state of rebellion and proposed the use of the army to suppress them.121 Although
Kevin Mulroy argued that the Seminole-Black Seminole arrangement remained largely intact
from pre-removal era, U.S. policies had clearly racialized Africans as “Black” and only legally
recognized them as property.122 While colonization proved untenable and did not solve the
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dilemma of the presence of the Black Seminoles, Mason’s ruling did restructure their
relationship with the Seminoles to more fully comply with the U.S. racial order.
Seizure of the Black Seminoles represented only one of the many complications that the
Seminoles faced in Indian Territory. Potential Seminole subjugation to Creek authority
remained a major concern. In 1843, Seminole Subagent Thomas Judge informed Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Hartley that Creek headmen were unsatisfied with Seminole settlement
patterns. Little integration had occurred between both groups and the Seminoles were not
abiding by Creek laws. Many of the Seminoles in fact had refused to enter Creek territory
altogether.123 Judge proposed withholding the Seminole annuity in order to pressure the
Seminoles from Cherokee lands to assigned areas. During the following year Coacoochee,
Eufaula Micco, and John Horse led a delegation to Washington, D.C. primarily to seek a separate
territory from the Creek. In 1845 a new treaty essentially reinforced the existing arrangement,
which meant Seminole integration within the Creek Confederacy. In exchange for Seminole
promises to relocate, the agreement provided them more latitude in deciding specific locations
for their settlements within Creek territory. Although the Creek retained legal jurisdiction over
the Seminoles in terms of national policy, headmen were guaranteed authority over local matters.
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Figure 6.5 John Horse. Source: Kenneth W. Porter, The Black Seminoles, 135.

Micanopy’s death in late 1848 raised the question of succession and internal divisions
while the Seminoles continued resisting Creek authority. Although the new treaty was ostensibly
written to solve the Creek-Seminole impasse, it failed to give the Seminoles the level of
autonomy they desired. For Coacoochee the situation became unbearable when Jim Jumper had
succeeded him as the principal headman. Concurrently, John Horse and the Black Seminoles
under his command continued to suffer from insecurity and slave raids. Famously in 1849,
Coacoochee and John Horse led groups of Seminoles and Black Seminoles to Mexico and
reached an understanding with the Mexican government for both groups to serve as a border
militia. In the 1870s a detachment of Black Seminoles returning from Coahuila, Mexico to
Indian Territory were enlisted in the U.S. military near the U.S.-Mexico border. In effect these
bands of Seminoles and Black Seminoles were shifting with the border until they straddled the
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Southwestern Borderlands. They had come from a tradition of exploiting ambiguous political
and social spaces in which the power of the nation-state was marginal. Similar to Florida at the
turn of the nineteenth century, Indigenous and African peoples leveraged competing powers in
order to negotiate their own autonomy.

Conclusion
Coacoochee and John Horse’s decision to relocate to Mexico marked their strategic
withdrawal from Indian Territory where both leaders felt increasing pressure from internal rivals
and the nation-state. The U.S. had expended a great deal of resources in the Second U.S.Seminole War and the subsequent effort to remove the Seminoles and Black Seminoles.
Undoubtedly the war and U.S. officials’ policies represented the pivotal event when the
geopolitical Florida Borderlands were reshaped and the nation could project its power within its
territorial borders. Nonetheless Seminole resistance surprised and frustrated military
commanders who never grasped the significance of removal for Florida’s Indigenous and
African peoples. American rhetoric had justified relocation since the Seminoles were perceived
as being nomadic and recent immigrants to the area. Indigenous leaders contested that argument
when they spoke against removal and re-iterated their intimate connection to the land of their
ancestors. Equally significant, the U.S. continued to insist that the Seminoles become subsumed
under the authority of the Creeks. The latter represented a more numerous and potent political
entity and a number of their members had served as fighters in the Second U.S.-Seminole War.
They had captured a number of Black Seminoles and led the U.S. army to Seminole positions in
southern Florida. Continuing Creek claims of legitimate ownership over the Black Seminoles
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constituted a part of the larger struggle to rein in the Seminoles. Being affiliated with the
Africans gave the Seminoles an important resource, especially in terms of troops, in the
continuing effort to preserve their autonomy. Concurrently, the Black Seminoles were
combating their classification as “Black” and being consigned to the status of slaves and
property.
Racialization was central to the project of removing the Seminoles and Black Seminoles
and facilitated its success. General Jesup sought to end the conflict by separating the interests of
both groups and restructuring the nature of their relationship into strictly master and slave.
Abraham’s decision to assist U.S. negotiators to secure his freedom represented the difficult
choices that awaited the Black Seminoles. Although Abraham was an important advisor to a
principal Seminole leader and had adapted to Indigenous sociocultural systems, under U.S. law
his status was relegated to being chattel. While Jesup sought to create political and social space
between groups that had interacted frequently, he also homogenized Florida’s Indigenous
peoples as Seminoles. Rancho populations had witnessed much contact and intermarriage
between Gulf Coast peoples and the Spanish, which posed a threat to removal. Their ability to
assert independence from the Seminoles and the removal treaties nearly unraveled the relocation
of Indigenous peoples. Jesup decided to ignore their racial and cultural fluidity in order to
clearly delineate racial categories. The creation of Indian Territory and the discussion over
African colonization represented the dominant discourse of innate racial difference. U.S. polices
had sought to relocate subordinate peoples on the premise that essentialized “Black” and
“Indian” races existed. This social order replaced the diversity, complexity, and fluidity that had
characterized the Florida Borderlands at the turn of the nineteenth century.
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CONCLUSION

A year 2000 referendum election in the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma led to the passage
of nine constitutional amendments. Three of the proposed changes stripped the Seminole
Freedmen or Black Seminoles of their citizen rights in the Seminole Nation.1 However, the
Department of the Interior (DOI) asserted their oversight powers, specified in the 1969 Seminole
Constitution, and did not approve the results of the election and subsequently refused to sanction
the proposed changes. One year later, despite U.S. government objections, the Seminole Nation
disenfranchised the Freemen and barred their participation in an election for Principal Chief of
the Seminole Nation. Since the DOI vetoed Black Seminole expulsion, the Freedmen remained
marginalized tribal citizens while their eventual legal standing was debated during the following
years within U.S. courts and through a number of appeals. 2
At the turn of the twenty-first century a flurry of media attention focused on the plight of
“Black Indians,” their status within tribal nations, and questions of identity, in particular, one
New York Times article asked “Who is a Seminole, and who gets to decide?”3 Both the
Freedmen and the Seminole national leadership constructed vastly different narratives of the
ongoing dispute. Mainstream media outlets largely argued that the conflict was between Black
Seminoles and “blood Seminoles,” individuals who utilized blood quantum, in a manner similar
to the U.S. government, as a marker of their Indigenous identity. Although these groups had
“intermarried over the generations,” they drifted apart because of competition for resources
stemming from U.S. government settlement funds first being distributed in 1990.4 While these
articles acknowledged the presence of individual Black Seminoles who preferred to identify
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solely as African-Americans, they nonetheless provided testimonials and quotes from individuals
who felt their African and Indigenous ethnicity were ignored and their right to Seminole
citizenship marginalized. Wilburt Cudjoe, a self-identified Black Seminole, highlighted his dual
identity when he argued that, “his ancestor may have been Black, but he was very much a
Seminole.”5 Similarly Bud Crockett embraced Seminole Nation citizenship because he wanted
“a correct account of history” that cemented his “legacy.”6 Cudjoe, Crockett, and others bristled
at the notion that they sought monetary gain or personal attention. Journalist Jeff Guinn’s book,
Our Land Before We Die: The Proud Story of the Seminole Negro, published in 2005, included
an interview with Clarence Ward, who emphasized his Indigenous cultural heritage.7 Newspaper
articles sympathetic to the Black Seminoles offered a couple of reasons for the tensions between
“blood Seminoles” and Black Seminoles, namely greed and racism. New York Times reporter
Brent Staples posited that the Seminoles were an “Afro-Indian tribe” in denial and continued to
be “running from history” as the Black Seminoles sought justice. Furthermore, the Seminoles
wanted to expel African-Seminole members, and that these actions were “mean-spirited and
immoral.”8
The Seminole Tribal Council’s arguments and positions were only given a perfunctory
discussion in the many of the articles mentioned above. Despite the mainstream media’s
dismissal of Seminoles’ arguments for excluding individuals with African descent, their concerns
were not simply smokescreens for racism. All Indigenous nations and groups have struggled
with issues over inclusion and exclusion. As Phillip Deloria’s Playing Indian has shown, EuroAmericans appropriated Indian personas, grounded in stereotypes rather than actual
representations of native peoples’ cultures, in order to construct an American identity.9
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Unfortunately the process included individuals claiming an Indigenous identity with little desire
to participate and contribute to Indigenous communities. Echoing Deloria, Eva Marie Garroutte
cites the adherents of New Age spirituality as especially prone to appropriating Indigenous social
ceremonies and even identities. She states that “the cavalcade of self-identified people and
groups who improperly present themselves as representing the views, values, commitments, or
authority of entire tribes” is a cause of serious concern that merits action.10 These observations
shed light on the Seminole Nation’s concerns about individuals claiming a Seminole identity.
In the dispute between the Seminoles and the Freedmen, the Seminole tribal leadership,
in particular embattled Chief Jerry Haney, argued succinctly “If they don’t have any Indian
blood, or prove it, then they’re not looked at as Indians.”11 Despite their contest for leadership in
the Seminole Nation, Kenneth Chambers agreed with Haney over the issue of Freedmen
citizenship. He also invoked the issue of culture by stating that the Black Seminoles and
Seminoles had always remained separate and that the “two cultures never truly mixed.”12
Although in various newspaper articles Black Seminoles in Oklahoma stressed that their lives
were intertwined with the Seminoles, Chambers insisted that the Freedmen do not speak
Muscogee, cook Seminole dishes, and do not “welcome another harvest by stomp dancing and
signing into the night.”13 Ultimately Seminole leaders argued that the decision to establish
citizenship standards is essentially a question of sovereignty. They viewed the conflict within
the context of the larger struggle to protect and enhance Indigenous nations’ authority in the face
of U.S. policies. Specifically, in the Seminole-Black Seminoles dispute, the 1866 Seminole-U.S.
treaty pressured the Seminoles to include the Freedmen within the Seminole Nation. Meanwhile,
recent U.S. policy protecting Black Seminoles’ citizenship has been followed by rulings denying
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Freedmen access to U.S. court settlement funds given to the Seminole Nation for Florida lands.
Consequently U.S. policies have kept the Black Seminoles in the Seminole Nation but only as
marginalized members.
Scholarship on the eighteenth and nineteenth century Florida Borderlands is relevant to
present-day events in Oklahoma, especially in regards to studies centering on colonialism, racial
discourse, and identity. Both Freedmen and Seminole leaders have turned to history to support
their arguments about Black Seminole integration within Seminole society. More broadly
speaking, the events surrounding the potential Freedman exclusion from the Seminole Nation
speak to the ascendency of the U.S., political centralization among Indigenous groups, and the
development of racial categories deemed immutable and biologically distinct. This work argues
that processes associated with hardening racial designations, nationalistic discourse, and the
market economy operated throughout the Southeastern Borderlands.
In Florida, older Indigenous and Spanish political, economic, and social systems were not
initially displaced but were in constant dialogue and interaction with what Claudio Saunt has
termed the “New Order,” leading to a complex sociopolitical milieu. The lack of a dominant
discourse meant that different understandings and notions of race, nation, and economic
exchange were possible depending on the situation, time, and place. However, in the 1830s the
United States was able to fulfill the colonial project initiated by the British in the 1760s. While
the British never advocated a program of Indian removal, Governor James Grant clearly outlined
his goals of encouraging British settlement and the development of plantations based on African
slave labor. He viewed alliances and presents with the Lower Creeks and Seminoles as
pragmatic measures until the colony matured. Once power dynamics changed, British expansion
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would necessitate Seminole displacement if Grant’s vision for the colony were to be fulfilled.
Removal of the Seminoles meant that the nation-state could control its territorial borders and
secure property in the form of African slaves in order to support a plantation export economy. In
the drive to buttress physical borders, colonial powers sought to also strengthen metaphorical
boundaries between groups in order to facilitate control over them by undermining their
cooperation and shared resistance. Only the U.S. mustered the necessary power to racialize and
remove Africans and Seminoles while simultaneously conducting policies that enforced
categories such as “Indian” and “Black.”

Post-1850 Seminole-Black Seminole Relationship
U.S. policies centered on Indigenous peoples have been notoriously inconsistent and
contradictory, especially in the case of the Black Seminoles and Seminoles. Both American
citizens and government officials since 1821 sought to seize the Africans living among the
Seminoles and return them to a state of bondage. During the Second U.S.-Seminole War, 18351842, General Thomas Jesup undermined his negotiations with Seminole leaders when he
assisted planters in claiming Black Seminoles among the Seminole ranks. In the face of
considerable African and Indigenous resistance, Jesup had to cede the fallacy of his strategy and
reverse his position by removing the Black Seminoles to Indian Territory. While these decisions
served to maintain the Black Seminole presence among the Seminoles, they also served to
eventually make the former into subordinate members of the Seminole Nation. Black Seminoles,
in the eyes of the U.S. government, had been transported to Indian Territory as the slave property
of the Seminole and not under the more nuanced and complex terms of their previous
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relationship in Florida.14 In conjunction with U.S. policies, the Seminoles gravitated towards
nationalism and consequently notions of a primordial racial identity, which in the twentieth
century would further marginalize the Black Seminoles within the Seminole Nation.
In the years leading up to the U.S. Civil War, Black Seminoles’ status remained tenuous
due to the presence of Euro-American and Creek slave raiders. Scholars have debated whether
the Seminole relationship with the Black Seminoles was dramatically altered due to relocation to
Indian Territory. Daniel F. Littlefield states that the proximity of the Creek disrupted the affinity
and cooperation between both groups since others were more likely to view the Black Seminoles
as chattel.15 Meanwhile Kevin Mulroy argues that the “1850s saw a re-emergence of many of
the characteristics of pre-Removal Seminole-maroon relations.”16 Nonetheless, both historians
agree that the Civil War marked the emergence of a Seminole faction led by Heniha Mikko, also
known as John Jumper, that sympathized with the Confederacy. Although the majority of the
Seminoles remained pro-Union, the Confederate alliance generally enjoyed more support in
Indian Territory and managed to gain control of the area during the war. Consequently the proConfederate Seminole faction passed legislation re-enslaving free blacks within the Seminole
Nation. Once the Confederacy surrendered, pro-union Seminole groups and Black Seminoles
returned from their exile in Kansas to Indian Territory. The U.S. informed them that they needed
to enter into a new treaty, despite never having joined any of the Confederate factions. Federal
government officials held the Seminole Nation culpable and considered them belligerents in the
war due to the treaty between Heniha Mikko and the Confederacy.
Post-war treaties between the U.S. and the Indigenous groups emphasized the
emancipation of slaves and the abolition of the institution of slavery. The 1866 U.S.-Seminole
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Treaty stipulated that the freedmen should gain their liberty and “enjoy all the rights of native
citizens” within the Seminole Nation.17 While the Confederate faction had an opportunity to
reintegrate into the Seminole Nation they objected to the treaty article bestowing citizenship
rights upon the Freedmen. They demonstrated the extent to which they had internalized EuroAmerican racial discourse when they stated:
We know the abolition of slavery to be a fact throughout the United States. We are
willing to recognize that fact by the proper acts of our Council. But the proposition to
‘incorporate’ the freed negro with us on an ‘equal footing with the original members’ of
the Seminole tribe is presented to us so suddenly that it shocks the lesson we have learned
for long years from the white man as to the negro’s inferiority. We honestly think that
both the welfare of the Seminole and the freed negro would be injured if not destroyed by
such ‘incorporation.’18
The Confederate faction faced accusations of seeking to control their slaves as long as possible
while seizing the slaves’ property.19 Meanwhile, the loyal faction did not have the same
concerns over the integration of the Freedmen and were often praised by U.S. officials for their
cooperation. Passage of the agreement proved significant not only because of the consequences
for the Freedmen but because it also enabled the U.S. to annex two million acres of the Seminole
reservation. The Seminoles were then assigned two hundred thousand acres in central Oklahoma
from previous Creek lands as a new homeland.
With the passage of the 1887 Dawes Act, U.S. Indian policy heeded the call of reformers
to dissolve Indigenous communal land holdings and promote private property in order to
assimilate native peoples. A decade later, the Curtis Act extended the provisions of the Dawes
Act to the “Five Civilized Tribes,” such as the Creek and the Seminoles. Commissioners
proceeded to compile the Dawes Rolls, a list of individuals that would receive their own private
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land allotments. Officials separated the Seminole Nation into two categories, “Seminoles by
blood” and the Seminole Freedmen. Individual enrollees were then placed into either category
based on whether they were considered Black or Indian. Among the “Five Civilized Tribes” the
process of delineating whether a person belonged to the “blood” or Freedmen roll was often
complicated and difficult to ascertain, resulting in irregularities.20 However Mulroy argues that
since the Seminoles and Black Seminoles had maintained their sociocultural distance; the
creation of the “blood” and Freedmen rolls was unusually straightforward and accomplished in a
relatively short amount of time.21 Melinda Micco and Martha Melaku nonetheless maintain that
the process was inherently problematic because of the role of U.S. government agents in
constructing the list caused “opportunities for inaccuracies to occur.”22 They respectively note
that nineteenth century racial discourse held fast to notions of hypodescent and the “one drop
rule,” which meant that a person was considered Black even if they had a limited number of
African ancestors. Conversely, to be recognized as a “real Indian” meant being a “full-blood”
since a “mixed-blood” individual was viewed as a dilution of the original racial stock but
simultaneously capable of being civilized if the person had a Euro-American parent.
Consequently, after the allocation of land parcels, safeguards remained for “full-bloods” but not
for “mixed-bloods,” since the former was considered unacculturated and vulnerable. U.S.
officials conflated race, culture, and blood, and assumed that the amount of “Indian blood”
signified whether an individual retained a primordial Indigenous culture.
As expounded by various scholars, the Dawes Act had severe consequences for
Indigenous peoples beyond the disastrous land displacement that led to the creation of the State
of Oklahoma in 1907. Blood quantum, which was originally established to facilitate the land
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dispersal, became the preferred mode of legitimatizing a person’s Indigenous identity. It is
questionable that Freedmen at the turn of the twentieth century realized the full importance that
blood quantum would later assume. Certainly Mulroy notes a few cases where individuals
sought to be listed on the “blood” rolls because of the social and economic benefits they could
gain during that period. However he does note that Freedmen and Seminoles received the same
acreage in their land allotment.23 Equal land distribution and the difficulty of appealing
exclusion from the “blood” roll may explain the limited number of Freedmen challenges over
their status. However, the “blood” or Freedmen rolls were later utilized to determine whether a
person remained eligible for economic assistance and the legitimacy of their citizenship. Eve
Marie Garroutte illustrates how U.S. policy and internal Indigenous political and social
developments led to the utilization of blood quantum to confer group membership. As a result,
Indigenous communities have become divided among those who can and cannot satisfy the
“blood” quantum requirements for tribal membership.
Seminole and Freedmen relations markedly deteriorated after the 1930s. Regionally,
African Americans in Oklahoma had already been subjected to Jim Crow laws that segregated
Blacks, violated their voting rights, and targeted miscegenation. In 1921 Tulsa had experienced
a major incidence of racial violence when an African American Dick Rowland was arrested for
assaulting a white women. After a Euro-American mob failed to lynch the accused they turned
their attention to the African American community defending Rowland. Rioters had done
significant damage to Black neighborhoods and the unofficial death toll stood at several hundred.
Oklahoma was not immune to the broader trends of a period viewed as the nadir in race relations
exemplified by the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan outside of the South into the Midwest. These
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trends also manifested themselves in the Black Seminoles’ increasingly tenuous sociopolitical
standing among the Seminoles. Until the Great Depression, the Freedmen could access
Seminole economic resources and political system. Beginning in 1930 the Seminole Nation
sought legal action to limit Black Seminoles ability to draw upon joint Seminole property and
funds. A distinction was made between Freedmen’s membership in the Seminole Nation as
opposed to the Seminole Tribe, and only the tribe could receive financial assistance.24 The
“tribe” and the “nation” evolved historically among Indigenous peoples. Tribes have become
perceived as sociocultural groups bounded by “blood” or race, while nations are political units.
Scholars have had difficulty highlighting the precise moment when the Seminole-Black
Seminole relationship became deeply strained. The legal battles in the latter half of the twentieth
century clearly demonstrate the rifts between both groups were now firmly in place. Seminole
leadership continued to appeal for U.S. courts to accept the expulsion of the Freedmen or at the
very least their marginalization within the Seminole nation. Seeking to utilize the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act to redress the dissolution of the Seminole Nation under the Dawes Act, a
number of Seminole leaders wanted to adopt a new constitution that excluded the Black
Seminoles. Their objections stemmed from the perceived social distance with the Black
Seminoles and their resentment with being associated with the Freedmen’s blackness.25
Seminole leaders continued to strive towards a constitution, which was eventually adopted in
1969. Similar to previous efforts to draft a constitution, the federal government thwarted the
ouster of the Black Seminoles by citing the 1866 treaty and its guarantees of Seminole
citizenship to the Freedmen. Not only did the constitution include the Black Seminoles but it
also contained a clause stipulating that the U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs had to approve
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any amendments, including the expulsion of the Black Seminoles, before they could become
effective.26
Although Seminole efforts to expel the Freedmen failed, their drive to restrict access to
economic resources did meet with some success. In 1976, the U.S. Indian Claims Commission
awarded the Seminoles 16 million dollars for land taken by the United States in the 1823 Treaty
of Moultrie Creek. The fund had increased to 56 million dollars by 1990, when the money began
to be utilized for various programs and a small per capita payment to individual members.
However the U.S. and the Seminoles agreed that the Freedmen would not receive any benefits
from the settlement because as slaves they did not own land and should not be compensated.
Susan Miller states that the Black Seminoles were only members of the Seminole Nation after
the 1866 treaty and thus not eligible for compensation for events that occurred in the 1820s.27
Seminole arguments questioning Freedmen’s land ownership had begun earlier in the 1930s
when the Seminoles desired compensation for lands allotted to the Black Seminoles because of
the Dawes Act. While previous litigation had failed, in 1976 the Seminoles did gain U.S.
support for barring the Black Seminoles from accruing any economic benefit from the recent
settlement.28
In response to these developments, Sylvia Davis, a former representative of the Dosar
Barkus band on the Seminole Council, brought forth a lawsuit against the U.S. in 1994 after she
was denied a clothing stipend for her son from the settlement funds.29 Her case was dismissed
and the subsequent appeals were unsuccessful because the Seminole Nation was not a party to
the lawsuit.30 Their participation in the legal proceedings could not occur because of sovereign
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immunity. Efforts to have the U.S. Supreme Court hear arguments in the case ended in 2005,
and ensured the enforcement of the earlier rulings.
Within this context, the 2000 election had sought to implement the use of blood quantum
to regulate citizenship, voting, distribution of economic resources, and access to leadership
positions. Individuals needed to prove that they could meet the one-eighth blood quantum
necessary for admittance into the Seminole Nation. Eligibility for the tribal council continued to
be set at one-fourth mark; however, the previous exemption made for the Freedmen was
abandoned. In response to Black Seminole access to the financial resources of the nation,
Seminole leaders sought to settle the issue by revoking all Freedmen rights. While the U.S.
agreed with the Seminoles in the Davis case, it sided with the Black Seminoles over the
opposition to the newly passed constitutional amendments. The government’s positions
remained anchored in the 1866 treaty that guaranteed citizenship to the Freedmen and to its
ability to veto any changes to the Seminole constitution. Nonetheless, the Seminoles conducted
an election the following year under the guidelines established by the 2000 vote. As a result,
Black Seminoles’ votes were not counted, especially in the contest for principal leader, which
was won by Kenneth Chambers. His opponent, Jerry Haney, contested the results and gained
assistance from the U.S. government, which ruled that conducting the election under
amendments yet to be approved by the DOI was invalid. Although Haney had demonstrated his
support for excluding the Freedmen from citizenship in the Seminole Nation, he utilized their
lack of voting rights as part of his challenge to the election’s legitimacy.
Indigenous scholars have highlighted the continuing U.S. colonialism over groups such
as the Seminoles. In the case of the Freedmen, U.S. policies and decisions are responsible for
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the current impasse. Refusing to acknowledge the results of the 2000 and the 2001 elections, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs applied significant pressure on the Seminole Nation. They continued to
recognize Haney as the leader of the Seminole Nation and more significantly they suspended
federal funding to the Seminoles. The Seminole leadership reluctantly reversed its positions
once their lawsuit against the U.S. ended in disappointment. Freedmen retained citizenship in
the Seminole Nation, but their marginal position continued to stand as a source of conflict. BIA
intervention did prevent Black Seminoles’ expulsion from the nation but also it served to
replicate U.S. racial hierarchies in the sense that the Freedmen were still denied access to
settlement funds. Similar to the position of African Americans in larger American society, the
Black Seminoles possessed political rights but not access to economic resources, which
contributed to their marginalization. While the current struggle has unfortunately been presented
as the Seminole Nation against the Freedmen, it is vital to recognize how the legacy of
colonialism, particularly racial hierarchies, was a vital component to the present situation.

Making Africans and Indians
At the center of the Seminole and Freedmen dispute is the emergence of Indigenous
nationalism, rigid racial discourse, and the conflation of “blood,” culture, and citizenship. While
scholars such as Mulroy assert that the present conflicts are largely due to the events of the
twentieth century, specifically the post-1930 debates over the governments formed under the
Indian Reorganization Act, this work argues that the tensions between people of African and
Indigenous descent are rooted in larger processes beginning in the eighteenth century. In
particular, the rise of the nation-state, racialization tied to a slave economy, and Seminoles’
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incorporation of U.S. racial categories shaped contemporary notions of race and identity. At the
beginning of the British colonial occupation of Florida, various bands of Lower Creeks had
migrated into the territory where remnants of more established native peoples lived.
Simultaneously, Indigenous ranks were augmented by various groups of runaway slaves from
regional plantations. These respective groups formed politically autonomous settlements
centered on kinship and ethnic diversity. Although four broad Indigenous groups were based in
Florida, the Alachua, Mikasuki, Apalachicola, and Gulf Coast peoples, the Spanish and the
British labeled all of them as “Seminoles” in order to facilitate treaty agreements. Despite the
problems caused by mislabeling, stable relations with these groups were important in order to
establish a plantation export economy, which in turn facilitated increasingly stark notions of
blackness. Although Africans in Florida came from different areas they became racialized as
Black through various laws and edicts that conferred slave status upon them and restricted the
rights of free Africans.
The Southeastern Borderlands at the turn of the nineteenth century was in the midst of a
significant transformation because of the market economy, Euro-American notions of property,
the impact of rigid racial categories, and political centralization. Across northern Florida more
established Spanish and Indigenous social, economic, and cultural systems were not completely
displaced by the processes mentioned above. In some cases different ideas about race existed
simultaneously, for instance, when British officials first utilized terms such as red, negro, and
white in their correspondence with the Seminoles. While the former viewed these terms as racial
classifications, the Seminoles only later adopted them as racial designations. This was also the
case when Spanish and Euro-American planters living in the same area adhered to different types
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of slavery. Florida represented an ideological borderlands due to its geographical position and
easy accessibility, unlike other areas that had been somewhat isolated in the Spanish North
American Borderlands. Emergent ideas interacted and were in dialogue with more traditional
beliefs, resulting in a complex and fluid situation where no specific discourse was dominant.
Integral to this work’s larger arguments is an emphasis on the analytical continuities
between British, Spanish, and U.S. colonialism. The British had sought to establish a colonial
model, which they had clearly articulated through government sources and texts published by
various authors. They sought to establish stable relations with the Seminoles and limit their
territory to the interior. Indigenous groups retained considerable autonomy under this
relationship. British officials conceded power to the Seminoles because they were not currently
in the position to increase their presence in the territory. Additionally the British understood that
economic development of the colony hinged on the utilization of African slaves and the
construction of plantations. Native peoples’ seizure of plantation property and especially slaves
undoubtedly posed a threat to these economic policies. Consequently the British engaged in
diplomacy with the Seminoles and utilized the language of the Southeastern Borderlands, which
had become infused with recently developed racial designations. British-Indigenous relations
and the development of plantations and blackness were not isolated developments but illustrate
how colonialism in Florida and its impact on the Seminoles and Africans was interrelated.
Scholars have minimized the relevance of the British period upon the subsequent
resumption of the Spanish colonial project. However, after 1784, St. Augustine remained the
only true Spanish bastion in Florida. Previously individuals were classified according to their
sociocultural standing, which included factors such as religion, language, and economic class.
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However, in the Second Spanish Florida period, 1784-1821, the missions in the interior of the
province had faded and were replaced by British traders. Panton, Leslie, and Company, which
did not deal in spiritual salvation but rather property by commodifying deerskins and trading
them for manufactured goods from London. They served as Spanish agents while interpreting,
advising, and representing colonial governors and their administrations. In addition to British
merchants, Spanish officials encouraged Euro-American planters from surrounding Southern
U.S. states to immigrate into Florida. The Spanish lacked the political and military power to
support the colonial project first outlined by the British.
European colonialism before 1821 remained limited, even as it sought to homogenize and
racialize Seminoles and Africans. Despite the diversity of Indigenous peoples, including
Muscogee and Hitchiti speakers, over time through treaties and negotiations these groups came
to be known as Seminoles: a development counter to their history of political decentralization.
Equally significant, African slaves beginning with the British period were relegated to the status
of Black and consequently slaves. Previously Africans had been considered indentured servants
and not inherently inferior to the Europeans. In the Southeastern Borderlands there was a
vigorous Indian slave trade until the middle of the eighteenth century, when slavery then became
synonymous with blackness. Laws written at the end of the British period sought to secure
African slave property. Even under the Second Spanish period, edicts severely restricted the
rights of the African population because they were viewed as a threat. Both Indigenous and
African peoples sought to resist these racial categories by defending their autonomous
settlements and continuing to adhere to locally based identities centered on kinship. Black

351

Seminoles in particular resisted their status in both U.S. and Spanish settlements by finding
refuge among the Seminoles and developing their hybrid identity.
Due to a complicated geopolitical position, the British and the Spanish had a limited
ability to project economic and political power in Florida. Emergent nationalist discourse and
efforts at political centralization gained traction in the Southeastern Borderlands during the late
eighteenth century. However, the rise of the U.S. nation-state during the mid-1830s led to the
fulfillment of the colonial project first envisioned by the British. U.S. officials initially restricted
the Seminoles to an interior reservation while middle Florida witnessed the growth of cotton
plantations. Within a few years the Florida territorial government felt that economic
development and the use of African slaves was impossible because of the presence of Indigenous
peoples. The nation-state could not tolerate a threat to its control over territory posed by
autonomous Indigenous and African settlements. Equally distressful was the belief that the
Seminole and Black Seminole relationship of cooperation and intermarriage challenged U.S.
racial order and hierarchies. During the Second U.S.-Seminole War, the military sought to end
the resistance by separating and dividing both groups by firmly situating them within the racial
categories of Indian and Black. This was done through negotiations and agreements, which
placed the Seminole as slave masters and Black Seminoles as slaves despite the fact the
Seminole had not adopted chattel slavery. The U.S. made contradictory offers to the Seminoles
to guarantee their property while the Black Seminoles received an opportunity to gain their
liberty if they surrendered. Positioning each group as either master or slave effectively divided
their interests, created social space, and thus helped homogenize Blacks and Indians into two
broad racial designations.
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As illustrated by the points above, Florida was at the nexus of various processes, colonial
administrations, and Indigenous and African Diasporas. Unfortunately scholars have simplified
this complex and multifaceted history by emphasizing the colonial or national periods. More
recent works have emphasized a number of fields such as the African Diaspora, American Indian
History, the Spanish Borderlands, and U.S. History, but they continue to simplify complex
issues. This work both contributes to and problematizes a number of historiographical trends by
advocating for a Borderlands perspective that incorporates various fields and colonial sources
while seeking a multi-dimensional understanding of colonialism, racial discourse, and identity by
moving across standard time periods and thematic categories. Saunt’s criticism of Spanish
Borderlands framework stemming from the limited ability of the Spanish to project their power
or shape events outside the hinterlands of St. Augustine calls for an important adjustment.31 A
Borderlands framework examining Florida history must not remain centered on the Spanish but
must incorporate Indigenous peoples as well other European and Euro-American groups. The
Spanish were only one of many groups struggling to preserve their autonomy and promote their
agenda.
Power relations among the various groups were evenly distributed among the Spanish,
Alachua, Mikasuki, and Apalachicola. Although the Lower Creeks and later the United States
were significant political and military entities, their distance from Florida temporarily mitigated
the threat to the province. The Seminole and Spanish alliance, which also encompassed the
Black Seminoles, was based on the precarious situation faced by these parties. Spanish colonial
administrations faced danger from the United States while the Seminoles had to protect their
newly established independence from the Lower Creek. Africans living among the Seminoles
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also made alliances to protect their freedom. Thus, a Borderlands framework is best situated to
demonstrate that Indigenous, African, and European struggles in Florida were interrelated and
should be examined together. Current colonial and national frameworks for Florida history at
the turn of the nineteenth century are inadequate in encapsulating the complexity of life on the
ground in the borderlands.
Utilizing a Borderlands model facilitates a historical analysis that spans the tenure of
multiple nations, cultures, and peoples in Florida. This work especially emphasizes the shortlived British period, which only lasted twenty years but left an impression on its colonial
successors. Previous work on British Florida such as Cecil Johnson’s text on British West
Florida and M.L. Mowat’s book about East Florida simply recounted the events of the era with
little analysis. They contribute to the belief that the British period was too brief to have a lasting
impact and thus should be secondary to the Spanish resumption of power over the area.
However short their reign, the British had outlined a colonial vision for the province and began
to take the steps to realize their goals. Governor James Grant orchestrated a peace treaty with the
Seminoles at the 1765 and 1767 Picolata Congresses, which outlined the parameters of
Seminoles’ relationship with European powers until 1821. Their efforts to map out and develop
the area through the nurturing of a plantation export economy and African slave labor would
resemble efforts by later ruling governments. Having a more concrete influence on the Florida
Borderlands, British traders linked the Indigenous deerskin trade in the Southeast to a Caribbean
entrepôt tied to manufactured goods from London warehouses. In the latter days of the British
regime, the Panton, Leslie, and Company dominated trade among the Seminoles and Lower
Creek.
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When the Spanish returned to Florida they reached an agreement with the British traders
who served as an important link to the Seminoles. Merchants John Hambly and John Forrester
were stationed in company stores where they exchanged goods with Indigenous clients and
supervised the work of African slaves on adjacent lands. They also served as important Spanish
agents when they provided intelligence of Indian Territory while also transporting and
interpreting talks between Indigenous leaders and Spanish governors. The language of
Southeastern diplomacy and racial discourse was filtered through their cultural lens.
Highlighting the role of Panton, Leslie, and Company demonstrates some of the differences
between the First Spanish Florida period and the Second Spanish Florida period. This work
problematizes scholarship that posits that Spanish notions of race and slavery in Florida
remained unchanged after 1783. While the province served as refuge for runaway slaves in the
First Spanish Period, by 1790 the policy had been officially terminated. Jane Landers argues that
the exodus of slaves from the British colonies and later the United States into Florida clearly
illustrated that African slaves gained agency and opportunities under the Spanish system of racial
classification and slavery. However, this work addresses the fact that a substantial number of
runaway African slaves among the Seminoles were from Spanish settlements such as St.
Augustine and Pensacola. Perhaps the biggest example of this occurred in the famous 1816
“Negro Fort” incident, which scholars often present as a major slave rebellion. However, a
significant number of the slaves in the fort were from Spanish West Florida, and an unknown but
significantly smaller group from East Florida. When the Spanish and Panton, Leslie, and
Company representatives sought to convince the slaves to return to their masters rather than
remain in such a desperate situation, they refused. The dichotomy between a rigid racial order
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among the British and U.S. as opposed to a more malleable and fluid Spanish system during this
period should be questioned and problematized.
One of the larger historiographical debates over the Florida Borderlands concerns the
relationship of the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles. Kenneth Wiggins Porter first sought to
classify the relationship as “democratic feudalism,” and several scholars such as Kevin Mulroy
and Landers have generally agreed with that assessment. They argue that the Seminoles and
Black Seminoles generally maintained a sociocultural separation while cooperating on economic
and military matters. Miller is more adamant in her belief that both groups were temporary allies
and that Porter overstated the relationship that existed. However, other scholars have
emphasized the cultural hybridity and transculturation between Seminoles and Africans. J.
Leitch Wright Jr. went further than most scholars in his argument that many “Indian-Negroes
were essentially Indians and not Africans” and that “blacks had been absorbed or acculturated by
the Muscogulges.”32 Mulroy noted that Africans had lived in separate towns away from the
Seminoles. However, Micco argues that this does not automatically imply a sociopolitical
distinctness because “this pattern of town structure followed the organized settlements modeled
after the Creek Confederacy.”33
The disparity among various interpretations of the intimacy between Seminoles and
Black Seminoles is based on two main factors. First, Black Seminoles occupied a multitude of
positions among the Seminoles that ranged from recent runaways in autonomous settlements, to
Africans that had Seminole kin that married into numerous clans. This makes it difficult to
generalize or provide an all-encompassing term such as “democratic feudalism” to define this
relationship. Second, scholars’ interpretations are hindered by the limited nature of the
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documentary record. While governors and Indigenous leaders are represented in the historical
record, information concerning individuals of lesser sociopolitical stature is difficult to obtain.
Records from colonial officials and traders would typically only focus on prominent members of
the community with scant attention to non-elites. Many colonial sources were written by traders
and officials either unconcerned or unwilling to see the complex nuanced identity of the Black
Seminoles and often labeled these individuals as simply slaves of the Seminoles or Negros de los
Indios. Some scholars use these documents to argue that intermarriage between Seminoles and
African was largely a “myth” that, if it occurred, was relegated to leaders and “high-profile
individuals.”34 In contrast, I argue that a borderlands perspective that focuses on cultural
intermixture and hybridity, and that moves beyond the histories of nation-states and colonial
powers, can emphasize the complexities of the relationships between various people “on the
ground.” A number of scholars agree that the Black Seminoles and their descendents eventually
underwent an ethnogenesis and developed an identity based upon their distinctive history.
Although generating less debate than the issue of the Seminole-Black Seminole
relationship, this work also argues that more attention should be directed towards the territorial
period after U.S. annexation of Florida. The majority of scholarship on Florida after 1821
focuses on the Second U.S.-Seminole War since the conflict was costly for the U.S. and
manifested an impressive display of Seminole and Black Seminole military resistance.
Nonetheless, the years preceding the conflict were vital in establishing the Seminoles as a
“domestic dependent nation” within the U.S. With the expansion of the nation-state came the
drive to control territory and people within demarcated boundaries. U.S. officials sought to
control Seminoles’ physical movements and to restrict Indigenous groups to reservations. This
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period also contains various U.S. citizens’ slave claims upon the Black Seminoles, many living
within Indian Territory. These valuable sources not only shed light on individual African slaves
but also illustrate how the nation-state sought to enforce racial hierarchies by re-enslaving Black
Seminoles.
While this work engages with the established historiography of the Florida Borderlands,
further emphasis on questions of identity are merited, especially with the consultation of
additional sources. Slave claims from the territorial period after 1821 provide rare insight into
the lives of runaway Africans among the Seminoles. Access to other claims from holdings such
as the St. Johns County archives yield more information. Apart from the textual record, oral
histories can provide scholars with an opportunity to improve sociocultural analysis. These
resources would be necessary in order to supplement the perspective gained from colonial
officials and Indigenous leaders and shed light on non-elites. More importantly, this study
presents a broad overview of the Florida Borderlands from the 1760s to the 1830s, which would
be well served by further emphasis on individuals and family history, to demonstrate how racial
discourse and identity formation function on a local level. The benefit of this analysis is its
potential to offer further insight into the Seminole and Black Seminoles relationship.

Contemporary Significance
As mentioned above, gauging the sociopolitical position of the Black Seminoles within
and near Seminole settlements remains a significant but difficult topic to examine. Further
complicating scholarly research in this area are the political implications of such work. As
recognized by students of historiography, scholars are often affected by contemporary events
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while they craft their historical analysis. Specifically, the ongoing conflict between the Seminole
leadership and the Freedmen can politicize one’s findings since both sides have sought to
buttress their arguments through historical evidence. While scholars have undoubtedly strived to
ground their interpretations in data and discernable facts, post-modern scholars have successfully
illustrated the fallacy of claiming pure objectivity. This further complicates the challenges
facing historians even as it saves their work from being classified as simple academic exercises
with little meaning or significance. Simultaneously scholars must realize that their work will
have concrete consequences in debates that affect individuals’ lives.
On an immediate level, the Oklahoma Seminole and Black Seminole dispute is centered
on the distribution of settlement funds and changes to the Seminole Nation’s constitution in order
to utilize blood quantum to decide citizenship. More broadly speaking, the impasse concerns the
development of Indigenous nationalism and the struggle for sovereignty over questions of
identity, group membership, and citizenship. Members of the Seminole Tribal Council have
argued that attempts to amend their laws represent a movement to claim the rights of a nationstate to set its own criteria for citizenship. Indigenous Nations continue to fight to gain
autonomy and sovereignty because they are still considered “domestic dependent nations” under
the oversight and jurisdiction of the U.S. Thus the ruling by the DOI in the 2000 election
represents the curtailing of sovereignty and the continuing manifestation of U.S. colonialism.
When the Seminoles coalesced into a political entity in the late eighteenth century, they
formed a loose confederation mainly during conferences where important matters such as treaties
and defense were discussed. European powers and individuals such as William Augustus
Bowles injected nationalist discourse in the Florida Borderlands in hopes of facilitating their own
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agendas. Colonial regimes desired to elevate Seminole headmen to positions of “chief” so that
they could sign treaties that could then be applicable to all Indigenous groups in the region.
Although this did unintentionally serve to lay the seeds of a Seminole nationalism, which the
Seminoles would also shape through their own sociopolitical traditions, they largely remained
groups of politically decentralized and autonomous settlements until removal. U.S. policies,
such as the Indian Reorganization Act, have sought to impose a nation-state model upon native
peoples. Indigenous groups have adopted this framework in order to resist U.S. colonialism.
While the Seminoles did not simply replicate a nation-state model exactly similar to EuroAmerican nations, they did begin to associate the nation with a primordial race. Thus the recent
efforts to expel the Black Seminoles can be perceived as an effort to preserve an imagined
pristine Seminole race due to the belief a nation consists of a homogenous people. This has
occurred despite the Seminoles’ well-documented history of ethnic and cultural diversity. Aside
from the issue of sovereignty, the Seminole leadership has justified the expulsion of the Black
Seminoles on the grounds that have are not culturally assimilated and are outsiders to the
Seminole Nation.
Scholars have critiqued Indigenous groups’ utilization of the nation-state framework. On
one hand they note that the nation has served as a counter hegemonic force against colonialism
but which also promotes controversial policies. Garroutte cites Taiaiake Alfred who argues,
“sovereignty introduces foreign values” and “destroy those communities’ original foundations,
and may lead to unnatural and divisive distinctions among tribal members who occupy different
legal statuses.”35 Basically, Garroutte and Taiaiake argue that sovereignty and blood quantum
are recent developments that are contrary to Indigenous historical traditions. In the conflict
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specifically dealing with the Seminoles and the Black Seminole this is also the case. While
Landers and Micco do not argue that Black Seminoles should be regarded as Seminole Indians,
they make a case that the distinct and shared history between both groups should be considered
in the Black Seminoles appeal for financial assistance and citizenship. They highlight the joint
resistance and cooperation between both groups to ward off removal at the hands of the U.S.
Landers asserts that while the U.S. government labeled the Black Seminoles as chattel, they were
indeed property owners like the Seminoles, thereby implying the Freedmen deserve participation
in the recent land settlement.36 Micco’s interpretation of both groups’ history affirms that the
“Seminole Freedmen and their ancestors were a meaningful part of the Seminole Nation from its
founding in the Southeast.”37 Whether or not significant intermarriage or cultural exchange
existed between both groups, scholars agree that the Black Seminoles constituted a part of the
larger Seminole political entity.
The issue of defining citizenship remains a contentious issue not only for Seminoles but
also for all Indigenous peoples. Garroutte advocates that native peoples in general should
replace blood quantum as the marker for citizenship and Indigenous identity. Rather she
supports a modified notion of kinship that continues to value “genealogical” relations and
simultaneously creates a mechanism for the adoption of others. Group and national membership
should be based upon an individual’s contribution and participation in Indigenous
communities.38 Since this work has focused on the Florida Borderlands, there has been an
emphasis upon the conflicts within the Seminole Nation. However, the Seminoles are not the
only group dealing with issues of race, identity, the nation-state, and membership criteria. These
issues concern many different communities. While the situation of the Seminoles and other
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Indigenous peoples is distinct to that of other ethnic and racial minorities in the U.S., all groups
in some form must face questions of how they define themselves and whom they consider
legitimate members. These populations also broadly share a historical legacy of colonialism that
created the racial designations that continue to shape their lives today.
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